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Abstract
In an oil exporting developing country the issue of how to stabilise the domestic
economy from oil market volatilities has been a big concern for both scholars and
policy makers during the last two decades. Modelling the behaviour of key arguments
involved in the transmission mechanism of oil revenues into the domestic economy is a
necessary introduction to dealing with this problem.
On the specification point of view, previous empirical works in this area show little
concern over a process that takes the variables back to their steady state positions.
This leaves long run equilibrium values of the variables involved in this processes
undefined.
This thesis attempts to provide a careful analysis with empirical evidence of the issue
of the macroeconomic effects of oil revenue fluctuations on key economic variables
such as domestic and foreign prices, money demand equation, exchange rates and non-
oil gdp growth set in a Dutch Disease framework for the Iranian economy during
1960-1990 period. The analysis, using annual data, employs modern econometric
techniques (such as cointegration and error correction) to examine dynamics (short
run) and static (long run) components of:these variables in connection with oil revenue
fluctuations. Two modified versions of the Purchasing Power Parity and conventional
money demand relationships are used to model black market exchange rate and
monetary aspects of oil revenue changes, respectively. To model domestic price
movements, we experiment with 2 long run equilibrium positions, inverted money
demand function and reversed PPP relationship.
PPP appears as a valid model of the long run black market exchange rate and domestic
prices determination. We also find strong supportive evidence for conventional model
of real money balances.
The main conclusions are: increases in oil revenue (i) depress black market exchange
rate asymmetrically; (ii) suppress domestic inflation directly and then pull it up
indirectly through higher foreign inflation and a more depressed exchange rate; (iii)
have a contractionary effect on non-oil real gdp growth; and (iv) change real money
balances with a small elasticity.
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Many problems of oil-exporting developing countries (0EDCs) can be seen as issues
relating to managing the economic rent stemming from oil production. Oil revenues
aside, many of the oil exporters are still characterised by the major features of less
developed countries (LDCs): insufficient infrastructure, limited endowments of skilled
labour, inadequate developmental institutions, widespread illiteracy, and a large
proportion of the population in economic sectors where productivity remains low. Oil
revenues remove only one constraint to development, the financial one.
A massive petroleum boom represents opportunities 1 for accelerated development of
the domestic economy on one hand, and serious problems of adjustment on the other
hand.
Acquiring large amounts of foreign exchange revenues from oil exports is a
considerable economic opportunity to remove financial obstructions. However, it also
tends to reduce the urgency of motivating and expanding non-oil export industries - the
industries that inevitably have to take the responsibility of providing the foreign
exchange if oil revenue falls in the future - and so these industries often stagnate.
Keeping an 'artificially' overvalued exchange rate is usually used as an essential
instrument to encourage the import of capital and intermediate goods 'and also to keep
food prices down in the politically sensitive urban centres' (Pesaran, 1982 p. 510).
'The oil industry is important in development programmes of these countries largely because it
provides a source of easily controlled and easily mobilised revenue for government and a supply of
foreign exchange greatly in excess of what the indigenous industries could possibly earn, and not
because it transmits its dynamism directly to the rest of the economy.
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Sluggishness in the rate of expansion of the traditional and agriculture sectors and also
in small -scale and self-employed activities are expected to be the likely disadvantages
of such policy. The persistence of an overvalued exchange rate, which is more feasible
in an oil-exporting country can also destroy any chances for non-oil economic sectors
(including industrial sector itself) to gain access to international markets to export their
products, a problem which is rarely felt in an oil-exporting country. This is one of the
reasons why the effect of oil income in an oil-exporting country is treated as
paradoxical in some parts of literature (Karshenas, 1990 and Karshenas and Pesaran
1995).
For a country with a volatile and out of control source of foreign revenues finding a
stable economic situation in domestic and foreign markets deserves an overwhelming
task. Identifying, specifying and evaluating the behaviour of the leading arguments
involved in the main stream of the economic process is at least a worthy introduction
to such a task.
The argument of how an OEDC can get rid of oil market shocks or eliminate the
ensuing effects resulted from those shocks, is and has been frequently put forward by
policy makers and scholars in such countries.2
In this study we intend to investigate some aspects of Iranian economy, as one of the
most important oil exporter developing country among 12 major OEDCs, 3 in
connection with oil revenue fluctuations during 1960-1990 period.
The role played by boom sector in Iranian economy is both straightforward and
complicated. It is straightforward in that any random investigation of the historical
record readily shows that oil exports is the most dominant item in the country's export
sector. Equally, revenues from oil dominate the government's fiscal resources. The
modern history of development planning in Iran is largely an analysis of the utilisation
of oil revenues and any credits that could be raised for the creation of new assets.
2 'Independent - of - oil economy' is a repeated doctrine in these countries, especially when they face a
considerable crash in the oil market.
3The 12 major oil exporting countries are Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Nigeria, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. (IFS)
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Drawing general conclusions about the sector's impact on the overall economy is much
harder to judge, however. Many links that may exist between the boom sector and the
rest of the economy are not generally as perceptible.
Quantification of the nature and degree of the petroleum sector's impact on the
economy should provide some help toward an understanding of the mechanisms
underlying developments which have occurred in Iranian economy during last decades.
The main questions addressed in this thesis are: (a) What have been the likely effects of
the oil fluctuations on exchange market and how the short and long-term behaviours of
exchange rates could be explained in the whole period under consideration and in pre
and post-revolutionary periods separately? (b) Has oil laid a basis for self-sustaining
growth at a higher rate than would otherwise have been possible? This appears to have
been the main goal of all oil producer governments. Or, have the difficulties of
economic management through fluctuating income severely reduced the benefits of oil
windfalls, and resulted in increased oil dependence. Monetary and inflationary aspects
of oil windfalls should also be discussed.
Our aim is not to provide a detailed and comprehensive picture, an objective which, in
the light of deficiencies of the data available seems very hard to attain, but to focus
upon those features which can help us to understand the main forces and players
attributed to this process.
Such works have been discussed, mostly analytically, in the context of Dutch Disease
(DD) theory.
The DD full employment model of adjustment predicts several consequences of an oil-
led boost in the domestic economy. First, real exchange rates will appreciate.
Secondly, this is associated, in the medium run at least, with a shift in production
structure towards the non-traded sectors, and leading to greater dependence on oil for
foreign exchange. Thirdly, increased domestic investment should raise growth.
Massive and excessive incomes from oil exports usually gives the false sign of a more
favourable balance-of-payment position than would otherwise be possible, and an
'equilibrium' rate of exchange valued at a much higher level than would otherwise be
the case. This unwarranted and spurious feeling of well-being discourages non-oil
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exports, encourages imports and foreign dependent domestic production, and
stimulates capital exports, instead of promoting internal investment. As a consequence,
the economy becomes more volatile in the short run as oil prices fluctuate beyond the
country's control in the global market. In the longer run, as oil is gradually depleted,
the country is unlikely to be able to finance its accustomed levels of consumption
because of the paucity of income-generating investments and the dwindling supplies of
foreign exchange.
In this context, the issue of how to deal with and manage the fluctuations of oil rent is
an important point. More precisely, it can be said that DD sheds light on the difficulty
the government has in managing short-term oil rents which arise from the export
boom, without losing consistency with its long-term objective of promoting economic
development through the expansion of non-oil tradable sector. Government policies in
the face of the oil boom, therefore, are crucial.
A number of reasons may make an oil economy deviate from these stylised patterns.
Price controls and import liberalisation can limit the appreciation of the real exchange
rate by deflecting demand onto imports. Next, if traded sectors are able to respond
strongly to investments financed by oil revenues, product market pulls towards the
non-traded sectors may be counterbalanced, particularly if labour markets are slack so
that expanding non-traded sectors do not draw labour from the traded sectors. Finally,
the overall impact of higher public spending on growth may be low if the quality of
investment projects declines with accelerating spending, or if subsidies and other
expenditures drain resources from the public investment programme.
The level of exchange rate can affect the range of a country's export sector,
expanding it when the exchange rate depreciates and contracting it when it appreciates.
Concern with the structure of exports, especially with increasing the share and
maintaining the competitiveness of non-oil exports, makes the exchange rate
particularly important for the oil exporting country's development prospects. In this
sense, the right equilibrium exchange rate is a necessary, though not a sufficient,
4 The results of Gelb (1986)'s studies suggest that the impact of expanded investment on growth of
non oil GDP has been unsatisfactory during the (oil boom of) 1972-81 compared with 1967-72. (see
Gelb, 1986, p. 79)
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condition for export diversification. We will discuss exchange rate behaviour in
connection with oil revenues fluctuations in detail in this thesis.
Although changes in nominal exchange rate is the first step in this procedure, the final
outcome is, however, conditioned by its final effects on real exchange rate. Any
attempt to expand expenditure beyond the economy's short-run absorptive capacity
(which is usually encouraged by the 'excess' available oil revenue) will simply give rise
to relative and general price level effects that will reinforce appreciation. So dealing
with the movement of domestic inflation rate is a necessary task in this discussion.
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) or 'inflation theory of exchange rate' (Dornbusch,
1987) is usually used as a basic framework to evaluate exchange rate and price level
movements. In fact, we should see the PPP theory as a model of exchange rates and/or
prices.
In many oil exporting countries, the process of adjustment initiated by the rise in oil
revenues has been accompanied by a deterioration in their non-oil current accounts,
domestic inflation, a rise in the prices of non-traded goods relative to those of traded
goods, and a tendency toward corresponding changes in the structure of domestic
production. These developments have been very important in bringing about balance
of payments adjustment on current account. At the same time, however, they have also
been regarded as interfering with the efforts of these countries to create a more
diversified base of non-oil production.
Monetary aspects of the boom are parallel forces by which the boom revenue is
accommodated into the domestic economy (Edwards, 1986), and which reinforce the
real effects. If this revenue accrues to the government and is deposited in the central
bank there will be no increase in the domestic money supply unless the government
spends at home out of the increased revenues or domestic credit to the private sector is
increased'. In the absence of any increase in public spending, the increase in net foreign
assets of the central bank is exactly offset by the reduction in net domestic credit to the
government (reduction in budget deficit or debt of government to the central bank). So
5 In the case that this revenue accrued to the private sector and be deposited in the commercial banks,
the domestic money supply will increase.
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the money supply will increase as government domestic spending rnonetises the boom
revenue. In fact, the extent of change in the domestic money supply depends on the
extent of foreign exchange receipts from oil exports and the extent to which the
monetary authorities sterilise these proceeds to neutralise their effect on the domestic
money supply (Noorbakhsh, 1990). We will discuss the monetary effects of oil revenue
in an appropriate framework of modelling money market.
Although theoretical models have been discussed to evaluate the macro-economic
problems associated with a boom sector mostly in the context of DD literature,
empirical examinations of such models are not frequently conducted. Yet, most of
accomplished empirical works in this area have used an illustrative method (see for
example Forsyth and Kay, 1981). The research that used a more comprehensive and
efficient framework to discuss DD phenomenon preceded new econometric methods
now available. On the specification point of view, a little concern has been maintained
over a process which take the variables to their steady state positions. This leaves long-
run equilibrium values of the variables (prices, exchange rates, money) undefined (see
Edwards 1986 for instance). Inclusion of an error feedback factor would help to make
the analyses more clear and improve the qualifications of the other estimates.
Karshenas (1990) argues that the main source of structural imbalances in the Iranian
economy over recent decades was not the 'crowding out' of the traded goods sectors
by non-traded sectors, as is expounded in the recent literature in 'booming sector
economies'. The basic assumption of such theory is fill employment equilibrium with
given technology, the situation which is far from that of most OEDCs.
In the light of data deficiencies (quantity and quality) and the problem of rapid
structural change common in most less-developed countries (see Morgan 1979) and
compatible with Iranian case during recent decades, applicability of any econometric
method and interpretation of its results should be taken with adequate caution.
Chapter 2 presents a brief review of the nature and complexities of the Iranian
economy in which the study is being conducted. This chapter considers the general
consequences of oil boom era, and discusses post revolution stagnation.
The development of the Iranian economy between 1959 and 1974 had been marked by
the growth of oil production, and the decline of agriculture and the rural population
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and boom and bust in this sector afterwards. Post-revolution period (until 1990) is
characterised mainly by oil revenue crash, war and economic stagnation.
Chapter 3 critically examines the literature relating to the Dutch Disease phenomenon,
whereby a booming resource sector is presumed to lead to a contraction of the non-
boom tradable sectors, via the loss of competitiveness, due to the appreciation of the
domestic currency. The DD theory would be approached in the light of oil export
boom and the consequential effects on other tradable sectors. The extension and
applicability of the concepts of the core model of the DD phenomenon to an oil
exporting developing country, then, will be discussed.
Because of the complexity of the process there is not a unique interpretation of this
mechanism: several alternative models analytically or numerically have been discussed
in the literature during the past few decades based on different scenarios: whether the
resource of the boom is privately or publicly owned; how the authorities spend the
revenues, gradually or immediately; the fiscal and monetary policies conducted after
the boom, the structure of the economy under consideration and so on. For example,
while in a core model of Dutch Disease, manufacturing sector is considered as the non-
boom tradable (lagged) sector which would be squeezed after a boom (de-
industrialisation phenomenon), in some cases it is the (export-oriented) agriculture
sector which is buffeted by the boom repercussions (see Pinto, 1987, where the
agriculture sector is taken as the main non oil tradable sector in Indonesia and Nigeria).
In chapter 4 some of the most relevant concepts and ideas in econometric modelling
and time series estimation by which our research will be conducted are reviewed.
There are models which make use of dynamic adjustments (short run movements) to
steady targets (long run solution), in the form of error correction terms.
Throughout this thesis we have used modern econometric techniques to investigate
static and dynamic components of the processes under consideration. These methods
of modelling usually are more sensible from the economic point of view and less
problematic from the econometric point of view. Since many economic time series
appear to be non-stationary processes, this kind of modelling prevents some of the
problems which potentially could appear when traditional method is applied.
Johansen's method will be used to search for cointegrating vectors among variables
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under consideration. Where we find cointegration relationship(s), we try to test for any
theoretically sensible restriction applicable on them. But because of data restriction,
which lower the performance of Johansen's method, a general non-linear model are
used to specify the final model.
Chapter 5 deals with exchange rates performance in the literature theoretically and
empirically, and then applies an appropriate exchange rate model to our data. In
section one of this chapter main aspects of the PPP theory and its later developments
will be reviewed and discussed. Section 2 reviews, selectively and briefly, the empirical
works on PPP revealed in the literature.
Empirical work on PPP during recent decades shows that several methods have been
used to test the validity of this theory. The econometric methods applied in these
works have been chosen as a criteria to categorise this review6.
Section 3 of chapter 5 assesses the results obtained from applying different versions of
PPP relation on our data, official and black market exchange rates. First part of this
section considers the relevance of simple economic models to the determination of the
official and black market Rial/Dollar exchange rate. This part also considers how the
behaviour of these exchange rates differed before and after the revolution.
For many years a free market for foreign exchange has existed alongside the official
market for foreign exchange in Iran. The official exchange rate has been fixed 7 and
subject to infrequent changes of nominal value. Sometimes the free market has been
almost dormant, at such times the premium that could be earned in the free market has
been almost zero. But at other times, most notably since the revolution of 1979, the
free market has been the dominant source of foreign exchange. The social and political
6 Abuaf and Jourin (1990) believe that the negative results obtained in previous empirical research
reflect the poor power of the test rather than evidence against PPP.' (p. 157)
7 In February 1975, the pegging of the rial to the dollar was abrogated in order to reduce the rial's
sensitivity to fluctuations in the value of the us. dollar vis-a-vis the other major currencies, and an
SDR peg was adopted at a par value of 82.2 Rials for SDR. In addition, the commercial rate was
allowed to float within a ± 2.25 percent band. The US dollar, nevertheless, remained as the currency
of intervention by the central bank. Throughout this period the parallel market exchange rate floated
closely above the official exchange rate.
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unrest starting shortly before the revolution began a rapid depreciation of the black
market exchange rate as the demand for foreign currency exceeded the official supply.
In the post-revolution period, the premium on foreign currency sold in the black
market over currency sold in official markets has been rapidly increasing, from near to
zero shortly before the revolution to over 2000% by 1990. The purpose of this
chapter is to see if Purchasing Power Parity has influenced either the black market or
official exchange rates. We then proceed to examine the relationship between the
exchange rate and oil revenue, and obtain an exchange rate equation that can be used
to simulate the effect of oil on the economy. There is some evidence found in support
of PPP as a relevant model of both, official and black market, exchange rates in pre-
Revolutionary period. In the whole period an adjusted version of PPP is found a valid
model.
The process by which a resource boom affects the economy are complex and messy,
and depend upon such things as the ownership of the resource, how state revenues are
used, and the structure of the economy in question. Given these considerations, it is
not surprising that there is a broad range of models of 'Dutch Disease'. The purpose of
chapter 6 is to examine how oil booms and slumps have affected the Iranian economy,
in particular growth of the non-oil sector and inflation. Estimation of the full system is
infeasible given the shortage of data'. Rather, we proceed by estimating single
equations. Even with the single equations it is not possible to apply Hendry's general-
to-specific approach to modelling 9 . Reasonably we must try alternative specifications
and settle on those which appear to best correspond to general economic theory whilst
having acceptable statistical properties. We then test the best equations for shifts in the
slope parameters since the revolution, and then test any cross equation restrictions
before settling on our preferred specifications. Oil revenue restrains domestic inflation
in early stages, in a longer horizon two other opposite forces, foreign inflation and
exchange rate depreciation generated by oil boom dominate. Massive political and
economic shocks that dominated on Iran in recent decades may have given rise to a
8 A system of all equations except money equation is, however, estimated and the obtained results are
reported in chapter 7. These results are then used to simulate key indigenous variables.
9However, where applicable this method was chosen as the strategy of the estimation.
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drastic change on the pattern of our variables particularly real gdp. Perhaps this reason
accompanied with inefficiency in our data should be blamed for preventing us to get a
convincing result on non-oil gdp growth. A long lag contractionary effect of oil
0
revenue changes on non-oil gdp growth should therefore be accepted with caution.
There is strong evidence found in support of conventional model of real money
balances with a small oil revenue elasticity.
In chapter 7 the complete model as a system was estimated using SUR (seemingly
unrestricted regression) method to get more efficient results. These results, then, were
chosen to undertake the simulation exercise. The simulation results plus plots for
selected key variables are presented in the following subsections and in the appendix.
The exercise considers several scenarios by various assumptions on oil revenue
changes (and its related oil prices) within and out of sample. The examination of the
model performance in tracking the historical data is then presented. We also proceeded
to examine the response of our endogenous variables to different time paths for our
exogenous variables, oil revenue and oil prices. Obtained results reflect mainly the
same trends dedicated from our previous chapters that is indicative of a reasonable
stability in our estimations.
Chapter 8 puts the main findings altogether, discusses them and concludes
accordingly. Generally, the conclusions are: increases in oil revenue (i) depress black
market exchange rate asymmetrically; (ii) suppress domestic inflation directly and then
pull it up indirectly through higher foreign inflation and a more depressed exchange
rate; (iii) have a contractionary effect on non-oil real gdp growth; and (iv) change real
money balances with a small elasticity.
22.1 Introduction
The Iranian economy can be divided into three sectors: the Oil sector, and the modern
and traditional sectors in industry, agriculture and services. The oil industry mainly
produces crude oil for the world market and provides part of the capital and a majority
of the foreign exchange for the modern sector, both private and public. The oil
industry's linkages to other economic sectors are limited , due to its capital-intensive
nature and the underdeveloped state of the modern sector in Iran's capital goods
industries. The modern sector relies on the traditional sector for labour and part of its
raw material and sells much of its output to the traditional sector and the rest to itself.
Of course, the relative importance of the traditional sector has declined due to
migration to towns and the expansion of the modern sector.
National income data starts statistically from 1959, when GDP stood at $3.69 bn, with
agricultural making up 27 per cent of the total and oil a mere 11 per cent. After a
period of economic stagnation in the early 1960s, a period of sustained economic
expansion began during 1964 that lasted through to 1973. Indeed, the rate of growth
accelerated steadily from an average 9.6 per cent in the 1962-68 plan period to 11.8
per cent in the 1968-73 period as oil became the leading sector. The negative aspects
of the "boom" years hold clearly in growth between 1973 and 1978, which dropped to
an annual average of 6.9 per cent. The decline came mainly from the poor performance
of the oil industry. After a protracted period of economic stagnation, the rate of real
GDP growth rose to an official estimated 10.1 per cent in 1990/1991.
Recent trends in capital formation show that, other than during the brief boom in
1983/84, there was a major decline on this account in most years since the mid-1970s
(EIU 1992/93).
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2.2 Pre Revolutionary Period (1960s & 1970s)
2.2.1 Economic Steps
In the inter world war period the main role of the government had been the
mobilisation of the economic surplus within a principally agrarian economy through the
control of trade. In the post-1953 period the state had direct control of a substantial
share of the national income in the form of oil revenues, and so faced the duty of
distribution and allocation of the already centralised economic surplus'. After the 1953
coup, the Iranian economy was subjected to a massive inflow of external finance.
During the five year period of 1956-60 government oil revenues amounted to $ 1228
m, compared to $ 483 m during the entire thirty-six year period of 1913-49.
Furthermore, there were also substantial inflows of foreign capital in the form of
official aid and grants during this period. Between 1953-1960, the Iranian government
received more than $ 890 m in the form of aid and grants from the US government
alone. The most notable aspect of these new conditions was the considerable rise in oil
revenues and easy access to foreign capital in the post-1953 period. With the rapid
growth of oil revenues and increasing reliance on foreign borrowing (equivalent to
mortgaging the future oil revenues), the state (through Plan Organisation) increasingly
assumed a central role in Capital accumulation during this period. The market
intervention of the state during the post-1953 period was largely indirect, mainly in the
form of foreign trade and exchange regulations, credit rationing, indirect taxes and
tariffs, with a view to the protection/subsidisation of particular sectors of the economy
rather than revenue-raising motives. Between 1953 and 1955 the nominal exchange
rate was revalued by about 15 percent (Table 2-1).
This was not due to the automatic response of the foreign exchange market, but it
rather resulted from deliberate policy by the government which maintained strict
exchange controls in this period.
'The 1950-53 period could be regarded as the period of oil and political crisis. In 1953 the last king of
Iran (Mohammed Reza Shah) was restored via a coup d'etat supported by US against the popular
Prime Minister M. Mossadegh.
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Inflationary pressures resulting from the investment boom2, together with
government's implementation of revaluation of the exchange rate did in fact result in a
noticeable revaluation of the real exchange rate- as is signified by the opposite
movements of the domestic prices and that of imported commodities (Table 2-1). As
this table shows, while the wholesale price of imported goods declined by about 20
percent between 1953 and 1960, the general index rose by more than 15 percent over
the same period3.
Table 2-1 Exchange rates and price movements 1953-60
WPI 1953=100
Year Nominal
Exchange rate'
Real	 Exchange
Rate
(1)1(2)
Imported
goods
(1)
General
Index
(2)
1953 90.5 1.0 100.0 100.0
1954 84.5 0.96 106.1 110.7
1955 76.5 0.92 97.8 106.8
1956 76.5 0.79 91.0 115.1
1957 76.5 0.72 81.6 112.9
1958 76.5 0.72 80.0 111.6
1959 76.5 0.72 81.3 113.6
1960 76.5 0.71 82.8 115.9
Source: Karshenas, (1990, P. 118). . a Rial per US dollar.
The unparalleled growth of investment and incomes in this period, which resulted in a
substantial divergence between the structure of demand and supply in the domestic
economy, gave rise to the balance of payment crisis of the early 1960s. The economic
recession of the early 1960s (up to mid 1963), following the 1955-59 boom, created
strong internal and external political pressures for social reform and change of the
economic strategy of the government.
2 In the Dutch Disease literature this phenomenon is considered as the 'expending effect'. (see
Corden, 1984, among others, for more details. Also see chapter 3)
3 This real exchange rate appreciation damaged the non-oil exports during the following years.
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The new period (1960-62) was in fact a period of political crisis for the regime leading
to the breaking of its connections with the powerful traditional established classes. The
period witnessed a rapid decline in the rate of investment particularly in the private
sector, following the Stabilisation Programme of the government and the political
uncertainties which characterised the period.
The third phase (1963-77) formed the longest period of sustained accumulation in
recorded economic history of Iran, with a real annual rate of growth of 18.9 per cent
for gross fixed investment. The share of gross fixed investment in non-oil GDP rose
from 16.9 per cent in 1962-3 to 30.9 per cent in 1971-2, and reached the phenomenal
rate of 50.7 per cent in the post-1973 oil boom years. After the 1973-oil boom an
over-expansion of investment could be distinguished (with a domestic investment
growth rate of 20 per cent between 1974 and 1975) and the over-heating problems
which it gave rise to.
During 1963-77 period, the share of oil revenues in financing government expenditure
was growing while that of tax revenue was weak. In fact one of the negative effects of
unsustainable oil revenue is that it diverts the financing of public expenditure from
sustainable tax revenue to exhaustible oil revenue. Karshenas (1990, 171-2) has shown
that the (annual) elasticity of real public sector investment with respect to government
oil revenues are 0.3 in the short term and 1.0 in the long-term, with variations in oil
revenues explaining more than 98 per cent of variations in government investment.
The share of oil revenues in total government revenue increased from about 50 per
cent during the 1963-67 (third plan) period to more than 75 per cent over the 1973-77
(fifth plan) period, while domestic taxes remained generally below 10 per cent of GNP
(Table 2-2). As can be seen in table 2-3 despite a more than four-fold increase in real
per-capita GNP, central government tax revenues remained relatively low in relation to
national income. While non-oil and oil income show the same contribution to total
public income during the 1963-67 period, the former declined to less than one-third as
much as the oil income during the 1973-77 period (Table 2-2). This shows that the
expenditure policy of the government had a much more important bearing on income
distribution than its taxation policy.
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A fifth plan was prepared for the period 1973-78. It was designed to reinforce all the
major industrial projects and infrustructural investments begun during the previous
plan. Total investment was set at $ 36.5 bn and there was fear that this would be too
demanding for an undeveloped physical and commercial infrastructure. Planners were
also concerned by doubts about growing inflation and a lack of innovative projects
both for agriculture and for genuine small-scale entrepreneurship in industry. Planned
investments were almost doubled to $ 70 bn but increased spending on defence,
prestige construction projects and a range of additional schemes taken on at random
made the plan itself almost irrelevant.
Table 2-2 Aggregated public sector accounts 1963-77 (Per cent of GNP)
1963-67 1968-72 1973-77
Total income
from which:
16.7 21.5 41.0
Oil income 8.5 11.8 31.0
Non-oil income 8.2 9.7 10.0
Public sector deficit 2.5 5.0 0.7
(excluding	 oil (10.6) (16.8) (32.3)
_ income)
Source: Karshenas (1990), p. 189.
During the years 1973-78 there were constant shifts in government policy in reaction
to gross overheating of the economy in the mid-1970s and to sharp falls in revenue
later on. There was severe inflation, a massive stream of population to the towns, a
marked down turn in agricultural development, competition for scarce resources and a
predictable failure of the infrastructure to cope with the rate of expansion in what was
essentially an import led boom (ETU 1992/93 ).
A higher rate of growth of the industrial sector on a sustained basis would not only
lead to higher productivity growth in the sector itself but is also expected to create the
conditions favourable for growth of the economy as a whole by absorbing the surplus
labour and providing the goods necessary to raise productivity and incomes in the
other sectors of the economy. What normally handicaps the generation of such
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dynamic processes in the underdeveloped economies is the limited market for the
manufacturing sector and shortages of foreign exchange both of which are related to
the inefficiency of the manufacturing sector and its inability to export in the early
stages of the industrialisation. If a country could pass this stage of development
process successfully and access the international market in order to supply part of its
industrial production, then those two sensitive bottlenecks (domestic market limitation
and exchange shortage) could be gradually overcome. Furthermore, by accessing the
international markets the existing inefficiency in industrial sector (which is usual in the
early stage of industrialisation process) would be progressively removed (through
'learning' by exporting).
Table 2-3 Real per -capita income and central government tax
revenues 1963-77
Per-capita income l	Total Taxes2
(000 Rials)
1963 14.8 8.0
1964 15.2 7.1
1965 16.6 8.1
1966 17.6 8.5
1967 19.2 9.1
1968 21.0 9.3
1969 22.3 9.3
1970 24.4 10.0
1971 28.5 9.9
1972 30.6 9.7
1973 41.3 7.9
1974 53.8 6.0
1975 54.0 9.5
1976 58.7 9.6
1977 58.1 10.6	 ,
Source: Karshenas (1990), p. 190.
1 At real 1959 prices.
2 Per cent of GNP.
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In an oil-exporting country such as Iran in this period for which almost all the foreign
exchange needed for industrial sector has been easily provided by oil exports, the
exports of industrial production do not to achieve a significant level and therefore the
efficiency of this sector did not improve. Table 2-4 shows the role of oil and non-oil
exports in financing import expenditures during the 1959-72 period.
Table 2-4 Foreign Exchange providers for imports.
As percentages of imports
Year Value	 of
importsa($ m)
Non-oil
exportsb
Oil	 sector's
net earnings
Total
external
c
resources
1959 572.9 27.8 58.9 72.2
1960 597.3 28.3 60.1 71.7
1961 565.4 26.1 69.2 73.9
1962 527.3 25.1 80,3 74.9
1963 547.9 27.0 85.9 73.0
1964 758.9 19.2 73.2 80.8
1965 931.8 22.5 65.2 77.5
1966 1088.0 20.7 65.8 79.3
1967 1342.3 21.7 63.2 78.3
1968 1804.7 20.3 54.3 79.7
1969 2072.2 20.3 53.0 79.7
1970 2365.1 17.6 53.9 82.4
1971 3013.8 19.4 71.3 80.6
1972 3502.4 21.1 74.2 78.9
Source: Karshenas (1990), P. 212.
a
-Imports of goods (c.i.f.) and services.
b
-Exports of goods (f.o.b.) and services.
c
-Equals oil sector exchange earnings plus the current account deficit.
The real annual average growth rates of imports and non-oil exports of Iran compared
with some middle-income economies are shown in table 2-5.
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As can be distinguished from this table the rank of the growth rate of Iran's commodity
imports is sixth, while that of non oil exports is 22nd.
Table 2-5: Growth rates of real GDP, imports and non-oil exports (1960-1970)
Real annual average rates
Iran Upper	 quartile	 of
middle-income
economiesa
No.
	 of	 countries
above Iran
GDPb 8.8 6.2 1
Commodity imports 11.4 9.0 5
Commodity exports
(non oil)
7.1 9.2 21
Source: Karshenas (1990), p. 211.
a
-58 countries according to the World Bank classifications, excluding the high-income oil-exporting
gountries.
-Refers to non-oil GDP for the case of Iran.
Although the growth performance of the Iranian economy during the 1959-72 period
was very impressive and forceful, amongst the highest in the world this growth
performance was, however, heavily financed by external resources in the form of oil
revenues and foreign borrowing. Oil revenue on average grew by the phenomenal rate
of 17.9 per cent per annum in real terms (deflated by the import price index) during
this period. In addition about 10 percent of gross investment during this period was on
average financed by foreign borrowing. As Karshenas (1990) argues, the external
resources (oil income and foreign borrowing) in fact have had a dual contribution in
the domestic economy. On one hand they contributed to the process of growth by
covering the gap in the non-oil current account of the balance of payments (see table 2-
4, share of imports financed by external resources). On the other hand external
resources contributed to the financing of domestic investment (Table 2-6).
Given this picture of the Iranian economy during this period, it is clear that the long-
run viability of the growth path after the exhaustion of oil resources could not be
guaranteed, since in the long-run the success of the import substitution strategy
depends on the ability to export.
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Table 2-6 Gross Investment: values and growth rates (1959-72)
Percentage of Gross investment
Year Gross investment
(bn Rials)
non-oil savingsa Total external
resources
1959 52.7 47.6 52.4
1960 57.8 42.9 57.1
1961 54.3 51.2 48.8
1962 47.4 61.2 38.8
1963 51.5 58.6 41.4
1964 63.2 38.8 61.7
1965 85.5 32.7 67.3
1966 90.0 36.8 63.2
1967 119.3 37.7 62.3
1968 136.5 31.7 68.3
1969 156.4 27.4 72.6
1970 167.3 29.0 71.0
1971 216.3 28.9 71.1
1972 287.4 30.8 69.2
Source: Karshenas (1990), p. 213.
a
-non-oil savings are derived as the residuals of gross domestic savings and the net contribution of the
oil sector (oil revenues of central government).
Despite considerable reductions in import ratios' in sub groups of production, there
was an increase in the import ratio of the manufacturing sector as a whole, and in
particular in capital goods sector. The process of import substitution, therefore,
appears to have led to an increased import penetration as measured by the import ratio
(31.7; 33.6; and 32.8 for 1963, 1967 and 1972 respectively).
Comparing the ratio of import to total supplies for different manufacturing branches in
Iran with the international norms for a country with similar levels of income and
4 Import ratio has been defined as 100*M 1/Di , where Mi= imports of commodity i, and Di=home
demand = Qi +mi -Xi . Qi and Xi
 indicate to sector i's total domestic output and exports of i's product
respectively (for details see Karshenas (1990 p. 222)
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population, it is clear that in almost all intermediate and capital goods industries (old
ISIC 25-28), import coefficients were by far higher than the international norms. (see
Karshenas, 1990, p. 223)
Though the Iranian economy achieved high growth rates and rapid structural change,
growth was financed by 'excessive' reliance on external resources'. In an import
substitution strategy, therefore, the main problems from a medium term point of view
could be the rapid rate of growth of imports; while the main problem in long run
appears as the relatively slow rates of growth of manufacturing exports. Excessive
import dependence, to the extent that it could be regarded as 'undesirable', arises
because of the combination of high rates of protection of the domestic market and high
subsidies given to the imported intermediate and capital goods.
The structural balance of payments problems which arise during the growth process
are thus largely blamed on the price distortions which the import substitution strategy
itself creates. Devaluation of the exchange rate and a free trade policy are advocated as
the main instruments for restructuring the economy through a better use of pricing
mechanism.
It should be noted that the accusation of overvaluation of the exchange rate (usually
made about oil-exporting countries experiencing perverse growth) is basically correct.
But this is a problem which can not be relieved by the devaluation of the exchange rate
alone. Depending on the income generating policies of the government, a nominal
devaluation of the exchange rate could even have the paradoxical results of leading to
an even higher exchange rate in real terms'.
The ease of access to external resources, i.e. oil income and foreign borrowing,
allowed the rapid acceleration of the rate of growth of investment and government
expenditure without the need to restrict the income and consumption of higher income
groups.
5 'excessive' in the sense that in the medium term the economy was prone to severe balance of
payments crises and in long-run, given the continuation of the existing pattern of structural change,
the economy could not sustain itself after the exhaustion of the oil reserves.
6 That is, it is possible that any devaluation policy in these countries not only create a deep negative
effects in short run (J curve effect), but also it is not expected any improvement will happen in the
long run; unless some other complementary and contractionary fiscal and monetary policies are
implemented simultaneously.
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Generally, three five-year plans were implemented during 1963/64 to 1977/78.
Development plans represent the longest period of sustained growth of per capita real
income that the Iranian economy has experienced and is likely to experience for some
time. During this period the per capita income rose from about $ 176 to $ 2160 at
current prices and the country's GDP grew in real terms by an average annual rate of
around 9.3 percent, ranking Iran as one of the fastest growing developing countries in
the world. The real non-oil GDP grew by an average annual rate of 10.8 percent over
the 1963/64-1977/78 period (Table 2-8), which was 1.5 percentage points higher than
the annual rate of growth of GDP with oil, indicating a considerably broader base of
development than is normally realised.
The share of agriculture sector in the total GDP, which in 1962/63 stood at about 28
percent, declined steadily over the whole period, and by 1977/78 it was no more than
9.3 percent of the country's domestic product at current prices (Table 2-13).
Such a sustained, though unbalanced, growth performance was achieved by following
the import-substitution industrialisation strategy backed by rising oil revenues and a
stable political environment'.
2.2.2 Import Substitution Strategy
The industrialisation strategy of import substitution backed by the stream of oil
revenues, that was implemented in Iran during 1960s and 1970s, had it's own social
costs and unfavourable economic consequences. Some general reasons could be
attributed for such outcomes. (see Pesaran, 1982)
• A high wall of protection policies (through high tariffs, tax relief policies and
abundant investment incentive schemes), regarded as essential to a successful
implementation of the import-substitution strategy, usually results in constituting
some inefficient, although partially successful, industrial firms.
7 Political stability during this period was brought about not through increased participation,
reconciliation, and political tolerance but by the harassment, imprisonment, and torture of political
opponents of the regime (Pesaran 1982, p. 505).
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• Such firms, provided with an excessive protection from domestic and foreign
competition, will spoil any possibilities of "forward" and "backward" linkages with
the rest of the economy.
• Keeping an 'artificially' overvalued exchange rate is usually used as an essential
instrument to encourage the import of capital and intermediate goods 'and also to keep
food prices down in the politically sensitive urban centres' (Pesaran, 1982 p. 510).
Sluggishness in the rate of expansion of the traditional and agriculture sectors and also
in small -scale and self-employed activities are expected to be the likely disadvantages
of such policy. The persistence of an overvalued exchange rate, which is more feasible
in an oil-exporting country like Iran, can also destroy any chances for non-oil economic
sectors (including industrial sector itself) to gain access to international markets to
export their products, problem which is rarely felt in an oil-exporting country. This is
one of the reasons why the effect of oil income in an oil-exporting country appears
paradoxical.
The strategy typically involves the replacement of imported manufactured goods by
domestically produced commodities and basically relies upon tariffs and import quotas
and the granting of all kinds of tax and investment incentives to local industrialists and
their foreign partners. This growth strategy was based on the false assumption that the
benefits of high rates of growth would somehow automatically "trickle down" from
the rich to the low income groups, and on the erroneous belief that the magnitude of
GDP , particularly in a major oil-exporting country like Iran, can be regarded as a
satisfactory yardstick of the economy's development and progress. But the benefits of
rising real income were not enough to improve or even stop the unfavourable trend in
the distribution of income and wealth among householders and geographical regions,
or between rural and urban areas that existed in the early 1960s. Consequently, this
growth strategy which was implemented basically on a stream of oil income, with little
"backward" and "forward" linkages with the rest of the economy, finally badly affected
the structure of the economy and widened the socio-economic gap between rural and
urban societies. All these adverse trends took on new dimensions when oil prices more
than quadrupled in 1973/74. In spite of this tremendous price increase, no attempt was
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made by the Iranian government to reduce the level of oil exports, and as a result
revenues from oil exports rose from $ 4.9 billion in 1973/74 to $ 18.7 billion in
1974/75. On the basis of this unprecedented rise in oil revenues and the apparent
overflow of foreign exchange reserves, government expenditure was more than
doubled, all foreign exchange controls were lifted, and selective liberalisation of
foreign trade was implemented. In spite of trade liberalisation policies, heavy
government subsidies on essential foodstuffs, and the unpopular anti profiteering
campaigns, the trend rate of increase of consumer prices not only did not fall but
started rising even faster (Table 2-7). Such an inflationary movement, which is a
disadvantage of oil boom', spoiled the competitiveness of Industries. Many
industrialists who found themselves faced with a greater degree of foreign competition
preferred to invest in safe financial assets abroad or become importers rather than
undertake risky new domestic investments. Although the exact figures are open to
debate, the capital outflow during 1978/79 are estimated about I 4 to 6 billion
(Pesaran, 1982, p. 509).
One of the features of import-substitution strategy is to keep the exchange rate
overvalued in order to encourage the imports of capital and intermediate goods
necessary for domestic (especially industrial) production. This policy was financed by
the large oil revenues of this period. The consequences of such a policy are usually
greater capital intensity of production techniques and a slowdown in the rate of
expansion of the traditional and agriculture sectors (Table 2-9). The Rial was revalued
against the dollar in February 1973. The overvaluation of the Rial also penalised small-
scale producers and the self-employed at the expense of providing greater benefits to
the large local enterprises and their foreign partners.
Whilst acquiring large amounts of foreign exchange revenues from oil exports is a
considerable economic opportunity to remove financial obstructions, however, it tends
to reduce the urgency of motivating and expanding non-oil export industries; the
industries that inevitably have to take the responsibility of providing the foreign
exchange when oil is depleted in the future and so these industries often stagnate.
8 See chapter 3 for more details. Big jumps revealed in earnings of construction workers could be
indicative of a strong effect of oil boom in non tradable sectors of the domestic economy (Table 2-7).
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Table 2-7 Annual Rates of Price Increases in Iranian Economy (in percent)
Year Retail prices Wholesale prices Earnings of
construction workers
1962/63 0.9 1.4 -5.0
1963/64 1.0 0.4 -2.3
1964/65 4.5 5.4 7.4
1965/66 0.3 0.9 3.6
1966/67 0.8 -0.5 1.3
1967/68 0.8 0.2 5.8
1968/69 1.6 0.7 11.5
1969/70 3.5 4.0 14.1
1970/71 1.5 3.4 3.5
1971/72 5.5 7.1 2.8
1972/73 6.3 5.7 17.5
1973/74 11.2 13.1 21.6
1974/75 15.5 16.9 28.9
1975/76 9.9 5.3 47.12
1976/77 16.6 13.5 39.4
1977/78 25.1 14.6 34.4
Source: Pesaran (1982)
The structure of government's revenues which is enormously dependent on oil
revenues shows another adverse effect of the oil windfall. The availability of non-tax
government revenues weakens the government's desire to implement badly needed but
unpopular reforms of the taxation system.
2.3 Post Revolutionary Period (1980s)
In the two decades prior to the revolution, a strict import substitution strategy
accompanied by a highly protected domestic economy was the policy followed by
Iranian government. Although producing rapid growth rates in this period, the
paradoxical result of this strategy was to make the economy increasingly dependent on
oil export revenues to finance the growing needs of the industrial sector for imported
intermediate and capital goods (see previous section). From the mid-1970s, however,
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when reserves obtained from the 1973 oil boom were exhausted the growth rate
decreased.
In this section the economic developments in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution are
overviewed with special attention given to foreign trade and exchange rate movements
in this period. The economic goals of the revolution include:
The redistribution of wealth and income; political and economic independence from the
West and East; increased economic self-sufficiency; and policies favourable to the
agricultural sector (which was thought consistent with the income redistribution aim)9.
The relative oil recovery during 1981-1985 was reflected in an annual growth rate of
about 8 percent in real GDP. Similarly, the significant weakness in the oil sector two
years later was the main cause of the downturn in real GDP of about 10 percent. This
arrangement was followed again in 1989, when the economy grew by 4.3 percent as
production and exports of oil recovered. It is worth showing how much this growth
was related to oil by showing growth rates in non-oil GDP. Non-oil GDP increased by
26.7% over 1981-85, decreased by -14.6% in 1985-88 and again increased by 23.2%
in 1988-91 10 . In fact among the various sectors of the economy, the industrial sector
performed least satisfactorily. As already mentioned in the previous section, although
high growth rates were achieved by this sector during the two decades before the
revolution, the overall degree of import dependency of the industrial sector increased;
contrary to the principal aim of the import substitution strategy. The nationalisation of
9The 32.1(1977/78) percent of population in activities related to the agriculture sector received only
8.5 percent of GDP, while the 33.4 percent in industrial sector, 0.6 percent in oil sector and 31.0
percent in services sector had 18.7, 32.5, and 40.3 percent of GDP respectively.(see Amuzegar, 1993,
339 for these details)
I ° Calculated based on Table 2-8.
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Table 2-8 Growth rates of oil revenue and real non-oil gdp (log
difference)
obs non-oil gdpa oil revenue
1960 NA NA
1961 0.026 -0.002
1962 0.068 -0.022
1963 0.064 0.123
1964 0.144 0.328
1965 0.116 0.026
1966 0.096 0.009
1967 0.105 0.420
1968 0.141 -0.035
1969 0.122 0.095
1970 0.100 0.239
1971 0.114 0.393
1972 0.155 -0.480
1973 0.081 0.258
1974 0.071 1.287
1975 0.014 0.548
1976 0.184 -0.489
1977 0.066 0.036
1978 -0.250 0.593
1979 -0.097 -0.122
1980 -0.143 -0.365
1981 -0.026 0.006
1982 0.127 -0.034
1983 0.132 -0.226
1984 -0.006 0.595
1985 0.018 -0.639
1986 -0.152 -1.290
1987 0.010 0.301
1988 -0.091 -0.132
1989 0.016 1.232
1990 0.116 -0.106
a Defined as real gdp - oil revenue. Real gdp obtained from Economic
Report and Balance Sheet, Central Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran,
several issues. Oil revenues obtained from IFS, several issues.
a big portion of the industries, the destructive effects of war, and the uncertainties
caused by the political and economic sanctions are other factors in this story.
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Figure 2-1 Growth rates of oil revenue and real non oil gdp
Overall, the Iranian economy showed an asymmetric growth trend in the 1980s. Since
the mid-1970s, the oil sector (as the main provider of the foreign exchange necessary
for production process) has played an expected and crucial role in the economic
irregularity (See Ghasimi, 1992).
2.3.1.1 Immediate changes
During the post-revolutionary period some immediate changes in economic policies
were introduced by the Provisional Government. The most important changes, in
particular, were: the nationalisation of foreign trade (as part of a severe import-
restriction); extension of full public ownership and control over the oil sector; a move
toward the establishment of Islamic, interest-free banking system (see Amuzegar 1993
p. 45) 11 . In many cases the nationalisation of large scale modern industries (originally
"Principle 44 of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran (perhaps the most important economic
principle) summarises the country's economic system as follows: " The Economic system of the
Islamic Republic of Iran consists of three sectors: governmental, co-operative and private, with
systematic and sound planning.
The governmental sector consists of all major industries, foreign trade, major moneys, banking,
insurance, power production, dams and major watercarrying networks, radio and television, postal,
telegraph and telephone system, air, sea, land and railroad transportation, and others similar to the
above, which in the form of public ownership are at the disposal of the government.
The co-operative sector establishes and assigns the co-operative companies and organisations which
have been created in the cities and villages in accordance with Islamic regulations.
The private sector consist of those portions of agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, trade, and
services which supplement the activities of the governmental and co-operative sectors.
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owned by major businessmen associated with the Pahlavi family) was imposed on the
government as the owners and managers of factories had left the country and some
enterprises were on the edge of breakdown. The Iranian economy in the aftermath of
the 1979 revolution has been subjected to a number of adverse external and internal
shocks. The revolution, the lengthy and costly war with Iraq, the freezing of Iranian
assets, the economic isolation of the country, and the downward oil price shocks of the
1980s all have taken their toll on the economy (Karshenas, 1995).
The Islamic Republic of Iran imposed exchange controls to initially stop the post-
revolutionary capital flight . However, exchange controls then became one of the main
economic devices to allocate limited foreign exchange as foreign exchange became
increasingly scarce.
The outbreak of the war with Iraq, which could be regarded as the beginning of a new
period, provided a new framework through which the government could impose a
collection of new restrictions and regulations. Quantitative constraints on foreign trade
(particularly imports) to conserve foreign exchange (external balance); the rational
distribution of basic necessities, foreign exchange allocation (to restrain capital flight),
and wage-price controls (to retain internal balance). The constraints imposed by war,
the freezing of assets, western economic sanctions, and oil market volatility,
interrupted the development of a sustainable and coherent economic system12.
The necessity of pursuing a year-to-year managed strategy -dependent on the oil
fortune- resulted in a public mode of action and policy formulation based on what may
be called expedient discrimination `. This strategy manifested itself in : establishing a
dozen different exchange rates for different categories of imports; granting various
types and amounts of subsidies to domestic social-economic procedures; setting up
different foreign exchange quotas for various industries, activities and institutions;
Ownership in these three sectors shall be protected by the laws of the Islamic Republic as long as this
ownership is in conformance with the other essentials of this chapter, does not depart from Islamic
precepts, promotes economic growth and development for the country, and does not harm the society.
The details regarding the standards, procedures, and conditions for all three of these sectors will be
determined by law."(Middle East Journal, 34, 1980, 184-204)
Although the private sector has appeared weak and 'supplementary' in this principle, in principle 43,
however, a strong warning is given against "turning the government into a major absolute
employer" `(Pesaran, 1982).
12 A five-year plan that was worked out in great detail in 1982-1983 but never got off the ground at
that time.
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designating different rates and volumes of foreign exchange surrender obligations for
non-oil exports; offering different price subsidies to essential consumer goods;
allowing different permissions to certain privileged business operators; and
guaranteeing arbitrary protection of property rights belonging to different groups and
individuals.
The most outstanding feature of this period was the regime's extraordinary flexibility in
seeking, sorting, interpreting and justifying pragmatic, ad hoc solutions.
The third period, which began after the cease-fire in 1988, continued, more or less, till
now. During this period the dominant economic policies are mainly: emphasising
domestic private enterprise; price de-control; trade liberalisation; business
deregulation; export promotion; attraction of foreign private investment, and
repatriation of Iranian Capital, management and entrepreneurship, speedy exchange
rate adjustment; and wholesale privatisation of non-defence industries.
2.3.2 Economic Steps
The first period of decline actually began in 1978/79 with nation wide strikes, street
demonstrations, physical damage to property, and other revolutionary events that cut
down productive economic activity. The negative trend continued in the first year of
the revolution, and was accelerated in the second year due to a significant fall in oil
revenue, flight of capital and skilled labour, the war with Iraq and a sharp overall drop
in investment. Economic activity in the second half of 1978/79 showed a sudden
decline, followed by an equally drastic fall in oil exports, industrial activity,
construction, and government revenues. Only the agricultural sector showed notable
growth. Real GDP at factor cost experienced a decline of 10.9 percent during 1978/79,
followed by another 5.2 percent fall in 1979/80. Again, agriculture was the only area to
show growth, along with the services sector. The oil sector, on the other hand,
experienced a 19.4 percent decline (on top of a 28.7 percent fall in the previous year),
and industry showed a 15.7 percent drop. The fall in industrial output (combined with
the smaller than expected rise in farm output and reduced imports due to trade
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sanctions) caused both unemployment and inflation to rise. Industries dependence on
imports of raw materials and spare parts at a time of foreign exchange shortage caused
industrial output to decline below the already depressed level of 1979/80.
In 1980/81 the oil sector showed a drastic 65.8 (Table 2-9) percent drop in value from
the year before, causing real GDP to take another 14.9 percent decline. The Iraqi
invasion of Iran in 1980/81 caused enormous damage to main parts of industry and
resulted in a drastic drop in capacity utilisation. This event caused government
revenues to decline and government expenditure to increase, and so the budget deficit
increased. During the four-year recession 1978-81, the decline in real output amounted
to about 33 percent, bringing the real 1981/82 GDP to the same levels as those of the
early 1970s. As could be expected, the most negatively affected sector after oil was
manufacturing, where among others, the shortage of foreign exchange, and severe
difficulties in obtaining raw materials from either domestic or foreign suppliers played
havoc with the normal production process. Almost 12 percent of the labour force were
officially out of the work in 1981/82.
The deterioration in oil exports caused by the oil industry strike before the victory of
revolution and the devastation of the war reduced the foreign exchange available in the
market, whilst demand was increasing. From the mid-1980s this process led to a policy
of import compression and strict foreign exchange controls and rationing which
heightened inflationary pressures in the economy.
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Table 2-9 The Sectoral Composition of GDP (1977-1991) (B. Rials; 1982 prices)
Agriculture 0112 Industry Services GDP' Non-oil
GDP3
1977 1640,4 4408.3 2330.0 4817.3 12851.3 8443.0
1978 1747.2 3144.0 2104.3 4841.1 11440.9 8296.9
(-1.7)%
1979 1851.2 2535.2 1773.7 4964.4 10841.3 8306.1
(0.11)
1980 1914.9 866.1 1874.4 4855.0 9228.4 8362.3
(.07)
1981 1952.7 882.6 1875.1 4507.2 9031.7 8149.1
(-2.5)
1982 2091.4 1947.7 1884.0 4543.4 10335.4 8387.7
(2.9)
1983 2193.0 2006.3 2254.6 5135.6 11517.6 9511.3
(13.4)
1984 2353.7 1625.6 2364.3 5260.5 11522.1 9896.5
(4.0)
1985 2537.6 1644.4 2232.2 5373.2 11723.6 10079.2
(1.9)
1986 2650.5 1403.0 2032.7 4654.7 10692.5 9289.5
(-7.8)
1987 2715.8 1598.7 2084.1 4340.5 10736.2 9137.5
(-1.6)
1988 2648.0 1745.0 1978.1 4030.2 10360.6 8606.6
(-5.8)
1989 2746.0 1889.5 2109.1 4100.9 10799.9 8910.4
(3.5)
1990 2967.5 2264.7 2391.8 4499.6 12045.2 9780.5
(9.8)
1991 3118.8 2488.8 2834.3 4738.9 13090.6 10601.8
(8.4)
I Factor cost, adjusted for Imputed service charges. 2 Includes oil extraction and refining. 3 =GDP -Oil
sector; Average growth rate 1979-1991=%2.02.
Source: Bank Markazi: Iran's National Accounts 1974/75-1987/88; Iran's National Accounts 1988/89-
1990/91; and annual Review 1991/92.
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With the partial restoration of political stability and a gradual return of public certainty,
real output resumed its pre-revolution growth trend in 1982/83. The ensuing four-year
recovery period was largely underwritten by the resumption of oil exports, and
particularly by the relatively firm prices of crude oil. Rising oil revenues enabled the
government to finance larger imports of industrial inputs and other raw materials
needed for industrial growth. For the four-year period, the average annual real GDP
and non-oil GDP growth rates were as considerable as 6.8% and 5.6% respectively.
The favourable growth cycle was reversed in 1986/87 through to 1988/89, as a result
of a drastic fall in the price of oil, and the loss of oil exports caused by attacks on oil
facilities and oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. High war expenditures, the fall in oil
income, and exhausted foreign exchange resources, brought almost all foreign-
exchange dependent domestic economic activities to a pause. Real GDP dropped by
8.8 percent in 1986/87 when capacity utilisation in industry fell as low as 30 percent in
certain activities, and other sectors also experienced large declines. A drop in farm
output in 1988/89, combined with the sluggish recession in the industry and services
sectors contributed to form another negative growth rate of 3.6 percent in that year.
With the launching of a new five-year plan in 1989/90, and a distinct shift in the
government's priorities and policies, substantial resources released from war efforts,
and a noteworthy improvement in oil production and exports helped the 1989/90 GDP
realise a 4.2 percent rise in real terms. The growth picked up speed in 1990/91 when
the oil and industry sectors took the lead and pushed GDP up by 11.5 percent (Table 2-
9). The positive growth rates continued through the Plan-years (although with a
diminishing trend).
Overall, despite the presence of some destructive events such as war, political shocks
and frequent oil shocks, by the end of 1991/92, real GDP had reached a level around 2
percent above that of 1977/78. But, because of a high population growth, per capita
real GDP was only about 62 percent of the level achieved before the revolution (Table
2-10) (see Amuzegar, 1993 , table 4.2 and 4.3 for more details).
Broadly speaking, the developments in the Iranian economy over the period after
revolution have been shaped by the policy response of the government, within the
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constraints set by the pre-existing structures of the Iranian economy and the newly
emerging post-revolutionary institutions.
Table 2-10 Trend of gross domestic producta
1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90
Total (IR bn)
At current prices 16556 18126 21270 23588 28122
At constant (1985/86) prices 16556 15163 14994 14270 ...
Real change (%) 4.2 -8.4 -1.1 -4.8 ...
Per head (1R)b
At current account 34621 36663 41641 44912 51886
At constant (1985/86) prices 34621 30669 29354 27171 ...
Real change (%) 0.1 -11.4 -4.3 -7.4 ...
a Years beginning March 21. b Calculated using IMF population estimates.
Source: E1U Country Profile 1992-93.
2.3.3 Oil : A Free Gift?
The oil sector in an oil exporting developing country is usually regarded as an alien
sector; that is alien in its ownership, control, management, production, pricing,
marketing and downstream operations (Amuzegar, 1983)
The modern history of development planning in Iran is largely an analysis of the
utilisation of oil revenues and any credits that could be raised for the creation of new
assets. Success came late and was relatively brief; being restricted to the period
1964/65 to 1972/73.
The 1979 revolution brought about significant changes in the structure and policy
direction of Iran's hydrocarbon sector, particularly the petroleum industry. In fact, no
other sector of the Iranian economy was as thoroughly affected by the 1979 revolution,
and subject to so many conflicting internal policies. Similarly, no other factor
influenced the behaviour and performance of the domestic economy as much as
petroleum output and exports. The industry had to also bear the burst of the war;
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absorb the new policies imposed by the new regime and adjust to a global oil market
that went from boom to bust , and bust to boom. Within a 14-year period after the
revolution, crude oil prices tripled during the first year of the revolution, fell to one-
fifth of the early peak in 1986, and shot up again to near the early 1980 level after the
Persian Gulf war, before settling down to a mid-range between the two extremes.
The share of the oil sector in GDP declined sharply from more than 30 per cent in
1977/78 to about 8 per cent in 1991/92 13 . Responsible for this volatile swing were such
diverse factors as the early decision by the Islamic Republic to 'save' oil by cutting
down output 14, foreign economic sanctions, damage inflicted by war, wild fluctuations
in world prices for crude oil, and poor maintenance of oil wells.
Revolutionary turmoil, strikes, and oil workers' demands reduced Iran's oil output
from a peak of 6.1 mb/d in September 1978 to 1.4 mb/d in the first part of November,
and by December. 1978 oil exports totally ceased, and were only partially resumed in
March 1979. The war with Iraq after Sept. 1980, continuous wrangling within OPEC,
and Iran's need for foreign exchange, subsequently determined the oil industry's level
of output and export.
The strikes by oil workers during the last months of the Shah's regime with their
crippling effect upon industries and urban life brought the country's oil production to a
complete termination and as a result the average daily crude output in 1978/79
declined by about 24 percent and amounted to 4.25 million b/d. The oil output
recovered quite slowly after the revolution, but because of some economic and
political problems started to decline again and fell from the average daily rate of 3.9
million b/d in the first quarter of 1978/79 to 2.4 million b/d in the last quarter of that
year. The export of oil also fell very sharply during these years, but thanks to the
doubling of Iran's crude oil (light 34° A.P.I.) prices from $ 16.57 per barrel in April
1979 to $ 32.50 per barrel in February 1980, Iran's revenues from oil and gas exports
amounted to $ 19.4 billion in 1979/80 (7.2 percent above the figure for 1978/79).
13 It should be remembered that the oil revenues have been converted into domestic currency at the
(overvalued) official exchange rate. So, the decline of the share of oil revenues in GDP could to some
extent be due to this fact.
14 By mid-January 1979, daily output was cut to only 700,000 barrels or below domestic consumption-
compared with 5.7 mb/d of production and 4.9 mb/d of exports as late as October
1978.(Amuzegar,1993 )
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The increase in oil revenues in 1979/80 coupled with lower imports of goods and
services resulted in an impressive net current account surplus of $ 6.1 billion, which in
turn meant an addition of $ 5.8 billion to the country's foreign exchange reserves
(Pesaran, 1982). Furthermore, the share of oil and gas revenues in total foreign
exchange receipts , which had stood at about 80 percent in 1977/78, increased even
further to 86 percent in 1979/80.
The doubling of the oil price in 1979 and 1980 reduced the demand for OPEC oil from
30m b/d in 1979 to about 23m b/d in 1981. This affected Iran's oil exports more than
other OPEC countries. Responsible for this were a complex of political factors and the
higher-oil price policy of Iran as well (see Fesharalci, 1985).
Iran has found adjustment to a declining international market for oil since 1982
difficult. Deterioration in the income generated by the oil and gas industry was
intensified by a cut in gas exports to the former USSR in the immediate aftermath of
the revolution. With the exception of a brief period of recovery during 1982-1983,
Iran's main economic prop -oil revenue- was gradually whittled away by events mainly
outside its control. By the time of oil price crash of 1986 the country was already
suffering acutely from economic contraction.
Although there was a recovery in the international oil price after 1989, the impact on
Iranian revenues was minor because export volumes remained depressed and costs of
crude exports remained abnormally high. These high costs are a legacy of the damage
done in the revolution and Iran-Iraq war and the inadequate maintenance undertaken
since 1979.
Table 2-11: Oil performance in economy
Average annual growth rate Oil Portions
1959-64 1964-72 1959-72 1959 1964 1972
Total Output 5.1 11.7 9.1 100 100 100
Oil Sector 12.2 10.9 11.4 10.4 12.2 27.4
Total
Employment:
2.4 2.7 2.6 100 100 100
Employment in
Oil sector
5.9 2.8 4.1 0.5 0.6 0.4
ource: Karshenas (1990), p. 210
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2.3.3.1 Government revenue and oil income
The expenditure effect of oil revenues is the main impact of these revenues on
domestic economy in oil exporting counties (see Corden, 1984). The organisations
which are responsible for distributing oil revenues among various economic sections
(investment, consumption, ...) are usually, directly or indirectly, under the state
contro1 15 . Therefore, the role of government in these countries may be very different to
what it would otherwise has been in the absence of oil. Any boom or bust in the oil
sector could affect the state's fiscal and monetary policies, including tax and money
supply arrangements. It is sometimes even believed that the big size of the government
in these countries is, in fact, an essential requirement in order to smooth the oil-
induced economic fluctuations and inflexibility in the supply side of their economy
(Karshenas 1990).
Usually referred to as the 'Dutch Disease', massive and excessive incomes from oil
exports have given the false sign of a more favourable balance-of-payment position
than would otherwise have been possible, and an 'equilibrium' rate of exchange valued
at a much higher level than would otherwise have been the case. This unwarranted and
spurious feeling of well-being has discouraged non-oil exports, encouraged imports
and foreign dependent domestic production, and stimulated capital exports, instead of
promoting internal investment. As a consequence, the economy has become more
volatile in the short run as oil prices have fluctuated beyond the country's control in
the global market. In the longer run, as oil is gradually depleted, the country is unlikely
to be able to finance its accustomed levels of consumption because of the paucity of
income-generating investments and the dwindling supplies of foreign exchange.
Table 2-12 shows the performance of the government in Iranian economy during the
pre revolutionary period. The government's total revenue is derived from three main
sources: oil and gas revenues; non-oil revenues; and special revenues. Oil and gas
15 In most of oil exporting developing countries, like Iran, oil revenue accrues directly to the
government. Whereas, in oil exporting developed countries like UK the government imposes a high
tax rate on the oil companies which acquire oil revenues.
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income accrued from the export of crude oil and natural gas. Non-oil revenues consist
of tax receipts and non-tax earnings. It is clear that along with any increase in oil
revenue (row 2), the rate of growth of the government revenue shows an increase (row
1). While the share of oil revenue in total government revenue stood at 58.4 percent
for pre oil boom period (1971-1973), this portion reached its peak at 83.1 percent in
1974 and then again diminished to 75.5 percent in the post boom years. Annual
government revenues gradually increased from 24.4 percent of GDP in 1971-73 to
38.8 percent of GDP in 1974 and then 43.1 percent of GDP in 1975-78.
Table 2-12 Growth and Structure of Government Revenues
1971-73 1974 1975-78
Annual Rate of Growth of Total
Government revenues (% p.a.)
33.5 171.4 19.1
Annual Rate of Growth of Oil revenue (%
p.a.)
Share of Major Revenue Components in
Total Government Revenues:
41.8 258.1 35.2
Non-Oil Tax Revenue 30.7 12.8 18.5
Oil revenue 58.4 83.1 75.5
Ratio of Total Government Revenues to
GDP
24.4 38.8 43.1
Ratio of Non-Oil tax to Non-Oil GDP 9.9 9.2 12.8
Source: Amuzegar (1983, P.44-45)
The importance of oil revenues from oil and gas accounted for 72 percent of the
government's total revenues in 1979/80 as compared with the figure of 74 percent in
1977/78 (see Pesaran 1982).
After revolution annual government revenues gradually declined from more than 34
percent of GDP (at market prices) in 1977/78 to about 10.5 percent of GDP in
1988/89, before turning up again to about 31 percent in 1992/1993. A sharp drop in oil
and gas revenues, as the main part of government revenues were to blame. The fall in
oil revenue was partly due to the limited volume of crude exports caused by the war-
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related damage to the oil facilities and the depressed prices of oil in some years. But
the main reason for the declining oil-GDP ratio was the government's deliberate policy
of calculating the value of its petrodollars at an artificially overvalued official rate of 1R
70=$ 1. (Amuzegar, 1983)
Since the government budget deficit is usually financed through borrowing from the
country's banking system, in the case of a decline in oil revenue this borrowing must
increase16 . In other words, any increase in trade deficit must usually be compensated
for by a budget deficit to provide the necessary funds for investment or other part of
public expenditure.
Table 2-13 GDP by Sectoral Origin (Percentage share in total)a
1
1962163 d 1963/64 1968/69 1973/74 1977/78 1985/86 1990/91
Agriculture 27.9 30.3 21.8 13.1 8.5 17.6 17.8
Oil 18.6 14.3 17.3 34.9 32.5 12.9 19.4
Industry 15.8 13.4 17.1 16.9 18.7 18.2b 15.813
Services 37.7 42.0 43.8 35.1 40.3 51.8e 47.0
GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
a. Sources: 1963/64-1977/78 from Amuzegar (1993, pp.339) and thereafter from EIU Country Profile 1992/93
(pp. 20) (Years beginning March 21)
b. including mines.
c. Including -0.5% imputed bank service change.
d Data in this column have been taken from Pesaran (1982, p.506).
6Dailami (1979) examined the extent of contribution of foreign reserves to the supply of the monetary
base in Iran. He concluded that this contribution fluctuated from value of -9 percent in the 1970 to a
maximum value of 163 percent in 1974, while it exhibited a rather stable pattern contributing on the
average 48 percent (p. 17).
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partly due to the increase in oil revenue in these years. A considerable oil depression
happened in 1985 and again affected the trend of non-oil GDP after that year.
Figure 2-3 Non-oil Real GDP 17 (B. Rials)
2.3.5 Inflation
During 1960s Iranian economy enjoyed a stable price level. The annual rates of
increase in the average level of consumer prices ranged from 1 to 6 percent during
1968-72. All corresponding inflation rates after this period jumped to two digits values
amounting to as much as 27 percent in 1977. As Looney (1982) argues, 'injection of
oil revenues beyond a certain level, that is annual absorptive capacity, only led to
higher inflationary pressures with little or no corresponding increase in output resulting
from this expenditure.' (p. 141). International inflationary pressure which expanded
after 1973/74 oil shock is also partly responsible for intensification of domestic
inflation process since that year.
A comparison of the rate of increase in the money supply and that of the major
inflation indexes indicates that in the post-1973 period the Iranian economy had
17 Source: Economic Report and Balance Sheet; Bank Markazi Iran, several issues (CPI were used to
convert the different-base raw data to 1990's base year)
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advanced beyond its absorptive capacity, in the sense of finding the complementary
factors of production (such as human skills and infrastructure) to be put to work
alongside the rapid increase in financial resources. Apparently, injections of oil
revenues beyond a certain level (annual level of capacity absorb) only led to higher
inflationary pressures with little or no corresponding increase in output resulting from
this expenditure.
During 1974 and 1975 almost all exporting developing countries implemented four
major types of fiscal policies to avoid inflationary pressure in their countries: (1) direct
subsidy payments on a wide range of goods and services. (2) indirect subsidy payments
through the pricing policies of public enterprises like electricity and water and energy.
(3) tax elimination or reduction on several categories of domestic goods and services;
and (4) the abolition of user prices for public services of health, education, and other
areas. (Morgan, 1979)
Table 2-14 Inflation Rates
1960-67 1968-73 1974-77
Average annual rate of 2.5 3.7 15.5
Inflation (%)
Source: Amuzagar (1993, p. 6)
After oil price increasing in 1973, Fifth Five Year Economic Plan was dramatically
revised. Total investment was doubled and social welfare and subsidy programs were
strongly supported through allocating of huge amounts to them. Government's
expenditures grew 200% between 1973-1974. From total budget in 1974, 28% went to
fixed capital formation, and 72% to current or semi-current expenditures. Such a great
expansion in government expenditure made its necessary increase in money supply and
hence caused a massive increase in effective demand. To reply to this excess demand,
producers and traders tried to provide the needed production factors and material from
domestic and foreign markets. Although the availability of foreign exchange made it
possible to import part of needed goods and services, the existed bottlenecks and
limitations in domestic facilities (like skilled workers and infrastructure capacity) and
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the rigidity of supply side of the domestic economy exerted a considerable inflationary
pressure on non-tradable sectors. This inflationary pressure , then, spilled over into
other economic sectors, plus imported inflation mentioned above built up a range of
higher inflation rates during post-1973 oil shock.
The increase in the rate of inflation in the first half of the 1970s together with the
government's seeming inability to stabilise the price level dramatised the need for a
deeper understanding of the country's inflation process. Something of a debate
concerning the precise cause of the rapidly accelerating price level transpired during
this period. In particular the role of money and monetary policy in controlling increase
in domestic price was a commonly debated topic in planning areas18.
The officially announced price index increased by an average 19.2 percent annually
from 1977 to 1982. In 1983, due to a short-run improvement in the economy's
macroeconomics performance, the rate of inflation slowed down. Also in 1984, the
rate of inflation was reduced to some extent, but this time it was due to an anti-
inflationary credit policy of the government and the decline of aggregate demand.
Since 1985, aggregate supply has also decreased, increasing rates of inflation and
unemployment. By 1988 inflation rate reached a value higher than 20 percent and
continued to rise until 1988 when the Iraq-Iran war seized. Since then inflation rate
was decreasing and in 1990 reached 7.7 percent°.
Despite the downward bias in official data, price developments over the years since the
revolution can still show reasonably clear trends.
Figures supplied by Bank Markazi (central bank of Iran) for all post revolution years
point to a persistently upward inflationary movement, albeit at different and irregular
annual rates.
18 One generalisation of the inflation process in Iranian economy relies on monetary view of inflation.
Defenders of this theory argues that given the proper monetary and fiscal policies, a steady rates of
economic growth accompanied with price stability would appeared. Another analysis of sources of
inflation treats the existed constraints in socio-economic structure of the country as the most
important responsible factor for the inflation. Structuralists argue that even with a proper monetary
and fiscal policies, given the existed institutional and socio-political bottlenecks in the economy,
inflation would be an inevitable phenomenon, especially when a sudden and large demand capacity
set upon domestic markets. (for more discussion on this topic see Karshenas, 1990; Noorbakhsh,
1990, Looney, 1982 and 1985).
19 Construction programmes conducted since post-war years started a new stream of inflationary
pressure in the Iranian economy and emerges some exceptional and historical values since then.
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Budgetary deficit that increase demand for goods and services, combined with
structural supply rigidities, leads to a chronic excess demand that merely knocked up
prices, leads to higher inflation and restrains the expansion of output, during post-
revolutionary period (1980-1990), this problem has been aggravated by the fall in
output which has given rise to a rare stagflation.
During 1978 1979 the overall consumer price inflation was held down to less than 11%
on average. In 1980, CPI shows 23.5% and growth in WPI (wholesale price index)
rose from 19.85 in previous year to 30.5%. Outbreak of war with Iraq in September
1980, a devastating decline in oil production and revenues (which resulted in a
significant reduction in imports of consumer goods and industrial inputs) accelerated
inflationary pressure in this year. In 1981 by introducing some proper distribution
policies such as war-induced rationing policy, the inflation rates decreased to 22.8%
(CPI) and 19.4% (WPI). These indices again reduced in 1982 to 19.2% and 13.7%
respectively. In 1983 because of some improvements in industrial sector on one hand
and introducing a more stringent distribution policy on the other hand, inflation rates
reduced to 15% (CPI) and 8% (WPI). A decline in current and public investment
expenditures resulted in a reduction in budget deficit, accompanied with a reduction in
private sector liquidity, resulted in a fall in aggregate demand. These developments
together with simultaneous improvements in supply side (agriculture and industry)
gave rise to further reduction in inflation and produced 10.4% (CPI) and 7.6% (WPI)
in 1984 and 6.9% and 7.3% in 1985. A considerable reduction in public sector
investment plus continued government subsidisation on basic necessities and a fall in
circulation of money supply, were the major causes. In 1986 an unprecedented rise in
the government budget deficit (due to a sharp decline in oil revenues) intensified the
inflationary pressure. In this year CPI and WPI rose by 23.7% and 22.1% respectively.
Inflationary spiral continued in subsequent year (1987) and reached the rates of 27.7%
(CPI) and 29.7% (WPI). Another reduction in oil price in 1988 affected public
revenues and raised budget deficit to 50% of total public expenditures and resulted in
28.9% and 22% inflation in CPI and WPI respectively. Cease-fire in August 1988
eased military expenditure and subsequently reduced the Rial cost of certain import
items (because of an appreciation occurring in free market exchange rate). This
situation continued, more or less, in two subsequent years, 1989 and 1990. In 1989
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CPI rose by 17.4%, and by 18.4% while the corresponding rates in 1990 show 9% and
23.9% respectively. With acceleration of peacetime economic activities particularly
growing demand for construction materials, basic commodities, industrial parts, and
skilled labour in 1991, CPI inflated by an estimated of 19.6 percent and WPI by 28.1%.
The clearest linkage between the fall in exchange revenues and the rise in prices is
apparent in the increase in liquidity resulting from budget insufficiency and the
consequent extra money creation.
2.3.6 Exchange Rate Movements
The Rial is the basic unit of currency in Iran. With the exception of only a few years,
Iran has had an official market for currency and a parallel market for foreign exchange.
(Mazarei, 1995)
Performance of the Iranian Rial has been highly variable in last decades. It officially
stood at JR 70=$ 1 during much of the 1970s but began a protracted and at the same
times spectacular collapse in 1981/82. An arbitrary revaluation steadied the official rate
in 1984/85.
A dual exchange rate system based on the use of export certificates was in effect until
a unified exchange rate system was put into place in March 1956. Up to May 1957,
foreign reserves (including gold and IMF accounts) were converted at the old principal
import rate which was 32.5 Rls per US dollar. In May 1957 foreign reserves were
converted at the new unified rate of 75.5. It should be noted that this unification of the
exchange rate did not amount to a devaluation of the exchange rate as far as the
private sector traders were concerned. The rate applicable to them before March 1957,
including the export certificates rate, was 76.5. The main effect of this act was in the
public sector by more than doubling the Rial value of government oil export revenues,
and turning the hidden subsidies on the import of essential goods into open subsidies
(see Karshenas, 1990, p. 98 foot. 16).
Prior to the oil boom of the early 1970s, Iran operated a fixed exchange rate system
under which the Rial was pegged to the US dollar. Between January 1974 and
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November 1978, Iran officially had a dual foreign exchange rate system comprising a
fixed commercial and a 'free' commercial rate. However, the central bank intervened
frequently in support of the Rial in the 'free market', and the country operated under a
virtually unified exchange rate system. In February 1975, the pegging of the Rial to
the dollar was abrogated in order to reduce the rial's sensitivity to fluctuations in the
value of the US dollar vis-a-vis the other major currencies, and an SDR peg was
adopted at a par value of 82.2 Rials for SDR. In addition, the commercial rate was
allowed to float within a ± 2.25 percent band. The US dollar, nevertheless, remained as
the currency of intervention by the central bank. Throughout this period the parallel
market exchange rate floated closely above the official exchange rate.
Since the advent of the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Iranian Rial has depreciated
against the US dollar by more than 30 times. In 1978 the nominal parallel exchange
rate between the Rial and the dollar was about 77 Rials per dollar (in the same year the
official exchange rate was almost 70.5 Rials per dollar).
With the expansion of domestic political tensions and of capital flight, the Central Bank
of Iran discontinued its support of the Rial in the free market in November 1978. In
May 1979, the commercial and the non commercial rates were replaced by two fixed
exchange rates: an 'official' and a devalued 'unofficial' rates.
Furthermore, surrender requirements on foreign transactions were reinstated. In May
1980, the official rate was devalued from 82.2 Rials/SDR to 92.3 Rial/SDR and
became characterised by a multiplicity of exchange rates. The exchange system was
further modified during the 1980s in response to domestic and external shocks. In
some years, Iran operated under a system of over ten exchange rates. However, the
actual structure and coverage of these rates had not been officially sanctioned.
As a result, after the revolution, the previously relatively liberal exchange system"
became restrictive, bilateral, complex and inefficient. Trade became vastly restricted
and regulated, and the exchange system became multiple and controlled. Imports
became a virtual state monopoly for most of the 1980s.
201n this period the availability of huge amounts of oil revenues, the regime's access to international
financial market and the external and internal political silence had provided a necessary situation to
keep relative stability in the foreign exchange market.
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The twenty fold increase in premium during 1980s in the parallel exchange markets
was indicative of the extensive subsidies which the government was providing to those
institutions and individuals which benefited from the government's foreign exchange
rationing system (Karshenas, 1995).
Iran's exchange and trade system was partly liberalised following the end of the war
with Iraq in 1988. In January 1991, the foreign exchange regime was drastically
simplified and the existing seven exchange rates were replaced by three rates. The three
rates included: the official rate (92.3 Rials/SDR --,-,' 70 Rials/US dollar), the
'competitive' rate (600 Rials/US $), and a floating exchange rate. To complete this
step, the government reduced drastically the extent of exchange and trade restrictions.
Numerous import items were moved from the official to the competitive rate and
surrender requirements on non-oil exports were abolished. Furthermore, foreign
exchange receipts from non-oil exports were made convertible under the floating rate.
After much anticipation, the multiple exchange rate system was virtually unified in
March 1993 (1540 Rials/US $). However, the unification was reversed in December
1993. (Mazarei, 1995)
The level of the exchange rate can affect the range of a country's export sector,
expanding it when the exchange rate depreciates and contracting it when it appreciates.
Concern with the structure of exports, especially with increasing the share and
maintaining the competitiveness of non-oil exports, makes the exchange rate
particularly important for the oil exporting country's development prospects. In this
sense, the right equilibrium exchange rate is a necessary, though not a sufficient,
condition for export diversification.
Although changes in nominal exchange rate is the first step toward the diversification
objective in exports sector, the success of exchange rate policy, however, is
conditioned by its final effects on real exchange rate. In oil-exporting developing
countries, expressly, such a policy could be useful to improve the competitive position
of their non-oil exports only if the depreciation is supported by other complementary
and consistent monetary and fiscal policies. Any attempt to expand expenditure beyond
Chap 2: Iranian Economy	 47
Table 2-15 Official and Black Market Exchange Rates
year Official Black Market
1960 75.75 80.142
1961 75.75 86.604
1962 75.75 91.666
1963 75.75 91.542
1964 75.75 82.166
1965 75.75 80.792
1966 75.75 78.863
1967 75.25 76.454
1968 75.9 76.412
1969 76.38 77.771
1970 76.38 79.213
1971 76.38 79.179
1972 76.38 77.333
1973 67.63 71.3
1974 67.63 68.354
1975 69.28 67.758
1976 70.63 72.104
1977 70.48 74.588
1978 70.48 76.925
1979 70.48 127.875
1980 72.32 200.75
1981 79.49 302.917
1982 83.43 452.083
1983 88.16 366.083
1984 93.99 509.125
1985 84.23 598.288
1986 75.64 678.166
1987 65.62 1000.4
1988 68.59 957
1989 70.24 1275
1990 65.31 1400
Source: IFS various issues for official rates; World Currency Yearbook
various issues for black rates.
60 65 70 75 80 85 90
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Figure 2-4 Official and Black Market Exchange Rates (1960-90)
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the economy's short-run absorptive capacity (which is usually encouraged by the
'excess' available oil revenue) will simply give rise to relative and general price level
effects that will blur the relative price and expenditure-reducing effects of the
depreciation. Behdad (1988) asserts that the devaluation policy 'is not an effective
instrument in the case of an oil-exporting country with a heavily import-dependent
industrial sector' (p.16). An effective devaluation is expected to lead to an
improvement in the balance of payments through reducing imports and encouraging
exports. In oil exporting developing countries imports react to devaluation very
sluggishly. On the other hand, more than 90% of their exports (oil) is determined
exogeneously, that is, independent of exchange rate devaluation.
In many oil exporting countries, the process of adjustment initiated by the rise in oil
revenues has been accompanied by a deterioration in their non-oil current accounts,
domestic inflation, a rise in the prices of non-oil traded goods relative to those of
traded goods, and a tendency toward corresponding changes in the structure of
domestic production. These developments have been very important in bringing about
balance of payments adjustment on current account. At the same time, however, they
have also been regarded as interfering with the efforts of these countries to create a
more diversified base of non-oil production.
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The question of what is the correct exchange rate policy for the oil exporting countries
to follow under these circumstances does not have a simple answer. Normally, a
country with a persistent balance of payments surplus would be expected to consider
an appreciation element in a mix of corrective policies. In some oil exporting countries,
the structure of domestic production is determined largely by government decisions
without regard to market incentives. In these instances, the effects of exchange rate
changes likely to be much smaller than in most non-oil developing countries. (IMF
(1980) Annual Report of the Executive Board, p.51-52)
Nevertheless, in a number of oil exporting countries the market plays a significant role;
and in these countries another objection is raised against a policy that results in an
appreciation of the national currency, namely, that it discourages diversification of the
non-oil traded goods sector. The desirability of encouraging the growth of this sector,
and the correct timing of such encouragement, varies considerably among economies,
depending on the projected time span and size of oil earnings, as well as on the
immediate development needs of each country.
Where encouragement of the non-oil traded goods sector is desired, suitable incentives
may include special government assistance to certain activities and changes in the
structure of taxes and subsidies. The use of exchange rate policy to faster a more
diversified non-oil sector, as has sometimes been suggested, would in general be a less
effective way of encouraging this development than would policies aimed directly at
reducing the growth of consumption expenditure or at augmenting the share of
expenditure devoted to investment. This is especially so in countries that already have
large balance of payments surplus, since in these circumstances exchange rate
depreciation tends to result in increases in wages, prices, and money supplies that
offset the initial effect of the depreciation on relative prices and domestic expenditure.
2.3.7 Foreign Trade
As I have noted before, owing to the large inflow of foreign exchange (and large
balance of payment surpluses in some oil exporting developing countries), there has
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been a tendency for the domestic currency to appreciate (in nominal, or real senses),
with a harmful impact on the competitiveness of domestic production and the objective
of diversification.
Following the 1973-74 oil boom, a real appreciation was come about in some countries
by nominal appreciation accompanied by domestic inflation. In other countries where
the nominal exchange rate was fixed, the real appreciation was achieved through higher
domestic inflation. The major effect of this appreciation was to reduce the
attractiveness of non-oil tradable sector.
In the face of the distortions created by the shift in relative prices, and real
appreciation, most oil exporting developing countries preferred fiscal and trade
policies. The trade policies in most oil exporting countries vary significantly from one
to another. However, the same objective has been followed by them. That is, all high-
absorbing countries aimed at supplementing the domestic market with needed imports
and protecting domestic import-substitution industries21.
Iran is essentially an oil based economy, a peculiarity that shows up clearly in the
country's trade figures (Table 2-16). Oil normally accounts for more than 90 percent of
all exports. Other exports are mainly traditional items-fruits , carpets, leather and
caviar. Cotton, which closely rivalled carpets as an export in the 1970s, has been badly
damaged and exports since 1980 have been negligible. Carpet exports declined
throughout the war years. In the same way manufactures, which were gradually
gaining a foothold in foreign markets before the revolution, have fallen back markedly
in recent years.
21 Only Indonesia attempted to correct the situation with the exchange rate, devaluing the rupiah by
34 per cent in November 1978. However, after 1978, while the nominal effective exchange rate
remained relatively stable, the real effective exchange rate appreciated by about 15 per cent.(see
Amuzegar, 1983, p. 43)
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Table 2-16 The structure of foreign trade 1959-72
Percentage shares Real annual
growth rates
1959-61 1970-2 1959-72
Non-oil exports
(f.o.b.)
Primary products 75.8 60.5 6.1
Manufacturing products 24.2 39.5 15.9
Total 100 100
Total value (m$) 96.3 328.2 9.1
Imports
Consumer goods 28.0 12.5 1.4
Intermediate goods 49.9 63.6 11.7
Capital goods 22.1 23.9 11.4
Total 100 100
Total value (m$) 493.7 2516.0 9.8
Source: Karshenas (1990).
Table 2-17 Main non-oil exports by typea ($mn)
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Agricultural goods
of which:
318.1 295.0 371.0 780.7 990.7 880.3
fruit 125.5 79.8 113.3 272.4 271.7 252.6
leather 34.6 48.7 60.5 60.6 103.0 78.2
caviar 19.0 21.9 19.8 15.7 33.9 43.5
carpetsb 88.9 89.8 115.1 272.4 271.7 252.6
Metal ores 12.5 38.8 30.0 24.9 38.3 32.8
Industrial goods
of which:
26.0 27.3 64.0 109.9 131.8 232.7
chemicals 0.1 1.4 4.5 11.0 17.4 32.6
textiles 10.0 14.3 8.8 15.4 9.9 6.9
construction
materials
refined copper
3.1
-
1.1
-
08
29.0
3.3
80.8
10.2
41.8
4.5
143.5
Years beginning March 21.
Source: EIU Country Profile 1992-93. b It is not obvious that why this item-which in fact belongs to
the manufacturing products- has been accounted as a part of agricultural sector.
The revolution brought a major shift in the type of goods imported. A significant
decline took place in capital goods imports, and there was also a sharp cut in consumer
goods imports, especially in those categories assessed to be luxury goods. Food
imports rose rapidly throughout the early 1980s despite the government's emphasis on
agricultural development. The underlying trend in food imports is upwards despite
reversals in years of good rainfall.
Table 2-19 Main imports by Sectoral destination a ($ mn c.i.f )
1986/87 1987/88 1988/89
Raw	 materials	 &	 intermediate
goods
5461 5498 4829
Industrial & mines 4017 4161 3492
Construction 405 407 424
Agriculture & livestock 724 644 596
Capital goods 2199 2209 1869
Industries & mines 1190 1223 1128
Services 887 954 665
Agriculture 122 32 76
Consumer goods 1695 1662 1479
Total 9355 9369 8177
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Table 2-18 Main imports by typea (£ mn cif)
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Food	 &	 live
animals
2368 2070 1538 1039 1466 1374
Beverages	 &
tobacco
90 82 99 109 107 47
Chemicals	 &
pharmaceuticals
2084 1768 1163 1369 1428 1304
Iron,	 steel	 &
manufactures
5326 3561 3356 2258 1952 1623
Road vehicles &
machinery
6317 5452 3896 3315 3066 2804
Total	 include
others
18103 14494 11989 9355 9369 8177
d Years beginning march 21.
Source: EIU Country Profile 1992-93.
Under the Shah's regime West Germany, the USA and the UK were traditionally Iran's
major suppliers. However, after the revolution trade ties with the USA were severed
while the UK declined in importance. Germany and Japan are currently Iran's major
suppliers of manufactures (Table 2-22). Japan is a significant market for oil. Barter
agreements, mainly with the former Eastern bloc countries, increased in importance
during the 1980s although political change and the current economic crisis in these
states throws the future of this kind of trade into doubt.
Years beginning March 21.
Source: EIU Country Profile 1992-93.
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Table 2-22: Main trading partners (% of total by dollar value)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Exports to:
Japan 15.8 12.9 12.8 13.7 20.8
Italy 9.7 8.6 6.1 6.2 9.5
France 4.0 5.2 1.4 8.0 8.2
Netherlands 4.8 7.9 11.5 7.9 6.1
Brazil 0.9 3.1 2.3 2.9 6.1
Belgium/Lu
xembourg
2.0 3.1 6.4 8.3 5.8
Imports
from:
Germany* 18.7 20.0 20.8 15.3 19.8
Japan 14.4 13.3 10.2 10.4 12.4
Italy 8.1 6.4 4.7 6.3 8.5
UK 7.3 6.4 5.6 4.8 5.3
France 1.2 2.3 2.5 4.1 4.6
Turkey 7.0 5.6 6.9 6.2 4.3
* Includes former East Germany from July 1990.
Source: EIU Country Profile 1992-93
Iran enjoyed a surplus on trade throughout the 1960s, 1970s and most of the early
1980s. But since 1984 the trade balance has shown wide fluctuations, mainly reflecting
trends in the volume of oil exports and international oil prices (Tables 2-20 and 2-21).
Import spending has also fluctuated mainly in response to oil trends. The total was
rapidly reduced from the heady $ 19.4 bn of 1978 down to $9.7 bn in 1979. A slow
recovery then set in with 1982 and 1983 as the peak years, when oil revenues were
relatively high and commercial confidence was returning. An import boom began in
1991 associated with the liberalisation of trade and an increase in oil and other
revenues.
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Table 2-23: Foreign trade ($ mn)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990a
Exports
fo.b.
of which:
13328 8322 11685 9084 13600 a 18800
Petroleum
(crude oil &
products)
non-
petroleum
13115
213
7183
1139
10515
1170
8170
914
12500
1100a
17300
1500
Imports
(c.i.f)
-11635 -10521 -9570 -11800 a -14500 a -18000
Balance 1639 -2199 2115 -2716 _900 a 800
a OPEC estimates.
Source: EIU Country Profile 1992-93
Iran's current account has mainly followed oil income developments. With the collapse
of oil prices in 1986, Iran's current deficit increased more than tenfold to $ 5.2 bn,
reflecting the shift of the trade balance from healthy surplus to $ 3.4 bn deficit. The
situation began to recover in 1987 with the deficits on trade and current account
closing to $ 89 mn and $ 2.1 bn respectively. Subsequently, Iran's external position is
believed to have surged during and immediately following the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis.
Iran enjoyed a considerable surplus in foreign exchange during the mid-1970s, entirely
on account of oil revenues. The boom began to collapse in 1976 and the government
was forced to raise import controls in 1978. After 1979 the revolutionary government
imposed severe restrictions on luxury imports. Other adverse factors were also
inherited by the new government: Iran had developed as a major long-term lender
during the 1970s but had, later in the decade, become a short-term borrower, often at
disadvantageous rates. Foreign debts were frowned upon by the revolutionary
government and consistent and successful efforts were made to reduce foreign
indebtedness. Moreover, repossessing the funds owed to Iran by foreign suppliers,
commercial partners and debtors proved a long and difficult business.
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2.4 Conclusion
As oil prices (and revenues) are extremely volatile, careful government planning is
needed to insulate the economy in the short run from the resulting instability of foreign
exchange revenues from oil-exports. The evidence regarding pre-Revolutionary Iran,
however, suggests that, despite the existence of medium-term planning, short-term
fluctuations in oil export revenues were very quickly translated into government
investment, with rather short adjustment lags (Karshenas & Pesaran, 1995). The
overall growth rate in real GDP increased from 9% in 1960-1972 to 13% in 1973-79,
but the domestic inflation jumped from 2% to 13% during the same periods (see
Aghevli and Sassanpour, 1982). Imports also show a rapid growth during this period.
The public sector deficit (excluding oil income) changed from 10.6% of GNP in 1963-
67 to 32.3% in 1973-77 (see Table 2-2).
The role of oil has remained critical in Iran's economic structure, peaking at some 50
per cent of GDP during the first oil shock of 1973/74. Oil and services combined
contributed approximately 70-75 per cent of GDP in the second half of the 1970s.
The accrual of substantial revenues from the oil sector to the government in a country
like Iran inevitably casts an important role on the state in the process of development.
These same revenues also can lead to over-centralising tendencies in economic
decision making, with the government monopolising the key allocation decisions.
By the end of 1970s the Iranian economy was as an 'excessively' import-dependent
economy operating in an 'excessively' protected environment financed through oil
revenues accruing to the state. Iran, therefore, at the end of the shah's reign, was more
dependent on oil than it had been at the beginning.
The developments in the Iranian economy over the period since the revolution have
been shaped by the policy response of the government, within the constraints set by the
pre-existing structures of the Iranian economy and the newly emerging post-
revolutionary institutions.
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The main influences on the economy after revolution arose from political factors,
principally the continuing adverse effects after the Iran-Iraq war and 1991 Persian Gulf
war. During 1980-1988 the authorities had been preoccupied with the war effort, and
allocations of available financial and real resources were influenced strongly by the
claims of military. In most ways the country had a full scale war economy. Effects of
the war have been made more damaging by the losses sustained during the revolution.
The effects of the revolution and the impact of the war have been sufficient to prevent
management of the economy on any systematic and medium-term basis. The effects of
disinvestment brought on by eight years of economic dislocation were apparent in low
and sluggish rates of growth, especially in industry and even the oil sector. The
departure of trained Iranians and the problems of using emtnigrant labour have
combined to create an adverse impact through constraining the availability of skilled
managerial and technical personnel. The basic endogenous sector, agriculture, has yet
to recover from the damage done to it during the years when the oil economy was
rapidly developing between 1970-80 and the uncertainties surrounding the
revolutionary government's policies toward the sector after the 1980 land reform.
The black market which had been virtually dormant since the end of the balance of
payments crisis of the 1960s, re-emerged on account of political developments in early
1978 and became one of the most important features of Iran's post-revolutionary
economy.
33.1 Introductory Concepts
The impact of a considerable and exhaustible revenue earned from a single commodity
export on the rest of the domestic economy is usually argued in the 'Dutch Disease'
framework. This term, which appears in the economic literature over last two decades
(see Corden, 1984), refers to the transmission mechanism and the ensuing effects of
boom sector revenues in connection with other economic sectors including non-oil
traded sector (Lagged sector) and non-traded sector.
The role played by boom sector in economy under consideration is both
straightforward and complex. It is straightforward in that any random examination of
the historical record easily shows that the exports of the boom commodity is the most
dominant item in the country's export sector. Likewise, for the oil exporting
developing countries, revenues from boom sector dominate the government's fiscal
resources. Drawing general conclusions about the sector's impact on the overall
economy is much harder to judge, however. Many links that may exist between boom
sector and the rest of the economy are not generally as perceptible.
Because of the complexity of the process there is not a unique interpretation of this
mechanism: several alternative models analytically or numerically have been discussed
in the literature during the past few decades based on different scenarios: whether the
resource of the boom is privately or publicly owned; how the authorities spend the
revenues, gradually or immediately; the fiscal and monetary policies conducted after
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the boom, the structure of the economy under consideration iand so on. For example,
while in a core model of Dutch Disease, manufacturing sector is considered as the non-
boom tradables (lagged) sector which would be squeezed after a boom (de-
industrialisation phenomenon), in some cases it is the (export-oriented) agriculture
sector which is buffeted by the boom repercussions (see Pinto, 1987, where the
agriculture sector is taken as the main non oil tradables sector in Indonesia and
Nigeria).
Despite the diversities on this subject, a simple core model can be exposed as follows:
Two different effects are usually distinguished in the related literature:
I. Resource Movement Effect: According to the core model of Dutch Disease,
because of profitability increasing in the boom sector following the boom, the
mobile productive factor (for instance labour) is drawn away from the rest of the
economy, namely the non-oil tradables and the non-tradables sectors, tending to
reduce the output in these sectors. The marginal product of labour rises in the
boom sector as a result of the boom, so that, at a constant wage in terms of
tradable goods, the demand for labour in the boom sector rises, and this induces a
movement of labour out of the non-boom traded and non-traded sectors. This is
called direct de-industrialisation which comes from the resource movement effect
of the boom. (see Corden 1984 and Neary, 1985 for more details).
2. Spending Effect: As the boom raises the economy's real income, so the demand for
both (lagged) tradables and non-tradables would be raised 2 . Add to this the excess
demand from the resource movement effect in these sectors. But only the price of
non-tradables rises, given that the lagged sector price is fixed by the world trade',
thus the real exchange rate appreciates. This is called the spending effect of the
boom. Increasing the price of the non-tradable sector provides a more profitable
situation for this sector and leads to an output recovery in this sector (the
1 The adjustment problem could be very different if the case under consideration is a desert
economy' like Abu Dhabi ; an economy with a medium-size industrial sector, like, Indonesia, Nigeria
or Iran; or a developed economy with a strong industrial sector, like UK (see Hague's discussion in
Neary, 1985).
2 Assuming that all goods are normal.
3 This later assumption could be questionable when we are considering an oil boom brought about by
an oil price shock. There is considerable evidence (including our own in this paper) supporting a
direct relation between oil price shock and world prices.
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magnitude of this recovery, however, depends on the related elasticities operating
on this process: the income-elasticity of demand for non-traded goods, output-
elasticity of supply with respect to the real wage and so on). It will draw resources
out of the boom and non-boom tradable (Lagged) sectors into the non-tradable
sector; as well as shifting demand away from non-tradables towards the boom and
lagged sectors's.
From this general simple model of the Dutch Disease, there are some alternative
channels through which a boom can be accommodated. First, if the boom sector does
not show a strong participation in the domestic factor market, the resource movement
effect would not be effective (see for example, Buiter and Purvis, 1983; Fardmanesh,
1991c van Wijnbergen, 1981 and Neary, 1985). The oil sector in the oil exporting
developing countries, for instance, is considered as an 'enclave' (Pinto, 1987, for
instance) with capital-intensive and hyper-technologic features (with minimum
competition with the non-oil economy) and so this sector does not exert a considerable
resource movement effect in such economies'. The key mechanism of resource
reallocation is the real appreciation. Providing spending on non-tradables goes up
initially, output of the non-traded sector must finally be higher than in the pre-boom
situation.
Another point which should be put forward is that the term' de-industrialisation' is not
a precise concept and can not entirely cover all cases under consideration. As Corden
(1984) points out the lagging sector can produce both non-boom (oil) exportables and
importables, and it need not consist only of manufacturing industry. In some oil
exporting developing countries one can in fact recognise 'de-agriculturalisation' rather
than de-industrialisation (p., 363).
Furthermore, non-traded goods are not the only products that are physically impossible
to trade; but there are also the products that are subject to binding quantitative
restrictions, for which the prices are determined only in the domestic market, and
should then be treated as non-tradable goods even though they are potentially tradable.
4 Real appreciation could happen, either because of nominal appreciation, high domestic inflation, or
both.
5 See also McKinnon (1976) for supporting the 'enclave nature' of the oil sector in oil-exporting
developing countries.
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Fardmansh (1991) argues that some oil exporting developing countries observed a
growth in non-oil traded (manufacturing) goods during the oil boom, the opposite of
what simple Dutch Disease model predicts. Instead it was the agriculture sector which
faced a considerable reduction in its share in GDP. He explains that although the
spending effect could worsen the trade balance, a rise in the world price of
manufactured goods relative to agricultural products (the world price effect) following
the oil boom may dominate the negative effect mentioned above and lead to an
expansion in manufactured output. The observed expansion of the non-oil traded
sector in most oil-exporting developing countries has been explained by other authors
in different ways. For example, Neary and van Wijnberg (1986) consider this sector in
these countries as a protected sector and so put that sector under the non-traded
category. Benjamin, et. al. (1989) attributed this unexpected phenomenon to the
imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign goods as well as to their
linkages with the rest of the economy.' (p.90). Gelb (1986) in a comparative study of
this issue, pointed out that Indonesia has been successful in using oil revenues to
expand the non-oil tradable sector (industries and agriculture sectors). Usui (1996)
confirms that the 1978 devaluation undertaken in Indonesia has been instrumental in
this achievement.
Neary (1985) discusses a model of Dutch Disease where there may be both de-
industrialisation and real depreciation (instead of real appreciation implied in the core
model). But he stressed that nobody has yet presented a plausible model which
simultaneously had an increase in manufacturing output and a depreciation in the real
exchange rate following a boom.
Monetary aspects of the boom are parallel forces by which the boom revenue is
accommodated into the domestic economy (Edwards, 1986b), and which reinforce the
real effects. If this revenue accrues to the government and is deposited in the central
bank there will be no increase in the domestic money supply unless the government
spends at home out of the increased revenues or domestic credit to the private sector is
increased6 . In the absence of any increase in public spending, the increase in net foreign
assets of the central bank is exactly offset by the reduction in net domestic credit to the
6 In the case that this revenue accrued to the private sector and be deposited in the commercial banks,
the domestic money supply will increase.
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government (reduction in budget deficit or debt of government to the central bank). So
the money supply will increase as government domestic spending monetises the boom
revenue. In fact, the extent of change in the domestic money supply depends on the
extent of foreign exchange receipts from oil exports and the extent to which the
monetary authorities sterilise these proceeds to neutralise their effect on the domestic
money supply (Noorbakhsh, 1990).
Change in
Monetary
Base
Change in	 Change in
= Domestic	 +	 Foreign
Credit	 Reserves
Change in foreign receipts earned from oil exports (Foreign Reserves) would change
the second term in the right hand side of the monetary base expression above. The net
monetary effect of oil revenues depends on how much the first term (Domestic Credit)
would be affected by oil revenue, and the authorities' decision to accommodate the
monetary effect.'
The transformation mechanism of oil revenue into the domestic economy, including its
monetary effects, consistent with the Edward's model, is shown in the chart below (see
an outline of the empirical results of the Edward's model in the appendix). Altogether,
once the oil boom has settled down in the domestic economy, we expect an expansion
in the non-traded goods and a stagnation in the lagged sectors (agriculture and
traditional manufacturing in oil exporting developing countries and non-oil industry in
oil exporting developed countries). The overall effect on non-oil gdp, however, is
ambiguous and can not be identified beforehand.
7 For instance, authorities may decide implement an open market policy and sell public bonds to
reduce money supply. On the other hand any increase in oil revenue usually leads to a decrease in
budget deficit of the government which in turn diminish the domestic credit.
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A general view of the mechanism of the effects
of a commodity export boom on economy 
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In the short run, possibly, increase in the rate of inflation to exceed what is
required to bring about the equilibrium real appreciation generated by the expo
rt boom; in this case, the real exchange rate will appreciate in the short run by
more than what real factors only would indicate.
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3.2 Developed and Developing Countries: Different Effects
In oil exporting developed countries (like UK) the oil sector usually affects the non-oil
economy mostly in an indirect way, through expenditure and exchange rate effects8.
More oil revenue provides more taxes to finance government expenditure. In a
developing country, however, the government is often the only direct receiver and
distributor of the oil revenue in the domestic economy. The inefficiencies in resource
utilisation in such economies is usually attributed to this character of such economies.
In fact, the extra revenue provides the opportunity for the government to increase
production subsidies to inefficient producers, which can considerably delay the
Learning by Doing experience and improvements in their competitiveness (see van
Wijnbergen, 1984).
Moreover, increased oil revenue in oil exporting developing countries may lead to
serious problems in building up a diversified export base because of real wage
pressures (see Wijnbergen 1984). Developing countries with only a limited range of
exports (typically primary products) face greater oscillations in their terms of trade
than more diversified advanced economies. Diversification in exports is now a very
important objective which economic planners in oil exporting developing countries are
seeking. This goal has been badly affected by oil shocks (boom or bust) in past
decades. The ability to export non-oil goods in international market would not only
lead to an improvement in the base of the balance of payments but would also enable
the 'utilising the "Learning by Doing" induced technical progress' (Wijnbergen 1984,
p. 41), and so gain efficiency through competition. Furthermore, The ease of access to
external resources (oil income) allows a rapid acceleration in the rate of investment and
government expenditures without the need to restrain the income and consumption of
higher income groups. This can gradually cause a very serious damage to the tax
system and eventually worsen social inequality in these countries.
The immediate contribution of oil income to growth in these economies comes from
alleviating the constraints on the growth process. For instance, the supply-demand gap
8 In the UK for instance following the great appreciation of sterling in 1979 and 1980, when the oil
price increased significantly, many economic models considered the oil component as an explanatory
factor in their models (see Brooks et. al.., 1986 for a brief survey).
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which often arises during the growth process can be moderated by foreign exchange
earned from oil revenue.
In next sections of this chapter we describe some indications of oil effects on several
parts of Iranian economy9 . During 1970-79, Iran which ranked an overall second in oil
exporting developing countries included in its investment programme 108 projects
averaging over one billion dollars each. The total capital cost was equivalent to over
one and a half times its 1977 GNP (Gelb, 1986). After the (1979) revolution the
Iranian share in providing the world's crude oil declined, and changed from 17.1% and
14.2% in 1974 and 1977 to 2.7% and 7.2% in 1980 and 1982 respectively(Gelb, 1986,
table 2-2).
3.3 Evidence: Dutch Disease Investigation
According to the standard model of Dutch Disease some outcomes are predictable:
• Real exchange rate appreciates.
• A shift towards the non-tradables sectors.
• Increased domestic investment should raise growth, accompanied with a change in
composition of non-oil GDP.
Number of reasons may make oil economy deviate from these stylised patterns. Price
controls and import liberalisation can limit appreciation of the real exchange rate by
deflecting demand onto imports. Next, if traded sectors are able to respond strongly to
investments financed by oil revenues, product market pulls towards the non-traded
sectors may be counterbalanced, particularly if labour markets are slack so that
expanding non-traded sectors do not draw labour from the traded sectors. Finally, the
overall impact of higher public spending on growth may be low if the quality of
investment projects declines with accelerating spending, or if subsidies and other
expenditures drain resources from the public investment programme°.
9 Oil was discovered in 1908 and was nationalised in 1951.
1 ° The results of Gelb (1986)'s studies suggest that the impact of expanded investment on growth of
non oil GDP has been less satisfactory during the (oil boom of) 1972-81 compare with 1967-72. (see
Gelb, 1986, p. 79)
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3.3.1 Iran in 1950s
Between 1953 and 1955 the nominal exchange rate was revalued by about 15
percentil.
Table 3-1
	 Exchange rates and price movements 1953-60
WPI 1953=100
Year Nominal Exchange ratea Imported goods General Index
1953 90.5 100.0 100.0
1954 84.5 106.1 110.7
1955 76.5 97.8 106.8
1956 76.5 91.0 115.1
1957 76.5 81.6 112.9
1958 76.5 80.0 111.6
1959 76.5 81.3 113.6
, 1960 76.5 82.8 115.9
Source: Karshenas, (1990, P. 118).
Rial per US dollar.
The 15 per cent nominal revaluation when added to the 5 percent decline in foreign
currency prices of imported goods should in time have led to 20 percent fall in the
domestic prices of imported goods.
In fact the general price index rose by more than 15 percent over the same period. This
happened mostly because of the 'spending effect' of oil revenue in the form of public
expenditure and an increase in the money supply at that time 12. These opposite (and
theoretically unexpected) movements of the nominal exchange rate and domestic
II Essential imports, however, were subjected to the preferential official exchange rate of 32.5 Rls per
dollar and were excluded from this revaluation.
12 Edwards (1986) discusses the monetary aspects of the Dutch disease in details.
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prices 13 together constitute around 35 percent real exchange rate appreciation. This
strange phenomenon which seems to be related to the interconnections between oil
revenue and government on one hand and private economic behaviour on the other
hand, is a very important character in oil exporting developing countries. 'On an
aggregate basis, therefore, it appears that the textbook predictions [of Dutch Disease
effects] hold (Karshenas, 1990, p. 117).
The economic movements outlined above reveal that the 'spending effect' directed by
real revaluation of the exchange rate has worked strongly in the period 1953-55;
though the 'resource movements effect' has not been observed in that situation. In fact
the resource market (labour, finance...) has not been in full employment (which is an
initial condition for 'resource movement' effect in Dutch Disease theory) and, hence,
there was no evidence of a general insufficiency of labour. The potential inadequacy of
the supply of finance as a resource, (regarded as a sustainable problem in a developing
externally induced boom economy) can be alleviated by government intervention and
minor modifications to the banking system (Karshenas 1990). So, the labour
movement from traded goods sector to the non-traded sector after a boom, discussed
in original Dutch Disease theory, is not a necessary result in an oil exporting country
like Iran".
3.3.2 Boom and 1980s Oscillations
The effects of an oil boom depends on how the government allocates the extra
revenue. The greater the extent to which the government increases expenditure either
directly by increasing its own expenditure or indirectly by reducing the non-oil tax (see
chapter 2 for this discussion) on private agencies, the greater will be the effect on the
non-oil sector.
13 According to PPP theory the change in price deferential and the nominal exchange rate should
roughly be equivalent (see chapter 5 for more details).
14Looney (1982) discusses that since farming methods with several exceptions were primitive, levels
of income in rural areas remained very low. As a result, most of the economy imposed few demands
on the oil industry, and responded little if at all to increases in the supply of oil or to the demands for
skilled labour and other inputs generated by that industry. (p.19)
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After oil price increasing in 1973, Fifth Five Year Economic Plan was dramatically
revised. Government's expenditures grew 200% between 1973-1974. From total
budget in 1974, 28% went to fixed capital formation, and 72% to current or semi-
current expenditures. Resulting in an increase of 189 per cent in planned investment
expenditure. Moreover, the shares in planned expenditure of agriculture, industry, oil
and gas declined while the housing and transport (non-traded) sectors had an
increasing share.
Government capital formation on machinery and construction constitutes on average
something about 26.2 percent of non-oil GDP in 1974-78 period. This portion
decreased in post-revolution period to 9 percent (see appendix 2, Table A.3-2).
Public consumption expenditures (including military and consumption subsidies) rose
from the equivalent of US$ 6.3 bn in 1973 to US$ 9.2 bn in 1974 (Bank Markazi Iran
1975/76). During 1973-1978 period public and private consumption expenditure in
real values increased 12.2 and 10 percent respectively.
Domestic prices during this period inflated on average by something around 12.8 per
cent. Given the low price of imported goods, partly because of low external inflation
and partly because of paying a very heavy subsidies on some imported goods, the real
exchange rate appreciated by 35.3 per cent during the period under consideration.
Prices of domestic goods and services consumed in rural regions rose on average 19
percent in 1974-79 (see appendix 2, Table A.3-1). In the same period the average of
inflation of imported goods appeared 10 percent. So the real exchange rate appreciated
around 23 percent in this period 15 . Domestic inflation and imports goods inflation rose
to 47 and 11 percent respectively in 1980-1990 in average. The related appreciation of
real exchange rate is 60 percent. One reason for such huge appreciation, despite a big
reductions in oil revenues in this period, is the decision of authorities on keeping an
overvalued official exchange rate. As mentioned in chapter 2, the revolution brought
about significant changes in the structure and policy direction of Iran's hydrocarbon
section. This sector had to tolerate the distruction caused by the eight-year war with
Iraq, alongside with the fluctuations occurred in global oil market. Crude oil prices
15 Real exchange rate was calculated by dividing index of imports prices over index of domestic prices
(see table 1 in appendix).
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tripled during the first year of the revolution, one-fifth of the early peak in 1986, and
raised again to near the early 1980 level after the Persian Gulf war. The volume of
production and exports of oil changed also dramatically because of the new policy of
revolutionary regime and the war and so do not necessarily show the same direction of
oil prices. Average of oil revenues during 1974-1979 is 1194 B. rials at constant 1982
prices while in 1980-1990 decreased to 423 B. rials (see appendix 2, Table A.3-1). The
share of oil sector in nominal GDP fell to its least value, 4.1%, in 1986 and increased
to 10.6% in 1990 (Iran Statistical Yearbook 1371). While oil sector's real value added
shows about 68 percent of non-oil real GDP in 1974/79 on average, this portion
declined to 19% in 1980/90 period (see appendix 2, Table A.3-2). Real value added of
construction declined from 1150 B rials in 1976 to 438 in 1990 (Iran Statistical
Yearbook 1371, p. 601). With little direct linkage between oil sector and the rest of a
developing economy the fluctuations in relative oil-value added were mainly reflected
in fiscal revenues. Such a considerable discount in oil sector mostly affected capital
expenditure of the government. Share of capital expenditures in total public
expenditures declined from 35% in 1976 to 19% in 1988, while share of current
expenditures increased from 65% in 1976 to 81% in 1988 (Table 3-2).
Table 3-3 exhibits the cumulative and annual average changes in the GDP deflator
(1962/72) and implicit prices (1974/79 and 1980/90) for the main sectors of non-oil
GDP before and after the oil booms.
As can be seen through this table, the prices of all sectors inflated around two times in
post-revolution period (1980/1990) related to those of post-boom period (1974/79).
Construction sector (non-traded) is the only sector in which the inflation rate
decreased from 52.2 during boom period to 36.2 in post-revolution one. This finding is
consistent with the prediction of Dutch Disease hypothesis. On the other hand,
inflation in industry (non-oil traded) sector is the least inflation related to all other
sectors in 1974/79 period. It is difficult to isolate a number of effects in 1980/1990
including oil crash, war and revolution effects. So, while some Dutch Disease effects
are perceptible in 1974/79, we could not judge on these effects in post-revolution
period.
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Table 3-2 Public Expenditure/Revenues (B. Rials)
Public Expenditure Public Revenues
Current Capital	 Exp. Total Oil Foreign Total
exp. (share in total%) sector exchange
(share
	 in
total%)
sales
1976 1084 592 1675 1329 0 1744
(35) (76) (0)
1980 2032 675 2707 938 0 1703
(25) (55) (0)
1986 2410 747 3157 417 18 1782
(24) (23) (1)
1988 3394 816 4211 668 142 2099
(19) (32) (7)
1989 3385 932 4317 771 744 3181
(22) (24) (23)
1990 4285 1766 6051 1118 2257 5637
(29) (20) (40)
1991 5564 2527 8091 1039 2511 7004
(31) (15) (36)
Source: Iran Statistical Yearbook 1371, table 23-4 (p.573).
Table 3-3 Cumulative percentage price change of main sectors
1962/72 1974/79 1980/1990
Cumul Avr. Cumul Avr. Cumul Avr.
Agriculture 37.7 3.77 100 20 366 36.6
Industry 22.4 2.24 58 11.6 322 32.2
Construction 70.0 7 261 52.2 362 36.2
Public services 10.5 1 96 19.2 419 41.9
Transportation
&
Communication
- - 127 25.4 437 43.7
Real non-oil
GDP
- - 89 17.6 467 46.7
Real GDP - - 96 19.2 386 38.8
Source: For 1974-1979 and 1980-1990 periods calculated based on: National Accounts of
Iran (1353- 1366) and (1367-1369), Bank Markazi Iran. For 1962-72 period calculated
based on Bank Markazi Iran (Central Bank of Iran), annual reports, several issues.
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3.4 Crowding out: Oil and Non-oil exports
Crowding out of the non-oil exports by oil exports is one of the most important
structural changes that has happened in oil exporting developing countries during oil
booms. This process happens, after a boom, partly through the changes of real
exchange rate (through inflation and/or nominal appreciation) and partly through the
direct spending effect which causes an increase in domestic demand for non-oil
potentially exportable goods.
The contribution of non-oil exports to financing commodity imports declined from 50
percent in the late 1940s to below 28 percent in 1959 and 21 percent in 1972. The
dollar value of non-oil exports after a 50 percent increase over the 1948-55 period,
remained stagnant over the period of the economic boom (see Table 3-4).
As this table shows during the period 1959-63, while oil export was increasing
significantly, the non-oil exports were stationary. After three decades, 1959-1989, non
oil exports decreased from 29% of imports to only 8% (see Table 3-4 and Table 3-5).
One can argue, of course, that this is an efficient response to the increase in income
from oil production, the oil exporter simply should move into oil derived industries and
non-traded goods and forget about their non-oil tradable sectors (manufacturing,
agriculture) until oil revenues are exhausted. As Wijnbergen (1984) pointed out,
almost all successful economic development during the post war II involve, without
exception, countries that promoted their traded goods sector strenuously. Technical
progress is usually considered a result of Learning by Doing process which is largely
restricted to the traded goods sector16 . Thus, it is in fact desirable not to focus
narrowly on the exports of one sector.
16 In fact, the development process is much better explained by human resources and technological
progress rather than capital accumulation.
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Table 3-4: Foreign Exchange providers for imports.
As percentages of imports
Year Value	 of
imports' ($ m)
Non-oil
exportsb
Oil	 sector's
net earnings
Total
external
resources'
1959 572.9 27.8 58.9 72.2
1960 597.3 28.3 60.1 71.7
1961 565.4 26.1 69.2 73.9
1962 527.3 25.1 80.3 74.9
1963 547.9 27.0 85.9 73.0
1964 758.9 19.2 73.2 80.8
1965 931.8 22.5 65.2 77.5
1966 1088.0 20.7 65.8 79.3
1967 1342.3 21.7 63.2 78.3
1968 1804.7 20.3 54.3 79.7
1969 2072.2 20.3 53.0 79.7
1970 2365.1 17.6 53.9 82.4
1971 3013.8 19.4 71.3 80.6
1972 3502.4 21.1 74.2 78.9
Source: Karshenas (1990), P. 212.
a
-Imports of goods (c.i.f.) and services.
b
-Exports of goods (f.o.b.) and services.
c
-Equals oil sector exchange earnings plus the current account deficit.
Table 3-5: Foreign Exchange providers for imports.
I Imports (B. Rls.) As percentages of imports
Year Non-oil
exports
Oil exports
1976 902 4.2 168
1981 1082 2.5 92
1986 721 9.7 64
1987 659 12.3 97
1988 568 12.5 92
1989 2026 8.1 93
1990 6.9 88
1991 8.8
Source: Calculated based on Iran Statistical Yearbook 1371 Plan & Budget
Organisation, Centre of Statistics of Iran, Tehran.
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3.5 Spending Effect and Public Expenditure
One of the indirect paths through which the spending effect of an oil boom takes place
is the structural changes in government revenues. The share of oil revenues in total
government revenue increased from about 50 percent during the third plan (1963-67)
period to more than 75 percent over the fifth plan, while domestic taxes remained
generally below 10 percent of GNP. Table 3-6 shows the public sector deficit,
excluding oil income, during three periods: 1963-67, 1968-72, and 1973-77.
Although share of oil revenue in total public revenues decreased in post-revolution
period from 76% in 1976 to only 15% in 1991, this does not necessarily indicate a
deviation of public revenues from oil revenues. Figures in Table 3-2 show that while
shares of oil revenue in public revenues have decreased after revolution, sales of
foreign exchanges (earned from oil exports) at free market exchange rate by
government increased from 0% in 1976 to 40% in 1990 and 36% in 1991. So we are
faced, in fact, with a change in accounting structure of the public revenues instead of a
real deviation from oil revenues.
Table 3-6 Structure of public expenditure (%GNP)
1963-67 1968-72 1973-77
/-Total income 16.7 21.5 41.0
(oil income) (8.5) (11.8) (31.0)
(Non-oil income) (8.2) (9.7) (10.0)
11-Current expenditure 12.4 15.9 27.5
Saving (/-//) 4.3 5.5 13.5
Capital expenditure 6.8 10.5 14.2
Public
	 sector	 deficit 2.5 5.0 0.7
(excluding oil income) (10.6) (16.8) (32.3)
Source: Karshenas, 1990, table 7.12
The gap between government expenditure and tax-revenues increased from 10.6
percent in 1963-67 period to 32.3 percent in 1973-77. This is an indication of the
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increase in the disposable income available to the private agents and hence an increase
in private expenditure.
The momentum of accelerated public investment (some of which implied large future
continual obligations) and growing subsidies proved hard to curb when oil revenues
fell, as they did in 1978 and after 1981. The summation of growth of foreign and
domestic deficits shown in Table 3-7 imply the increasing gap between supply and
demand of the economy.
Table 3-7 Foreign and Domestic Deficits
Net current account of
balance	 of	 payments
($ M)
Government's	 budget
deficit
(B. rials)
1976 3857 -169
1981 -2737 -1004
1986 -4197 -1375
1987 -1451 -
1988 -1349 -2111
1989 1700 -1136
1990 797 -451
Source: Calculated based on Iran Statistical Yearbook 1371, Plan & Budget
Organisation, Centre of Statistics of Iran, Tehran, p. 467 and 573
3.6 Agriculture section as the Lagged sector
Pinto (1991) argues that in two oil exporting developing countries, Indonesia and
Nigeria, it is the agriculture sector which has been affected mostly after the oil boom.
The other main sectors were not so important even before the oil boom. Katouzian
(1978) also shows a rapid destruction of Iranian agriculture sector in the period after
boom. So, in such conditions the expected result of an oil boom is the depletion of
agricultural sector 17 (see Katouzian, 1978 for details). The existing evidence supports
17 According to Corden's (1984) terminology de-agriculturisation.
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that the agricultural sector appeared to worsen in response to oil boom during 1960s
and 1970s, despite benefiting from the net resource inflow of a sizeable magnitude.
3.7 Unsustainable Growth
As was discussed in chapter 2 the easy access to external resources in oil exporting
economies could allow a reasonable rate of growth to be achieved without the
immediate need to bring about the appropriate structural adjustments in the domestic
economy in the short run.
The excessive reliance on external resources pushes the economy towards severe
balance of payments crises in the medium term and in the long-run the economy could
not sustain itself after the exhaustion of the oil reserves. The existing evidence shows
that the main cause of the deficit in the current account of the balance of payments is
the widening deficit in the trade balance, and that the manufacturing balance is the
main component of the trade deficit over time.
This could lead to a process of unstable growth, process of growth which is not viable
in the long-run and is subject to sharp cyclical fluctuations in the medium run. The
process of Perverse growth manifests itself in the form of periodic balance of payment
crises and is basically related to the supply maladjustment in the economy.
Gelb (1986) in a comparative analysis of oil exporting countries mentions that as the
pressure of demand decreased, the temporary boom of the mid-1970s was followed by
deceleration in non-oil growth. He claims that 'on average, non-oil economies were
4.1 percent smaller during 1979-81 than would have been the case had they maintained
their 1967-72 growth projectories' (p. 78). Results of the regressions of non-oil GDP
on growth of oil revenue (which are reported in chapter 6) also show that generally
there is a negative relation between non-oil GDP and oil revenue growth rates.
Growth of income per head in 1970-79 is associated with a shift from non-oil tradables
(agriculture and manufactures) towards non-tradables (services and construction). This
tendency is weaker in constant prices, however, since growth of income per head is
jm-
......	 .
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also associated with a rise in the price of non-traded relative to traded goods (Gelb,
1986).
The expected growth effect of an oil boom in medium and long run discussed above
could be summarised in the diagram below.
3.8 Conclusion
A unique generalisation about a boom sector's impact on the overall economy seems
difficult enough to draw up.
According to the core model of Dutch Disease two main effects are expected: resource
movement effect and spending effect. The former effect indicates the movement of
mobile factor from non-boom economy into the boom sector which gives rise to a de-
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industrialisation, and later one implies the excess demand resulted from boom which
creates a real exchange rate appreciation.
However, some argue that different outcomes can emerge in various circumstances.
For instance, when the boom sector does not show a strong participation in the
domestic factor market, resource movement effect would not be effective.
Monetary aspects of the boom are parallel forces by which the boom revenue is
accommodated into the domestic economy (Edwards, 1986), and which reinforce the
real effects. However, the extent of change in the domestic money supply depends on
the extent of foreign exchange receipts from boom sector exports and the extent to
which the monetary authorities sterilise these proceeds to neutralise their effect on the
domestic money supply.
In oil exporting countries, once the oil boom has settled down in the domestic
economy, we expect an expansion in the non-traded goods and a stagnation in the
lagged sectors (agriculture and traditional manufacturing in oil exporting developing
countries and non-oil industry in oil exporting developed countries). The overall effect
on non-oil gdp, however, is ambiguous and can not be identified beforehand.
Available evidence show that Iran ranked an overall second in oil exporting developing
countries during 1970-1979. However, after the revolution the Iranian share in
providing the world's crude oil declined, and changed from 17.1% and 14.2% in 1974
and 1977 to 2.7% and 7.2% in 1980 and 1982 respectively(Gelb, 1986, table 2-2).
The economic movements outlined in this chapter reveal that the 'spending effect'
directed by real appreciation of the exchange rate has worked strongly in the period
1953-55; though the 'resource movements effect' has not been observed in that
situation.
While some Dutch Disease effects are perceptible during 1974-79, we could not judge
on these effects in post-revolution period. Perhaps it is difficult to isolate a number of
effects during 1980-1990 including oil crash, war and revolution effects.
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3.9 Appendix 1
A brief survey of Edwards model (1986)
This appendix outlined a model of investigation of the developments originated from a
boom in a commodity exporter country (Colombia) in a DD framework.
In the Edwards model, which is briefly presented here, one can analyse the mechanism
through which commodity export prices, money creation, inflation and the real
exchange rate interact. The model was used to analyse the case of coffee in Colombia,
it emphasises the importance of money creation and inflation during an export boom.
This model has two components: a real block and a monetary block. Edward's model
points to the fact that under fixed or managed nominal exchange rates, an export
boom usually results in the accumulation of international reserves, money creation
and inflation.
Assumptions: Capital controls and no domestic financial market.
There are three interrelated main building blocks: a money market block, an inflation
block and an exchange rate block.
Definition of variables:
Mt=	 supply of money.
mdt=	 demand of money.
Rt=	 international reserves.
DCRt=	 domestic credit.
DEF t=	 government deficit.
t=	 domestic price of the "commodity exports".
Pt= 	 price level.
PNt=	 non-tradable prices.
P Tt=	 tradable 's prices.
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Yt=
	
real income.
Et=	 nominal exchange rate (domestic price of a foreign currency).
et=	 real exchange rate.
Hats (^) and star (*) above variables indicate the percentage change and foreign case
of those variables respectively.
Money market block
( 3.1) -A-4, = al? t + (1— a)DCRr
( 3.2) DOR, = f3DEFt
( 33) A = ro[Cltd
 —Mt-1]+21113c
( 3.4) 13,C = EtP:c
XI' fd = pt + 05) t
Combining (1) to (4) equations we obtain a first order semi-reduced form for the
motion of money through time.
( 3.5) 1C/1, = —a og_i + a,Pt +a,y,+a,fitc
 +a4DEF
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Inflation block
( 3.6) fit = 0 - 0 15,, + viPTt
( 3.7) PT, = ft + PT:
( 3.8) /5Nt = 011 t + 7r (M' t — f\-1":)+ PT,
Combining equations (6), (7), (8) and (4) we obtain:
( 3.9) /5, =-- bog + bi (E. , + 15;,)— b2y,
where b0+b1=1.
Exchange rate block
( 3.10) E.
 , = 60 1 t — 61-15T: — e2Pf
This equation allows for a number of possible exchange rate policies. For example, if,
co = ci = 62 = 0, the country in question will have a fixed nominal exchange rate. If
co = = 1 and 62 = 0, the country will have a strict PPP nominal exchange rate rule. If,
however, 82 > 0, it means that the authorities in the country in question recognise that
increases (decreases) in the commodity export price will have an impact on the real
exchange rate and will try to accommodate this effect through a slowing down of the
rate of appreciation (depreciation). Here we assume that c o  0.
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( 3.11) il, = g+ par -13;,)
In this equation it is assumed that changes in the real price of the commodity export
(i.e., changes in the term of trade) generate deviations of real income from its long-run
trend (g).
( 3.12) et = ft + firs, - Pm
Solution to the Model
Permanent monetary equilibrium
The model can be further divided into a real and a monetary block. The real side,
which is composed of eqs. (8) and (11) , can be solved under the assumption of full
and permanent monetary equilibrium. In this case the model becomes similar to most
models of the Dutch Disease which have traditionally concentrated on real aspects
only. Assuming permanent monetary equilibrium, E"=0, substituting (11) into (8) and
using the definition given by eq. (12), the change in the real exchange rate resulting
from changes in the commodity export world price is:
( 3.13) êt
 = —OpPtsc
In fact, eq. (13) is the spending effect of a commodity export boom emphasised in the
Dutch disease literature (Corden, 1984). Note from eq. (13) that the extent of the real
appreciation depends on the value of (1), the income elasticity of demand for non-
tradable. If (1)=0 for example, that is, if none of the increased real income is spent on
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non-tradable, the commodity export boom will have no effect on the real exchange
rate. In other words if the extra oil revenue purchases imported goods or is held
abroad (ignoring the interest on this reserves) there would be no effect on exchange
rate because the balance of payment has not changed (see also Brooks, et. al., 1987 for
more discussion on the other extreme position ).
Short-run monetary disequiblirium
Allowing for short-run monetary disequilibrium, the complete model works in the
following way.
On the money side, the higher price of the commodity exports which raises real income
and the price of non-tradables, affects both the demand and the supply for money.
From eq. (4), a higher demand for nominal (and real) money will result.
However, an excess demand for money is only one of the possible monetary
consequences of the export boom. In fact, according to eqs. (3) and (1), after the
boom international reserves will accumulate, and the rate of growth of money will also
be higher. Whether the final result is an excess demand or an excess supply of money
will depend on the relative values of some of the parameters in the model.
Assuming excess supply position, this will impact on the nominal price of non-tradable,
further appreciating the real exchange rate. What is the role of the nominal exchange
rate policy in this story? Two things will happen according to equation (10). First, as a
result of the higher commodity export price, the rate of the crawl will be slowed down
in period t, helping to accommodate the real appreciation generated by the spending
effect. Second, there will be a tendency partially to compensate the nominal exchange
rate for the higher rate of inflation, through co /5,. The final effect will be a real
appreciation resulting, partially, from the slowing down of the rate of the crawl and
partially from higher inflation. If the liquidity or money creation effect generated by the
higher price of the commodity is large enough, the real appreciation can be larger in
the short-run than in the long-run (overshooting) (see Edwards, 1984).
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The model can be solved for the rate of changes of the real exchange rate as a function
of exogenous variables only. Eqs. (6), (9) and (10) are first solved for
f„ IQ, and P. Then the definition of the real exchange rate is used to find ê:
( 3.14) -êt = k— A M1 	 —,13Ptc
(see the expressions of Xs in original paper)
From the comparison of equations (14) and (13) , it is possible to find out the extent to
which, after the boom, the short-run real exchange rate diverges from the new long-
run equilibrium real exchange rate.
There are three different channels, in addition to the spending effect, through which
changes in the commodity export price will affect exchange rate. Two of these
channels indicate that a higher commodity price will generate a real appreciation. The
third channel, however, suggests the opposite result.
The forces that tend to generate a real depreciation as a consequence of the export
boom are of a second order of magnitude, and work through the following channel.
The higher world commodity export price reduces the rate of the crawl and
consequently, through eq. (10), the domestic price of tradables and so reduces
inflation. These lower rates of inflation and revaluation, in turn, will tend to result in a
lower rate of domestic money creation, through eq. (5), and even lower inflation. This
lower inflation, of course, will generate among other things given, a real depreciation.
However, given the second order nature of this effect, the strong presumption is that
under normal circumstances, the appreciation effects will dominate.
An application: coffee and the real exchange rate in Colombia
Three main eqs. ((5), (9), (10)) were estimated simultaneously. The estimation was
performed using annual data for 1952-80.
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M, = —0.03 + 0.607 -IC4,_, +0.318P + 0.137i_, + 0.095 il*c + 0.125DEH
(3.15)
t - stat. (0.883) (4.067)	 (0.768)	 (1.373)	 (2.776)	 (2.345)
Dw=2.03;	 SEE=0.035
13, = —0.006+ 0.705M, — 0.045 k +0.311(E + 0+ 0.01DUM(	 )3.16
t - stat. (-0.729) (2.669) (-0.363) (2.182) 	 (0.314)
DW=2.23	 SEE=0.060
E t = —0.006+1.333/1 — 0.85(1;DUM) — 0.064: — 0.198A *c + 0.043DUM( 3.17)
t - stat. (-0.119) (2.569) (-1.678)	 (-0.063)	 (-1.604) (0.469)
DW=1.728 SEE=0.108
The results related to money equation confirm that higher (domestic) prices of
commodity export gives rise in short run increases in the rate of money creation. The
mechanism through which this takes place is the accumulation of international reserves
that are monetized by the Central Bank. The significant coefficient of lagged money
changes (MA) suggests that the effects of changes in commodity export prices on
money growth have some persistence through time. The money creation is also
influenced by the fiscal side of the economy captured by fiscal deficit.
Inflation equation shows a significant positive relationship between rate of money
creation and inflation on one hand, and domestically inverted world price changes (i.e.
rate of devaluation and/or world inflation). The coefficient of real income growth rate
is insignificant.
The main interest postulated in this paper is to investigate how changes in a
commodity export price affect the real exchange rate. The results reported above
indicate higher commodity export prices results in lower rate of devaluation and vice
versa.
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Comments on Edwards Model:
Edwards' paper analyses the effects of the tripling of real coffee prices between 1975
and 1977 followed by a return within the following four years to the 1975 price. This
kind of price boom obviously is different from a typical oil boom in oil exporting
countries where, although with some fluctuation, is treated as a permanent
phenomenon (compare current oil price with that of pre-1973 oil shock). Another
point could be put forward here is that the price of the commodity export can not
necessarily perform all the boom effects, instead it could be more appropriate to
account for the product of commodity price and actual commodity exports, that is the
revenue induced by the commodity boom. On the specification point of view, a little
concern has been maintained over a process which take the variables to their steady
state positions. This leaves long-run equilibrium values of the variables (prices,
exchange rates, money) undefined. Inclusion of an error feedback factor would help to
make the analyses more clear and improve the qualifications of the other estimates.
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3.10 Appendix 2
Table A.3-1 Index prices: (1974=100)
Domestic
goods and
services in
rural
regions
Oil price
index
Imports'
price index
Exports'
price index
Oil and Gas
exports
(B. rls., 1974
prices)
1974 100 100 100 100 1412.4
1775 109.9 103 112 103.5 1320.1
1976 128.1 115 113.7 125.2 1483.8
1977 160.2 129 119.2 140.5 1280.9
1978 176.2 128 130 145.8 938.6
1979 196.3 225 151.3 181.6 730.4
1980 242.5 364 183.3 233.9 228.6
1981 297.9 396 193.2 278.1 231
1982 355.2 349 197.8 324.3 486.1
1983 418.1 345 194.4 354.1 533.8
1984 462.1 353 193.8 401.5 433.6
1985 480.9 308 191.8 420.4 390.7
1986 580.9 142 195.4 517.9 336.7
1987 747.2 171 189.9 1076.5 438.5
1988 979 170 203 3477 476
1989 1150 297 225 3633 499
1990 1253 583 219 4113 600
Source: National Accounts of Iran 1974-1987 and 1988-1990, Bank Markazie Iran (Central Bank of
Iran) [in Persian language]
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Table A.3-2 Government's Capital Formation and non-oil gdp
Government's Capaital
formation in machinery
and construction (B. rls
at 1982 p.)
Government's
Capital
formation in
construction
(B. rls at 1982
P.)
non-oil
GDP
(B. rls at
1982 p.)
Value added of
oil sector
(B. rls at 1982
p.)
oil
v.added/non
-oil GDP
(%)
1974 938(21%) 664 (15%) 4517 4826 107
1775 1294 (30) 922 (19) 4978 4250 85
1976 1904 (29) 1516 (23) 6473 4781 74
1977 1781 (26) 1313 (19) 6776 4408 65
1978 1750 (25) 1250 (18) 6927 3144 45
1979 917(12) 611 (8) 8008 2535 32
1980 861 (10) 624 (7) 8457 866 10
1981 873 (11) 591 (7) 8293 882 11
1982 1057 (13) 688(8) 8388 1948 23
1983 1144 (12) 717(8) 9530 2006 21
1984 1078 (11) 635(6) 9962 1626 16
1985 891 (9) 500 (5) 9963 1644 17
1986 761 (9) 483 (6) 8459 1043 12
1987 570(7) 394(5) 8421 1599 20
1988 464 (6) 335 (5) 7480 1754 23
1989 469(6) 314(4) 7625 1890 25
1990 613 (7) 383 (5) 8400 2265 27
Source: National Accounts of Iran 1974-1987 and 1988-1990, Bank Markazie Iran (Central Bank of
Iran) [in Persian language]
Values in parentheses show percentage share of the related item in the whole value.
44.1 Introduction
This chapter will review some of the most relevant concepts and ideas in econometric
modelling and time series estimation to provide a reference point for the following
chapters.
An econometric search maybe regarded as a 'mining' or 'fishing' activity, where the
field of search is not the ground or a river, but is a 'data' set. A model in fact is a kind
of logical structure to describe the reality which hypothetically exists in the available
data. Because of the complexity of the reality, the human mind is unable to
comprehend it in its entirety. So to describe a real phenomenon, it is necessary to
construct a 'simplification of the reality' (model). Statistical models (in econometrics)
are intended to bear such a work , that is, to describe economic relationships using
statistical techniques.
The purpose of constructing a statistical model is not to replace serious economic
models with arbitrary statistical descriptions, but rather to provide a framework in
which one can compare the economic theories with reality, as measured by the data
series. Johansen (1995) suggests that a proper statistical treatment of systems of
economic variables should include the formulation of a statistical model in which one
can :
• describe the stochastic variation of the data, such that inferences concerning the
various economic questions are valid;
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• define the economic concepts in terms of the statistical concepts, like long-run
relations which become cointegrating relations between non-stationary variables;
• formulate the interesting economic theories and questions in terms of the
parameters of the model;
• derive estimators and test statistics as well as their (asymptotic) distribution such
that inferences can be drawn.
If we have such a statistical model describing a relevant set of economic variables, the
first task is to check for model specification, to make sure that the first point is
satisfied, or at least not completely false. If it turns out that the model is a valid
description from a statistical point of view, one can proceed to test that the economic
theory is consistent with the data.
Time series models are particularly useful when little is known about the underlying
data generating process (d.g.p.) that one is trying to model (economic theory). While it
is valid to model an economic variable, say yt, as a statistical process, this is of little
use if we are looking to establish (causal) linkages between variables. A pure time
series model such as Autoregressive (AR), Moving Average (MA) or Autoregressive
Moving Average (ARMA) model can be generated to include other variables
(stochastic or deterministic such as intercept).
4.2 Model selection
4.2.1 The Criteria for Evaluating of a Model
Some of the criteria that a satisfactory model should satisfy can be listed below:
Consistency with theory
A model should be consistent with theory or at least with one of any competing
theories (otherwise the researcher should put forward a plausible excuse). One would
reject, for example, statistically significant long-run average propensity to consume of
1.6 because of its inherent implausibility.
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Data admissibility
A model is data admissible if its predictions automatically satisfy all known data
constraints. In other words it should not be possible for models to predict values for
variables which are inadmissible. For example a model that is able to predict negative
values for prices when explanatory variables are given plausible values is an
inadmissible model.
Data Coherency
One highly important criterion that a model should satisfy is what is termed data
coherency. Data coherency is the goodness of fit criterion. However, there is more to
goodness of fit in this context than simply obtaining high values of measures such as
R2
 . If a model is an adequate representation of the underlying data generating
process, then the residuals from fitted versions of the model should be entirely random
in the sense that they are totally unpredictable. For example, the residuals should not
be autocorrelated since this would imply that there was some systematic part of reality
that was not adequately represented by the model. Because of the complexity of the
reality we can not expect our model to provide an exact description of it. The aim of
the model building is to reproduce the main systematic parts of the process we wish to
represent. In Hendry's view a model can not have achieved this if the residuals it
generates are non-random. So, the criteria which test for autocorrelation of residuals,
such as Durbin-Watson or Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistics would also be the
criteria for data coherency in a model.
Parsimony
The fourth requirement for a satisfactory model is parsimony. This principle implies
that we lose little if unimportant aspects are delivered to the disturbance term in our
models. Our models, then, should contain as few explicit variables as possible. To
Chapter 4: Econometric Modelling
	 92
quote Milton Friedman (1953), " A hypothesis is important if it explains much by
little."
The number of observations available in time series is rarely large, so that a lack of
parsimony frequently results in imprecise estimates.
Encompassing
Ideally a preferred model should also encompass all or at least most of the models
presented by previous researchers in the field. One model is said to encompass another
if it can explain all the results of the other models. A satisfactory model must therefore
not only explain existing data but also be able to explain why alternative models can
also do so. Moreover, if a model encompasses other models, it should be able to
explain any different conclusions that previous researchers using different models may
have come to.
Another requirement for satisfactory models listed by Hendry and Richard (1983) is
that of parameter constancy. A model is of little use if it can not forecast adequately
outside the sample period used to estimate it. For a model to do this its parameters
must obviously remain constant over time.
Exogenous explanatory variables
The explanatory variables should not be contemporaneously correlated with the
disturbance in the equation estimated. The major cause of contemporaneous
correlation is the simultaneity of many economic relationships. A simultaneous system
is a situation in which regressors and some dependent variables are jointly determined.
The model we select or build cannot be a perfect representation of a complex reality
and are inevitably a simplification in some sense. Moreover, reality can change over
time. Hence, it may always become necessary to improve or adapt our models. In
Hendry's view a preferred model is merely a tentatively adequate conditional data
characterisation. Such a model is only congruent with that data which is at present
available. New data may well mean that we will have to revise and improve the model.
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4.2.2 Several Approaches in Model Selection
The range of model selection criteria in econometrics is quite vast and includes
diagnostic checking and specification testing (Maddala 1992: 491)
There are two main approaches one can use to select an appropriate model; Specific to
General method and General to Specific one. The former approach has been used by
econometricians for many years and is called the Traditional approach (Thomas, 1993:
144). By this method the statistical model underlying the data is assumed to be known
at the outset. The problem is, then, to obtain good estimates of the parameters. In this
approach the economic theory or the results of previous experiences are used to
specify a suitable and reasonable set of variables for the model. This model is then
estimated, using Ordinary Least Square or its alternatives, and examined using several
usual test statistics such as t-ratio, R2, tests ... for autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity,
multicollinearity, and so on. In the event of any unsatisfactory test results, the model is
to be modified. " A large residual, for example, might suggest that special factors
affected a small subset of the observations, and lead to the introduction of a dummy
variable" (Krasker 1981:131)'. Several such iterations might be made before the
investigator settles on a particular model. Although 'purists would consider this "data
mining" process as an illegitimate activity, it is equally unreasonable to assume that we
know the model exactly at the very outset' (Maddala, 1992:490). Such a procedure
normally results in the investigator eventually selecting a model that is more
complicated or general than the one he or she started with. In a time-series framework,
this approach of model selection is known as the Box-Jenkins approach. This
procedure has been summarised in the following chart.
The problem with this approach is that it may bias the judgements. An investigator
following this methodology is almost certain to encounter omitted variable bias early in
the research and it is possible that this will lead to him making invalid generalisations
of his original equation. For example, if the omission of a relevant variable leads to a
low Durbin-Watson statistics, then this can lead to a quite inappropriate use of the
Cochrane-Orcutt iterative procedure. (Thomas, 1993)
1 Krasker, William. S. (1981), "The Role of Bounded-Influence Estimation in model selection",
Journal of Econometrics 16; 131-138.
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Box-Jenkins Approch 
r 1. Specification 
Using economic theories
and previous experiences to	 ,
sk.oecify a model.
I
(
Using suitable estimation )
methods to estimate the
parameters of the model
2. Estimation 
1n :i .ecified in stage one.
i
13. Diagnostic checking 
Assess the performance of
the model using suitable test
n atistics such as t-ratio, ...
I
c---4. Is model satisfactory?
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4.2.2.1 General to Specific Methodology
Although there is some convergence in the different views about research
methodology, Pagan (1990) 2 identified three major contenders for the best
methodology title in literature: "Hendry", "Leamer", and "Sims" methodologies'.
The Hendry's Methodology is essentially constituted of four steps4:
• Commence from the most general model that is reasonable to maintain. That is,
which is consistent with what economic theory usually offers as an equilibrium
relationship.
• Re-parametrize the model so that the explanatory variables become closer to
orthogonal and are interpretable in terms of the final equilibrium.
• Simplify the model to the smallest version that is compatible with the data.
• Evaluate the resulting model by extensive analysis of residuals and predictive
performance.
In this methodology, theory suggests which variables should enter a relationship, and
the data are left to determine whether this relationship is static or dynamic. In step 1
the investigator would make clear which variables should enter in the equilibrium
relation. In step 2 he should reparameterize the equation so that the explanatory
variables appear orthogonal and sensible, however, this step seems to be more of an
"art" than a "science" and, therefore, is difficult to codify (Pagan, 1990). Often in
typical time-series data the variables in the general model are likely to be highly
correlated regardless of whether dependent and independent variables are stationary or
not. In estimating a general model in levels of variables, we will face the usual problem
of multi-collinearity-large standard errors. However, the variables in the equivalent
ECM (see next section) representation will normally be far less highly correlated. In
2Pagan, Adrian R. (1990) "Three Econometric Methodologies: A critical Appraisal", in : Modelling
Economic Series ed. by C.W.J. Granger, 1990 Oxford Univ. Press.
3To see the most accessible summaries of the materials concerned to each one of these procedures one
can refer to Hendry and Richard (1982), Learner (1978), and Sims (1980).
4Much of the material in this subsection is based on Pagan (1990).
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fact they tend to be almost orthogonal - that is correlations between them are often
close to zero. This facilitates the testing down procedure because, with low standard
errors, the normal t-statistics in an estimated ECM will provide a good guide to which
difference variables should be eliminated. Thus it becomes easier to arrive at a
sufficiently parsimonious final preferred equation. Notice that since the differenced
variables simply reflect short-run dynamics, about which theory typically has nothing
say, their elimination from the general model does not violate the respective theory.
Problems arise in step 3, because the investigator faces alternative criteria functions
and decision rules for deciding which variables should be removed from general model.
How to use and report inferences from at this step is difficult (Pagan, 1990). What is
the criteria for deletion of a variable? There are some suggestions of alternative
decision rules that may be useful, such as Akaike (1973) and Rissanen (1983) 5 . A
criterion which is used in this stage is something equivalent to the likelihood ratio test
statistic, -21og (Ls / Lg) where Ls and Lg are the likelihood of simplified and general
models respectively. None of these is incompatible with the 'Hendry' methodology; but
to date they not been used much, mainly as a matter of choice rather than necessity.
What should be reported, after reaching a final simple model? Pagan (1990) believes
that there is no an exact description of what to do at this stage. Hendry tends to
compare the finally chosen simplified model with the original one.
4.2.2.2 Learner Methodology
Learner's (1978 and 1983) methodology is somewhat different from Hendry's. Leamer
regards as inevitable the fact that an investigator's prior beliefs will tend to influence
his research strategy and maintains that this should be explicitly recognised. In the
Learner methodology a researcher should identify the parameters of interest early in his
5Akaike (1973) and Mallows (1973) derive decision rules that opt for the deletion of a variable in a
linear model if the change in the residual variance is less than -5 times the inverse of the sample
size. Rissanen (1983), looking at the likelihood as an efficient way to summarise all the information
in the data, formulates a decision rule that the change in residual variance must be less than a
function of the sample size and difference in model dimensions. (Pagan, 1990: 102)
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study. The sensitivity of conclusions regarding these parameters to alternative
specification of an estimating equation should then be made clear. For example, is the
statistical significance of the coefficient on a variable affected by including other
variables in the equation or is the relatively robust to their inclusion? Learner regards
what he terms the 'fragility' of inferences about parameters as a matter that should be
rigorously investigated in any research study.
4.2.2.3 Sims Methodology
To estimate a simultaneous equation model using traditional method one needs to take
two steps: classifying the variables into two categories, endogenous and exogenous
and second imposing some constraints on the parameters to achieve identification.
Both these steps, as Sims (1980) argues, involve many arbitrary decisions and
suggests Vector Autoregression (VAR) approach as an alternative. This approach
which is a multi time-series generalisation of the AR model can be undertaken using
OLS estimation method (Maddala, 1992).
In the Sims (1980) methodology the data is almost all-important and can be allowed to
determine even causality, sometimes in the face of recognised theory.
Since VAR presumes that no variables are exogenous, and that all variables, each with
multiple lags, appear in each equation, it usually faces severe degrees of freedom
problems. This forces modellers to choose a small set of variables.
As an example, a first-order vector autoregression (VAR) model (in a structural form)
is shown below:
Yt = b10 — b l2Zt ± 711Yt-1 + 21 12 Z t-1 + Eyt
Zt = b20 — b21Yt ± r2lYt-1 ± r22Zt-1 ± 6zt
The structure of the system incorporates feedback since yt
 and zt are allowed to affect
each other. For example -b12 shows the contemporaneous effect of a unit change of zt
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on yt and 72 1 the effect of a unit change in yt_i on zt . Due to the feedback inherent in the
system, these equations cannot be estimated directly. The reason is that z, is correlated
with the error term eyt and yt with the error term EA syt and 6,, are pure innovations
(shocks) in yt and zt, respectively. It is possible to transform the system of equations
from the structural form into a system of VAR in a standard form :
Yt = a to ± anYt-1 ± anzt-i +e11
z = a20 + a 21y1-1 + a 22zt-1 + e2tt
The error terms in these equations (el, and e2,) are composites of the two shocks 63,,
and 6,t . Once the condition for stability is satisfied, we can express each variable (Yt
and zt) as a function of the current and lagged values of e ll ant e2t, the vector moving
average (VMA) representation of the VAR. These are known as the impulse response
functions. They show the current and lagged effects over time of changes in 631 and ce
on yt and zt. The VMA representation is an essential feature of Sims' (1980)
methodology in that it allows one to trace out the time path of the various shocks on
the variables contained in the VAR system.
There is an issue concerning whether the variables in a VAR need to be stationary.
Sims (1980) and others, such as Doan (1992), recommend against differencing even if
the variables contain a unit root. They argue that the goal of VAR analysis is to
determine the interrelationships among the variables, not the parameter estimates.
If some of the VAR equations have regressors not included in the others (i.e. different
lag length etc.), seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) provide efficient estimates of
the VAR coefficients. Hence, when there is a good reason to let lag length differ across
equations, estimate the so-called near VAR using SUR.
Chapter 4: Econometric Modelling	 99
4.2.3 The Advantages of Hendry's Methodology
Regardless of the attractions of the Learner and Sims approaches, the fact remains that
studies adopting the Hendry approach are more common, particularly in the UK, than
research work using either of the other methodologies (Granger, 1990).
One reason for misspecification in a model maybe because of including too many or
too few explanatory variables or regressors. In other words, excluding relevant
variables or/and including irrelevant variables might leads to misspecification problem.
Omitted variable error is the more serious problem because it leads to bias and
inconsistency. An important part of the Hendry's general to specific methodology is
that the misspecification problem is (hopefully) limited to those occurring because of
the inclusion of irrelevant variables rather than the omission of relevant ones.
Moreover, the problem of the lack of efficiency in estimators, arising from the
inclusion of irrelevant explanatory variables, becomes less and less serious as the
testing down process proceeds and such variables are gradually dropped from the
equation.
4.3 Stationarity
4.3.1 Definition
A stochastic process may be defined as a collection of random variables which are
ordered in time (Harvey 1993).
Consider the following equations all giving different explanations of the determination
of a stochastic process:
(4.1) y = Plyt_1+ P2Yt-2 +. • .+PpY1-p gt
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( 4.2) y, = + O1 e_1 + 02 ct_2 +...+OgEt_q
Y t = ColYt-i + P2Yt-2 +. . .+ Pp Yt p + e t + 01 6,_, + (92 6,2 +...+
( 4.3) 0q et-q
where Et is a sequence of independent 6 random variables drawn from a distribution
with mean zero and constant variance. O's and (p's are constants. Models (4.1), (4.2)
and (4.3) define the mechanisms by which the observations (y) are generated (DGP).
Model (4.1) is called autoregressive process of order p [AR(p)1. Model (4.2), by which
we assume that the y is generated by the random disturbances Et and its lags, is called
moving average process of order q [MA(q)]. Finally the model (4.3) is a mixed of AR
and MA process which is called Autoregressive Moving average process of order p
and q [ARMA(p, q)].
For a stochastic process to be stationary, the following conditions must be satisfied for
all values of t:
( 4.4) E(y) = ,u (constant)
( 4.5) E[(y, — ,u ) 2 ] = 0;2, = r (0)
and
( 4.6) E[(y, — ,u)(y,_,
 — ,u)]=-  y(z) r = 1,2,...
6 
covar(et, e,d=o for tr.
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Equations (4.4) and (4.5) imply that the mean and variance of yt remain constant over
time, while equation (4.6) gives the autocovariance at lag T, which in turn implies that
the correlation between any two values of y taken from different time periods depends
only on the difference apart in time between the two values. That is, for example,
although cov(yt, yt_) may differ from cov(yt, yt-5) both these covariances remain
constant over time. For example, cov(y6, y4) may differ from cov(y6, yi) but is the same
as cov(y7, y5), cov(v8, y6) and so on.
These conditions (4.4-4.6) provide a definition of what is known as weak stationary. If
a series is weakly stationary and normally distributed, then it is also stationary in the
strict sense (Harvey, 1993).
4.3.2 Non-stationarity and it's Consequences
Much conventional asymptotic theory for least-squares estimation (e.g. the standard
proofs of consistency and asymptotic normality of OLS estimators) assumes
stationarity of the explanatory variables, possibly around a deterministic trend. The
differences between the features of stationary and non-stationary variables could be
summarised as follow:
• The variance of stationary xt is finite, whereas in the case of non-stationarity it goes
to infinity when t goes to infinity.
• an innovation will affect the values of x t
 only temporarily in the case of stationarity
and permanently when it is non-stationary.
the autocorrelations decrease steadily in magnitude for large orders in stationary cases,
but tends to 1 as t goes to infinity for non-stationary variables.
Many important economic time series are not stationary. In such cases OLS estimation
might produce spurious results, implying that there are (apparently) significant
correlations between underlying variables when, in fact, there is not7.
7 See Banerjee et al, 1993, p. 70 for a detailed discussion.
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It has been shown that the standard regression techniques are invalid and problematic
when applied to non-stationary variables (see below). There have been a number of
methods suggested to solve these problems.
A generalised dynamic model of the short-run adjustment may be introduced by8:
( 4.7) y, = a 0 +Ey ix +la
	 +u„ i=0,...,q ; j=1, p
which in a very simple model (p = q= 1) is:
( 4.8) y, = a 0 + yox,	 + out, +U1
where ut — (0, c 2 ) is a white noise error. If y i and ot i
 # 0, the parameter coefficient yo
denotes the short-run reaction ofyt to a change in xt
 , and not the long-run effect that
would occur if the model were in equilibrium. The latter is defined as:
( 4.9) y, = +Ax, +
which is obtained from [4.8] when we impose the long-run restriction where yt = yt_i
and xt= xt.j . So in the long-run, the elasticity between y and x is f3 i [= ( y 0+ 9/ 1-a1 ],
assuming that a l
 <1 (which is necessary if the short-run model is to converge to a
long-run solution).
The dynamic model represented by [4.8] is easily generalised to allow for complicated,
and often more realistic, adjustment processes (by increasing the lag length p and q ).
However, there are several potential problems with this form of the dynamic model.
The first is concerned to the likely high level of correlation between current and lagged
8 See for example Banerjee et al (1993).
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values of a variable, which will therefore result in problems of multicollinearity 9
 (high
2	
iR but mprecise parameter estimates and low t-values, even though the model may be
correctly specified). Using the Hendry's general to specific approach, discussed before,
which would involve dropping out insignificant variables from the estimated model,
might therefore result in misspecification (especially if x is in fact a vector of
variables). Also, some (if not all) variables in a dynamic model of this kind are likely to
be non-stationary, since they enter in levels. As explained earlier, this leads to the
potential problem of common trends and thus spurious regression, while t- and F-
statistics do not have standard distributions and the usual statistical inference is invalid
(see Banerjee et. al., 1993).
4.3.3 Solving the problem of spurious results
4.3.3.1 Differencing
A popular past method to overcome the problem of spurious results has been to
respecify the model in (first) differences of variables rather than their absolute levels.
However, this removes any information about the long-run from the model and
consequently is unlikely to be useful for forecasting purpose. For example if we rewrite
[4.9] as:
( 4.10) y , — y . ig i (x, — x,_,)+ et
where
St = Vt - Vs-l.
If we estimate [4.10] instead of [4.9], we can not obtain any information about 130. The
other problem which may exist is that if the disturbance term in [4.9] (vt) is non-
autocorrelated, then the disturbance ct in equation [4.10] is a moving average and
9 Maddala (1992) insists that ' if there is enough variation in the explanatory variables and the
variance of the error term is sufficiently small, high intercorrelations among the explanatory variables
need not cause a problem' (p. 294).
Chapter 4: Econometric Modelling	 104
hence will be autocorrelated. Therefore, the differencing method to overcome a
spurious correlation problem seems unsatisfactory. An alternative to this approach is
the Error Correction Method. A major advantage of error-correction models is that
they result in equations with first-differences and hence stationary dependent variables
but avoid the problem discussed above.
4.3.3.2 Error-correction Model
The ECM goes some way toward providing an answer to a problem that has long
plagued economists - the problem of spurious correlation. The ECM was first applied
in economics by Sargan (1964) but in more recent years has been associated with
Hendry's approach to econometrics we discussed earlier.
Correlations can be spurious when the variables involved exhibit consistent trends,
over time. So we can not necessarily treat a correlation between dependent and
explanatory variables as a causal relationship. Since much econometric works is
concerned with 'time series' data, it is therefore wise not to be impressed with high
values of R2. R2 's for time series regression equations are typically very high
compared with those obtained from 'cross sectional' data for which the trending
problem does not arise. In fact ' classical' statistical inference in general was specially
designed for variables which are stationary in the sense that their mean, variance and
covariances remain constant over time. Whereas, in economics many variables are
stochastic and consist of non-stationary time-series. Consequently, we cannot rely on
the standard regression procedures.
ECM models are introduced as a proper solution for this problem. Rearranging and
reparameterising ( 4.8) gives:
( 4.11) Ay, --. ro Ax, _ (1— a1 )[y,_1 — Po — f3i xt_ 1 ]+ ut
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A	 A	 A
where fio = . Estimations of [4.8] and [4.11] are equivalent, but the ECM has
several distinct advantages. First, assuming that x and y are cointegrated, the ECM
incorporates both potential short-run and long-run effects. This can be seen by the fact
that the long-run equilibrium, [4.9], is incorporated into the model (squared bracket).
Thus, if at any time the equilibrium holds then, the disequilibrium term in [4.11] will
arrive at zero: vt-i — Po — PI x1 _ 1 ] = 0. During periods of the diseqilibrium, this term
is non-zero and measures the distance the system is away from equilibrium during time
t. Thus, an estimate of (1-a 1) will provide information on the speed of adjustment, that
is, how the variable y, changes in response to the disequilibrium10 . For instance,
suppose that yt starts to increase less rapidly than is consistent with [4.9], perhaps
because of a series of large negative random shocks (captured by u t). The net result is
A
that y 1 — fl o — /3, x t_ i ] < 0, since yt_ 1 has moved below the steady-state growth path,
but since - (1-a l) is negative, the overall effect is to boost Ayt , thereby forcing yt back
toward its long-run growth path as determined by x t (in equation 4.9).
The second feature of the ECM is that all the terms in the model are stationary so
standard regression techniques are valid (assuming cointegration). There is clearly a
problem if the 13's need to be estimated at the same time in the ECM. Often 13 1
 is set
equal to one (and 13 0 is set equal to zero), and justified on the basis that the theory
imposes such a long-run elasticity. This can be tested by including x t_, as an additional
regressor, since it should have an estimated coefficient value of zero, if in fact [13 0 , 13i]'
= [0, 1]'. However, including the coefficient of x,1 is itself problematic, since the t-
statistic of this coefficient does not have a standard distribution, thereby invalidating
the usual testing procedure. Third, as should be obvious from equations (4.9) and
(4.11), the ECM is closely bound up with the concept of cointegration. In fact, Engle
and Granger (1987) show that ify t and xt are cointegrated 1(1,1), then there must exist
an ECM (and conversely, that ECM generates cointegrated series). The practical
implication of Granger's representation theorem for dynamic modelling is that it
I °Large values of - (1-oc1 ) (tending to -1) indicate that economic agents remove a large percentage
(since the model is in log.) of the resulting diseqilibrium each period. Small values (tending toward
zero) suggest that adjustment to the long-run steady- state is slow, perhaps because of the large costs
of adjustment.
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provides the ECM with immunity from the spurious regression problem, provided that
the terms in levels cointegrate.
4.3.4 Testing for Stationarity
The discussion above made it clear that the stationarity of the variables under
investigation is a key factor in determining the econometric modelling strategy. Given
this, testing for stationarity (non-stationarity) of the variables is a high priority in
econometric modelling.
It can be shown that all MA processes such as (4.2) are stationary (see for example
Harvey 1993, p. 12). However, it is not necessarily the case with AR processes.
The AR model denoted by [4.1] can be simplified as A(L)y =Ct , where A(L) is the
polynomial lag operator	 — go, L — co2 L2 —...—( 0 p LP . Forming the characteristic
( — yol L — go 2 L2 —...—g o „LP = 0), for given (or estimated) values of the 9s, this is an
equation in lag operator L. If the roots of this equation are all greater than unity in the
absolute value, then yt is stationary. For the simple AR(1) case, if the root of 1 - (la =
0 is greater than unity in absolute value then yt will be stationary. Having L = 1/9 1 , this
means that ip i l should be less than one. Dickey-Fuller (DF), Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) and some of their extensions are the various tools by which one can formally
test for Unit root in a variable.
4.3.4.1 Dickey-Fuller Test
The simplest form of the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test amounts to estimating an AR(1)
model :
Yt = (plyt_ i ± et or:
( 4.12) (1 — L)y, = Ayt = (co l —1)y 1 +E t , et — IID(0,o-2)
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The non-stationarity null hypothesis Ho : (p i = 1 is to be tested against the alternative
stationarity Hi :	 < 1. The advantage of (4.12) is that this is equivalent to testing
((p i -1) = = 0 against (p <0. The standard approach to testing such a hypothesis is to
construct a t-test; however, under non-stationarity, the statistic computed does not
follow a standard t-distribution but, rather, a Dickey-Fuller distribution (Dickey and
Fuller 1979). It is worth noting that adding a constant and trend to the model increases
(in absolute values) the critical values, that is It tl > It > kJ"; and therefore making it
more difficult to reject the null hypothesis, even when it should, in fact, be rejected.
Perron (1988) has put forward the sequential testing procedure which starts with the
use of a general model and then eliminates unnecessary nuisance parameters 12 . If we
fail to reject the null using the most general specification (perhaps because of the low
power of the test), testing continues down on more restricted specifications. The
testing stops as soon as we are able to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root.
4.3.4.2 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test (ADF)
If the d.g.p. in fact follows an AR(p) process, then the error term (E t) in (4.12) will be
autocorrelated to compensate for the misspecification of the dynamic structure of the
process yt. In this case the DF statistics will be invalidated. ADF test is the DF test
when adjusted for some appropriate (significant) differenced dependent variable to
capture autocorrelation in the error term13:
p-1
Ay, = go *Yti + Doi Ay,_, +
i=1
11	 indicates the original unit root model (4.12) with the addition of a constant term, whereas tt
indicates that model when includes a constant and trend term at the same time.
12 Several criteria such as significance of the terms and serrial correlation can be used to catch the
best specification of the model. See also section 4.2.2 for more discussion in this concern.
13 See Perron (1988) for an alternative non-parametric approach for correcting this problem (also see
Banerjee, et al, 1993, for a brief explanation of that).
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or to allow for the possibility of deterministic components such as a constant or/and
trend:
p-1
Ayt = Co*Yt-I + co,	 + coo + + 6„ e IID(0, o-2)
The number of lags could be chosen based on an approximation of the number of
observations, such as T 18 (T indicates the numbers of observation), which is an upper
bound on the number of lags (Banerjee, et. al. 1993, p. 108). Selecting too few lags
may results in over-rejecting the null when it is true, while too many lags may reduce
the power of the test (through reducing the number of observation available for the
test).
4.3.4.3 Structural Breaks and Unit root Test
Perron (1989) argues that standard tests of the unit root hypothesis against the trend-
stationary alternatives can not reject the unit root hypothesis if the time series has a
structural break. In other words, a unit root test which does not take account of the
structural break in the series can result in (wrongly) not-rejecting the differenced
stationary hypothesis when in fact the trend stationary alternative is true (low power).
If the breaks in the series are known a - priori, then it is relatively simple to adjust the
ADF test by including appropriate dummy variables to the model. Kim (1990)
considered a situation in which the breaks are unknown a - priori using a Perron type
model. The relevant critical values for unit root tests involving shifts in trend and/or
intercept are found in Perron (1989, 1990).
4.4 Co-integration
The concept of cointegration is the connection between relationships between
integrated processes (from statistical point of view) and the concept of (steady state)
Chapter 4: Econometric Modelling	 109
equilibrium (from economic point of view). It was introduced by Granger (1981) and
extended by Engle and Granger (1987).
Testing for stationarity of a single variable is similar to testing whether a linear
combination of variables cointegrate to form a stationary, equilibrium relationship.
The two issues of being able to test for the existence of an equilibrium relationship
among variables and to accurately estimate such a relationship are complementary.
Indeed static regressions among integrated series are meaningful if and only if they
involve co-integrated variables.
Suppose that all the elements in vector of X are I(1) series. In general, then, any linear
combination 5' Xt of the elements of X. will produce an I(1) series U. The only
exemption, if one exists, is a co-integrating vector a such that a'X is 1(0):
al
 X = VT	 t )
Since ordinary least squares , in fact, minimises the residual variance of X t, a simple
OLS regression of the form above should provide a good approximation to the true
co-integrating vector when one exists.
All that is needed to parameterize a long run equilibrium relationship among a set of
variables is a static OLS regression. This regression is performed as the first step of the
Engle-Granger two-step estimator and serves as a preliminary check on the equilibrium
relationships postulated by economic theory to exist among the variables. However, as
I point out below, in practice the static OLS regression has proved to be an inferior
estimator of a cointegrating vector.
4.4.1 Concept and Definition
If a series must be differenced d times before it becomes stationary, then it contains d
unit roots and is said to be integrated of order d, denoted 1(d). Consider two time
series yt and xt, which are both 1(d). In general, any linear combination of the two series
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will also be 1(d); for example, there exists a vector 13, such that the disturbance term
from the regression (p, = y, — 13x, ) is of a lower order of integration, 1(d-b), where
b>0, then Engle-Granger (1987) define y1
 and xt as cointegrated of order (d, b). Thus,
if yt and xt were both 1(1), and !It — 1(0), then the two series would be cointegrated of
order C/(1, 1)14.
4.4.2 Methods of Estimation
4.4.2.1 Single Equation Approach
4.4.2.1.1 Two-stage Engle-Granger Method
This method uses the residual-based ADF test to investigate for cointegration between
the variables. If we wish to estimate the long-run relationship between yt and x1 , given
they are cointegrated, it is only necessary to estimate the static model:
( 4.13) y, = )0x, + L.„
( including an intercept and time trend if necessary for Et to be 1(0)). Estimating (4.13)
using OLS achieves a consistent estimate of the long-run steady state relationship
between the variables in the model, and all dynamics and endogeneity issues can be
ignored asymptotically. This is because of the superconsistency property.
Superconsistency indicates that ify t and xt are both non-stationary 1(1) variables, and Et
— 1(0), then as sample size, T, becomes larger the OLS estimator of 13 converges to its
true value at a much faster rate than the usual OLS estimator with stationary 1(0)
14 It is possible to have a mixture of different order series when there are three or more series in the
model. As Pagan and Wickens (1989) point out, in this instance a subset of the higher-order series
must cointegrate to the order of the lower-order series. So. if yt 4(1), X1 - 1(2), and zt - 1(2), then as
long as we can find a cointegration relationship between x t and zt such that vt (=xt - Azt ) -l(1), then vt
can potentially cointegrate with y1 to obtain cot (=yr -01)-1(0).
1/T instead of the usual 1/-'IT. (Hargreaves,
Y t = Y o xt ± Y i x t-i ± aY t-i + 1-1 can be
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variables 15 (Stock, 1987). That is, the 41) variables asymptotically dominate the I(0)
variables, Axe, dyt and et16 . Of course, the omitted dynamic terms (and any bias due to
endogeneity") are captured in the residual, e t, which will consequently be serially
correlated. But this is not a problem due to `superconsistency'. The estimated error
term (E. t ), then, should be tested for stationarity, i.e. the necessary condition for the
validity of two-stage Engle-Granger method.
Estimating y, = fix, + e, , is only the first stage of the EG procedure, with stage two
comprising estimating the short-run ECM itself using the estimates of disequilibrium
(2. ,_ i ) to obtain information on the speed of adjustment to equilibrium. That is, having
..
( "è t_1 = yt_ i — fix t_, ) from the static long-run estimation in the first stage, it is
possible to estimate:
A(L)Ay, -= B(L)Ax, — (1— /
./) . -1 +11,
where A(L) = 1— a I L — a 2 L2 —...—a p LP , and B(L) = r0 +r 1 L+r 2 1,2 ±...-F7 ql, and
ii= a, + a 2 +... a. This equation allows for a general dynamic structure to be
determined by the data. If yt and xe are I(1) and cointegrated, thus all the terms in this
equation are 1(0) and statistical inferences using standard t-and F-tests are applicable.
There are difficulties if one tries to estimate accurately a long-run' relationship with
only a small sample over a short time period. Furthermore, while the estimator
produced by this method may be superconsistent, it can be biased in finite samples
especially of the size typical in economics (Hargreaves, 1994).
15 In other words, a superconsistent variable is of order
1994)
16 A simple dynamic model of short-run adjustment:
rewritten as: y, = fix, + 2,Ax, + A, 2 Ayt + v, . Thus estimating the static model (4.9) to obtain an
estimate of the long-run parameter 13 is equivalent to estimating this dynamic model without the
short-run terms Ayt
 and AX.
17 See Hargreaves, 1994 for a brief clarification on endogeneity problem.
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Furthermore, in finite samples, it has been shown that bias is a problem (and this will
be discussed later on). Moreover, Philips and Durlauf (1986) have derived the
asymptotic distribution of the OLS estimator of 13, and its associated t-statistics,
showing these to be highly complicated and non-normal and thus invalidating standard
tests of hypothesis. Thus, in the case of finite samples bias and the inability to draw
inferences about the significance of the parameters of the static long-run model are
problems.
The other potential problem that appears when using Engle-Granger approach of
cointegration is the common factor problem. To sketch this problem, we remember
that ADF begins with estimating a supposed long-run model:
( 4.14) yt = f3x,+e„
with an AR(1) (stationary) error term; et = pc,_, + ,u,. These two equations imply:
(4.15) y, = y o x t +y i x t_ i +a iyt_ i +zit,
where yo = 13, yi = - 13p and a l = p. So: yooc i = - y i (common factor restriction).
(Cuthbertson and Barlow, 1991) If yo, Yi and a l are all significant and the common
factor restriction holds, then, we have the static model (4.14) (with an AR(1) error)
and hence the estimated p in the first stage of ADF proceeding indicates truly the long-
run coefficient. If, however, the common factor rerstriction does not hold we have a
dynamic model. In these circumstances the estimated coefficient in the first stage is in
fact a short run coefficient (which we have wrongly taken as a long-run coefficient).
So treating the coefficients in the first step of ADF as the long run, while they are not,
is equivalent to imposing the common factor restriction on the original model while it
does not hold (see Kendy, 1992).
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4.4.2.1.2 Alternative Methods
There are a number of alternative tests for cointegration. The simplest is the
cointegration regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW) test proposed by Sargan and
Bhargava (1983). However this criteria value is only relevant when the error term in
static model follows a first-order process, that is no higher-order residual
autocorrelation.
Kremers, Ericsson and Dolado (1992) suggested an approach according which the
parameter a in the error-correction formulation:
( 4.16) Ay, = y o Ax, — (1—	 +
should be directly tested for a = 1 as a null which implies no cointegration relationship
between variables. But again to apply this approach it is needed to estimate Et in a
static separate stage which results in the same problems as for the EG test.
4.4.2.1.2.1 Non-Linear simultaneous Estimation Method
As discussed before, when using EG method we need to estimate static (long-run)
coefficients in the first stage without accounting for short-run effects. This could
potentially lead to a set of inaccurate (biased) results. Although, because of super-
consistency, this problem can be overlooked when we consider a large set of data; in
the case of small samples, however, the problem can be serious. Bewley (1979) and
also Wickens and Breusch (1988) argue that one should estimate both the long-run and
short-run parameters simultaneously and one would get more efficient estimates of the
long-run parameters by this procedure (Maddala, 1992, p. 263). Therefore, it seems
reasonable to consider estimating a full model including all short-run and long-run
components simultaneously. Such a model is, in fact, a disequilibrium representation
of the process under investigation (see Thomas, 1993).
Chapter 4: Econometric Modelling	 114
( 4.17) A(L)y , = B(L)x, + fit
where A(L) = 1— a l L—a 2 V—...—ct,LP , and B(L) = r 0 +r1L+721,2+...+r,Lq.
This is a general model involving long-run and short-run components. The purpose of
the ECM is to focus on the short-run dynamics while making them consistent with the
long-run solution. For p=q=1, we can rewrite the general model as:
YE = ro xt -F ri x  + abYt-i ± Pt
and in an ECM form as:
( 4.18) Ay, = r o Axt — 11-(Yt-1 — fixt-i ) + et
Where 13 = (yo+y i) / 1-cc, and X = 1-ot l . The term in bracket shows the disequilibrium
error which in EG method is to be estimated in a separate and static stage.
One can estimate short-run and long-run coefficients in (4.18) directly using a non-
linear estimating method. Using this method, by not ignoring the short-run dynamics
compared with the EG method, the finite sample biases of the long-run estimates will
be likely reduced is . Banerjee, et. al. (1993) argue that this method is as good as
estimating the full system, but only if there is only one cointegrating vector.
18 Given the existing limitation in the number of observations in the data utilised in this thesis, this
method, among other single equation methods, was chosen as the most appropriate method in the
empirical models applied through the next chapters.
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4.4.2.2 Multivariate VAR Procedure
4.4.2.2.1 Johansen Procedure
If there are more than two variables in the model, the single equation approach can be
misleading, particularly if more than one cointegration relationship are present. When
the number of cointegration vectors is unknown, and given the need to allow all
variables to be potentially endogenous then one would gain little advantage in starting
the single equation method. Rather the multivariate VAR approach developed by
Johansen (1988) is the more proper frame to begin testing for cointegration. In a
system of equations including a vector of n potentially endogenous variables, the
number of co-integrating vectors will be unknown. Determining the number of
cointegrating vectors is very important since over-estimation or under-estimation of
them have potentially serious consequences for estimation and inference (see Banerjee,
et. al., 1993)
Johansen (1988) proposed a maximum likelihood approach to test the null hypothesis
that there are r n-1 different cointegrating vectors. Suppose that the following
unrestricted VAR:
(4.19) X, =
	 +A2X,_2+. Ak X t-k Pt,
shows DGP under consideration. Where, X t is (nx 1) vector. This model can be
transformed into a vector error-correction form:
(4.20) AX, =
	 + r2 AX ,_2 +...+rk_l AX t-k+i +11Xt-k
where
TI = - (I-A1 -.. .-A1), (i= 1,.. .k-1) and H = - (I-A1-...-Ak). The coefficient attached to III
are comprised of two components ct and 13 which represent the speed of adjustment to
equilibrium and the long-run coefficients of the model respectively (Il=a43'). So the
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terms 13 1 Xt_k represent up to n-1 cointegration relationship in the set of variables under
consideration. Given that Xt is a vector of non-stationary 41) variables, then equation
(4.20) involves two sub-sets of I((0) and 41) variables (AX and X respectively). For
the error term lit to be a white noise in (4.20), which is a necessary condition for the
validity of the estimation process, the terms IIX should also meet the stationarity
condition (i.e. IIX 40)). Given that all the variables in Xt are 41), for IIXt_k to be
I(0), up to r (n-1) cointegration vectors should exist in X: 13'Xt_k I(0). So H = oc13'
contains n columns of which r non-zero and n-r zero ones 19 . Testing for cointegration
amounts to an investigation of the rank III that is, finding the number of r linearly
independent columns in H. Rewriting (4.20) as:
( 4.21) AX, + afl	 = r,	 +. • .+Fk-i AX t -k +1 + Pt,
If one partials out the short-run effect (AXt-i, ••., AXt-k+i) on both AX t and Xt-k, one
could then estimate ri by regressing the adjusted AXt on Xt-k. These adjusted values
are the residuals of two multivariate regression on (AXt-1, 	 AXt_k+i) i.e.:
AX t = AX t-i +.	 AX t-k+1 +R
X t-k = AX t_, +...+t k_,AX t-k+1 Rkt,
which can then be used to form residual (product moment) matrices:
S = T	 i j = 0,k
19Each of the r cointegrating vectors in 13 is associated with a particular column in a which must
contain at least one non-zero element.
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The maximum likelihood estimate of 0 is obtained as the eigenvectors corresponding
to the r largest eigenvalues from solving the equation:
askk SkoS0(1) Sok l— 0 ,
A	 A
which gives the eigenvalues 2 1 > 2,>...> 2,, and the corresponding eigenvectors
= (	 , , i3,2 ) . Those r elements in 12 which determine the linear combinations of
stationary relationships can be denoted fr v^ , ,	 , that is those are the
cointegration vectors. Additionally, in Johansen's methodology we can test restrictions
on the cointegrating vectors, using Likelihood Ration tests.
There are different considerations on advantages and disadvantages of Johansen
method in related literature. Whilst Enders (1995) assesses this method as 'nothing
more than a multivariate generalisation of the Dicky-Fuller test' (p.386), Chremza and
Deadman (1992) regard this method as 'superior' to the Engle-Granger single equation
method20 . The statistical properties of the Johansen procedure, they argue, are
generally better and the power of the cointegration test is higher.
One of the most interesting aspects of the Johansen procedure is that it allows for
testing restricted forms of cointegrating vectors. For instance, in a Purchasing Power
Parity relationship one can test restrictions concerning the long-run proportionality
between exchange rate and price differentials. In terms of equation:
= ct0+a1Apt+v„
20 They emphasised, however, that the Engle-Granger and Johansen procedures are established
within different econometric methodologies and therefore cannot directly be compared.
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where et is logarithm of the nominal exchange rate (domestic price of foreign currency)
and Apt shows the logarithm of ratio of domestic to foreign prices, the restrictions of
interest are: ao = 0, and a l =1.
Johansen's test also provides a technique for testing all possible cointegrating vectors,
as well as the corresponding set of error-correction coefficients. (see Cuthbertson et.
al, 1992)
A major drawback associated to the Johansen procedure is that with this method two
different researchers may well lead to different estimates depending on the number of
lags they have used. Even it is hard to see how the Johansen method obtains its results
and why they varied so much as one changed the lag length or sample size. To get rid
of autocorrelation problem in error terms (which is assumed theoretically), the usual
practice is to allow for relatively long-lags. Using long-length lags, however, may be
inconsistent with economic sense. The lag-length, in fact, corresponds to the length of
response to a deviation from a long run path (equilibrium) which is usually assumed
occur after a relatively short period of time. So, to interpret the adjustment matrix (a)
sensibly, the length of lags cannot be large. On the other hand, a low length of lags
increases the possibility of autocorrelation in the error terms and this may affect the
validity of the entire estimation process.
Moreover, one practical problem with the Johansen estimator is the difficulty of
expressing what is going on inside the procedure which it probably is the case to most
users.
4.5 ARCH Models
The presence of uncertainty in economic relationship could be captured by the
variance of the error term which in standard estimations is presumed to be a constant
over the sample period.
Engle (1982) proposed a model in which the variance of the dependent variable is
allowed to depend upon the available information set and so called that ARCH
(Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity) model. The presence of ARCH in a
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model enables conditional variances to alter through time, thus explicitly allowing
changing uncertainty to be modelled and hence leading to more realistic forecast
intervals. The presence of ARCH can also lead to serious model misspecification if it is
ignored (Mills, 1990). In a simple case we can consider the model:
( 4.22) y, = Ay 1_1 + fix , + 6 „ 6 t "-• IN(0,h,)
( 4.23) h, = var e t = ct o
 + ctle,,
Et are not autocorrelated, but the variance of Et depends on et_ i . A simple test for the
ARCH effect, that is, a test for the hypothesis a l = 0 in [4.23] is to regress the OLS
residuals "e, on 2.
 (with constant term) and testing whether the coefficient of 2 . t2 1 is
zero. For example, an LM test would enable us to see whether the significant DW test
statistic is due to serial correlation in c t or due to the ARCH effect.
4.6 Conclusion
An econometric model can be considered as a 'bridge' between economic theory and a
simplified translation of the reality, and statistical inferences are the foundation of this
bridge.
While it is valid to model a single economic variable as a pure statistical process (time
series model), it is of a little use if one is intending to establish casual linkages between
variables.
Regarding the fact that the traditional 'specific to general' model selection approach,
which has been used for many years, may bias the judgement, the alternative 'general
to specific' approach is considered now as a preferred approach. In this approach
theory suggests which variables should enter a relationship, and the data are left to
Chapter 4: Econometric Modelling
	 120
determine any possible static (long-run) or dynamics (short-run) of the d.g.p. In such a
formulation, which includes a combination of different variables with possibly different
degree of integration (say, I(1) and I(0)), cointegration is a necessary condition for the
validity of the results.
Two-stage E.G. method for estimating an underlying cointegrated relationship is a
common and superconsistent method when the data observations are sufficiently
available. Nevertheless, in finite sample, it has been shown that the bias is a problem.
To avoid this problem, non-linear one-step estimation method is treated as a preferred
method.
In next chapters Johansen's method will be used to search for cointegrating vectors
among variables under consideration. Where we find cointegration relationship(s), we
try to test for any theoretically sensible restriction applicable on them. But because of
data restrictions, which lower the performance of Johansen's method, a general non-
linear model is used to specify the final model.
55.1 Theoretical Survey
5.1.1 Purchasing Power Parity Theory of Exchange Rate
5.1.1.1 Introduction
Given the importance attached to the exchange rate in the success or failure of an open
economy, it is not surprising that exchange rate economics is one of the most heavily
researched areas of the discipline. Despite this extensive research, a large number of
unresolved issues remain, and exchange rate economics continues to be an extremely
challenging area.
Early contributions to the post-war literature on exchange rate economics include
Nurkse (1945) and Friedman (1953). Both of these contributions are to a large extent
concerned with the role of speculation in foreign exchange markets. Nurkse warns
against the dangerous of 'bandwagon effects', which may generate market instability.
Friedman's classic apologia for floating exchange rates (1953) is remarkable in its
anticipation of much of the literature of the following two decades and is still cited as
the seminal article on stabilising speculation (MacDonald, and Taylor, 1992).
The early literature gave prominence to the current account in the determination of
exchange rates. Initial developments stressed the role of goods arbitrage; that is
currencies are valued for what they can buy. The spot rate would then be determined
by the relative prices between the domestic and foreign country. Frenkel (1978b,
198 lb) provides a very useful survey of the long intellectual history of the goods
arbitrage theory, commonly known as Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).
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5.1.1.2 Theoretical description of PPP
Purchasing Power Parity theory is one of the oldest theories' of exchange rate
determination. It says simply that, starting from a given base period, the exchange rate
between any two currencies (or between one currency and a trade-weighted bundle of
the other currencies) will move in line with relative price levels in the two economies
(or with prices at home relative to the trade- weighted inflation in the other countries).
There are two main assumptions required for this: domestic tradable goods be perfect
substitute for foreign goods; and the goods market be 'perfect' (low transaction costs,
perfect information, perfectly flexible prices, no artificial restrictions on trading)
(Cuthbertson and Taylor, 1987). Because the theory singles out price level changes as
the predominant determination of exchange rate movements it has also been called the
"inflation theory of exchange rate" (Dornbusch,1987 pp1075).
This theory argues that exchange rate movements primarily reflect differences in
inflation rates between countries. PPP is a plausible description of the trend behaviour
of exchange rates, especially when inflation differentials between countries are large.
Dornbusch (1987) has argued that "the PPP relationship does hold in the case of an
increase in the money stock. If price level movements are caused by monetary changes-
as they are likely to be if the inflation rate is high- then we should expect PPP
relationships to hold in the long term."
According to the absolute version of PPP, the price of foreign currency in terms of
domestic currency, or the exchange rate, E, should equal the ratio of an index of the
price of a domestic basket of goods (Pd) to an index of the price of a foreign basket of
the same goods (Pf) in the absence of transactions costs. This can be expressed as:
E = K (Pa/Pf)
'Although, some writers believed that the roots of PPP theory extend back more than two (Humphrey
and Keleher, 1982) or even four (Berholnz, 1982) centuries; the modern attention, however, was
revived by Cassel (1916). Based on the historical view the first contribution on the subject of PPP was
published in 1916 in the Economic Journal, using price level and exchange rate data for US, and
Sweden.
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where K is the real exchange rate. According to the strict version of absolute PPP,
K=1. Taking logs of the variables in the above equation yields:
e=k + pd - pf
where the lower case representation corresponds to the log of the upper case
representation. In this case, k is assumed to equal 0. This relationship is often specified
in its relative version which is given as:
Ae = Ak + Ap d — Apf
Here, PPP implies that changes in the domestic currency value of the foreign currency
will reflect the inflation differential between the domestic and foreign countries and
also changes in the real exchange rate which, in the strong version of relative PPP, are
assumed to be zero.
As a comprehensive model we introduce the following mode12:
Ae = E a .Ae . + E
	 .A(pd — pf ) . + Enzt	 t-ti = 1	 j = o
	
t —
A f )
t-i++2(e — 0 1 1,d — y2P
where A denotes the first difference of underlying variable. Z indicates a vector of the
other explanatory variables including oil revenue, and dummy variables'.
Using this model, we can test for two alternative versions of PPP theory called
absolute and relative (long-run and short-run components respectively). Meanwhile,
2 See chapter 4 for details of a non-linear simultaneous estimation model.
3The exigency of adding some extra explanatory variables (including lags) in some situations to the
PPP relationship will be discussed in the next sections.
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through estimating the ECM term (A) we can test for the cointegration relationship
among variables which, in fact, is a necessary condition in a valid estimating process.
This coefficient also indicates the speed of adjustment from a disequiblirium position to
equilibrium one.
The possible arrangements are:
• Absolute PPP plus slow adjustment	 -1<X<O, (1) 1=1, 42-1.
• Only-relative PPP
	 ERD-Zoci=1 ; and either X=---0 or ( and 43,2) Ii I.
• Absolute and relative PPP plus slow adjustment 	 Er3j/1-Eccr 1 ; - 1<X<O, 4)171,
The strong version of absolute PPP relies on the 'law of one price' in an integrated,
competitive market. Abstracting from any frictions, the price of a given good will be
the same in all locations when quoted in the same currency, say dollars: Pi = E • P11.
, where Pd, and Pf, represent the price of the ith commodity at home and abroad,
stated in home and foreign currencies respectively, and E the exchange rate.
Consider now a domestic price index Pi = f(p d1i,... pd n) and a foreign price
index Pf = g(P1i,...P11,...P1 n) , if the price of each good, in dollars, are equalised
across countries, and if the same goods enter each country's market basket with the
same weights, then by definition absolute PPP prevails. The law of one price in this
special case extends not only to individual goods but also to aggregate price levels.
Spatial arbitrage then takes the form of strong version of PPP:
E=P"/P1
whatever the monetary or real disturbances in the economy, because of instantaneous
and costless arbitrage the prices of a common basket of goods in the two countries
measured in a common currency will be the same or :
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Pd/E.Pf = 1,
at all time.
The basic assumptions behind this equation, as implicitly mentioned, include the
following:
1- No transport costs;
2- No impediments to trade such as tariffs or exchange controls;
3- Domestic and foreign goods should be perfectly homogeneous;
4- Continual equilibrium in the asset market.
The equilibrium relationship upheld in PPP hypothesis assumes that perfect commodity
arbitrage acts as an error correction mechanism to force the domestic price of a bundle
of home goods in line with the domestic price of the same bundle of foreign goods.
Whilst there may be little objection to this theory as a theoretical statement, objections
arise, however, when it is interpreted as an empirical relationship. In fact the (spot)
prices of a given commodity will not necessarily be equal in different locations at a
given time. Transport costs and other obstacles to trade, especially tariffs and quotas,
do exist and hence the location of delivery does matter. 'We would not expect the
price even of an ounce of gold of a specified fineness always to be the same in
NewYork and in Calcutta.' (Dornbusch, 1987 pp. 1076)
Information costs and impediments to trade stand in the way of strict spatial
equalisation of price. Impediments to trade and imperfection of competition, of course,
also make it possible that spatial price differentiation can occur, thus further limiting
strong PPP.
The weak version of PPP restates the theory allowing for obstacles to trade (such as
tariffs and non-tariff barriers), transport costs, information costs, and market
imperfections, under the assumption that they are constant over time:
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E= K (Pd/Pf),
where K is a constant factor. This relationship holds exactly in the rates of changes, so
that if the factors which cause absolute PPP to fail are constant over time, relative PPP
might hold even when absolute PPP does not. According to relative PPP, the real
exchange rate is a constant (but not necessarily equal to one).
There are some main questions in this framework:
• What is the relevant price index?
• In what circumstances would one expect divergence from PPP?
• Over what time horizon would PPP be expected to hold?
• How does causation run; is it from relative prices to exchange rate or in an
opposite direction?
Choice of the price index to be used in the PPP relationship has been subject to much
dispute in the literature. However, there is no strong convention among researchers
about which price index is appropriate.
On one hand authors who emphasise the role of commodity arbitrage to explain the
PPP relationship (Kravis and Lipsey, 1978; Milone, 1986) argue that an index of
traded goods has to be used'. The choice here is between export prices and wholesale
prices.
On the other hand, authors who explain the PPP relationship by referring to different
pricing mechanisms in goods and asset markets indicate that the proper index should
cover the broadest range of commodities (Frenkel, 1981a; Daniel, 1986a; Isard, 1977)
and that the use of traded goods in a derivation of PPP amounts to nothing more than
a tautology. However, if a price index which includes both traded and non traded
4 They implicitely consider that the relative price of tradables and non tradables remains constant over
time.
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goods is used, this can impart a bias into the calculation of PPP, stemming from cross-
country differences in weight (Officer 1976). The choice, in this case, is between the
consumer price index (CPI) and the GDP deflator. Dornbusch (1987b, p. 1079)
preferred the GDP deflator because of its 'clear methodological definition'. Rush and
1-lusted (1985) object to the use of GDP deflators, because they cover only prices of
currently produced goods and services, while CPI indices contain prices of second
hand goods as well. To sum up this part of discussion, those who suggest WPIs
(whole price indices which put more weight on traded goods) as more appropriate than
CPIs emphasise that the later are more comprised by non-traded goods than WPIs. But
when we notice that the definition of traded and non traded goods varies widely across
countries (compare, for instance, industrial with mineral or commodity export
countries)5 , and especially, when we are discussing developing countries, an index that
gives heavy weight to traded goods may not provide a proper framework to test the
PPP theory. Hence, we choose CPI as the appropriate indices in our empirical tests in
next chapters.
5.1.1.3 Causality
The usual relationship of PPP is, in most cases, presented as if causation runs from
relative prices to exchange rates. Any shocks affecting the exchange rate are
transmitted through prices. The reality, however, seems much more complicated.
There may be common underlying forces, e.g. monetary and fiscal, which drive both
exchange rates and relative prices (but at different speeds). If differences in relative
prices and in competitiveness persist, and result in persistent current account
imbalances, corrective forces are likely to come into play, ultimately producing
compensating changes in exchange rates'. However, one can think of circumstances
where causation might run from exchange rates to relative prices. For instance, a
devaluation raises the price of imported goods; this, in turn, may induce further price
5 For example, for countries like Japan and Germany, manufatured goods are the major traded goods,
but for countries like Astralia it is mining and agricultural products that are the major traded goods.
6In an adjustable peg regime a policy change to the exchange rate may come after differences in
inflation have persisted for a while.
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adjustments. With evidence supporting short-run price stickiness in the goods market
relative to rapid adjustment in the foreign exchange market, unidirectional causality,
however, becomes highly questionable. The evidence raises the possibility of bi-
directional causality or even unidirectional causality, but in the opposite direction from
that realised in equation e = k + pci — 1. Frenkel (1978) looked into the possibility of
the latter case and his empirical evidence, based on the experience of the 1920s
supports it. Commenting on the results he wrote that "Generally speaking, the results
indicate that the data are consistent with the hypothesis that prices do not 'cause'
exchange rates (in the Granger sense) while the exchange rates do 'cause' prices".
5.1.1.4 Divergence from PPP
There are strong theoretical reasons for not expecting PPP to hold in the short run; for
the longer run the analytical issues are more complicated but even here there are
circumstances where it might not hold. We mentioned above some basic and necessary
assumptions behind the PPP theory. If none of these assumptions hold, then, we do not
expect the PPP to hold. In reality one rarely could find the situation in which these
assumptions are perfectly valid. Furthermore, for any real shocks which are irreversible
during the short run, the simple version of PPP will be violated even in the long run
due to real exchange rate appreciation/depreciation. Argy (1994, p. 331) generalises
some main points which may cause divergence from PPP; 'any protracted real (or even
monetary) changes are likely to change the real exchange rate in the longer run. A real
change can come from, say, an oil price shock, a fiscal change, a change in the degree
of protection or a change in the demand for a country's exports. A change in the rate
of inflow of capital over time would also be expected to produce a change in the real
exchange rate.' [The effect of the oil shocks is the determinant which I will consider as
significant on oil exporting country such as Iran.] Structural changes are also very
effective factors in diverging PPP relationship from its long-run position.
Giovannett (1992, p.83) refers to the real shocks (such as productivity shocks, natural
resource discovery and so on) as events leading to divergence from PPP.
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5.1.1.5 Real and monetary shocks
Many economists disagree with the assumption that real exchange rate changes are
zero and point to findings rejecting PPP as circumstantial evidence. Some economists
suggest that real shocks account for deviation from PPP. These economists view
changes on the real side of the economy as driving the real exchange rate. Economists
who fall into this category include Balassa (1964), Samuelson (1964), Hooper and
Morton (1982), Jones and Purvis (1983), Davuytan and Pippenger (1985), Edison
(1989), Daniel (1986), Schotman (1987).
Another group of economists view divergence from PPP as largely caused by
monetary shocks in the presence of nominal rigidities. Given this, it is nominal factors
that lead to observed changes in the real exchange rate. However, these changes are
temporary, this belief is built on an asset theory foundation. This approach is not an
explicit model for real exchange rate behaviour since the real exchange rate is
described as the residual outcome of changes in the nominal exchange rate relative to
changes in the price level differential. Among proponents of this belief are Fleming
(1962),Mundell (1964), and Dornbusch (1976).
Explicit models of the real exchange rate have generally concentrated on one real
factor or another; for example Feldstein (1986) looks at the effects of the government
budget deficit on the real exchange rate, while Balassa (1964), Marston (1986) and
Huizing (1987) examine the effects of relative productivity growth. Hooper and
Morton (1982) show that changes in the real exchange rate are relative to movements
in the current account via an expectations mechanism which picks up changes in
underlying real factors, while Lothian (1986,1987) models structural shifts through
changes in monetary policy regime. None, however, relate these real exchange rate
changes back to the PPP relationship.
Lippert and Breuer (1994) have argued that real factors (altogether as one variable) is an
omitted variable from the PPP relationship and is the cause of divergence from PPP.
That is, the real exchange rate is an unobservable that is a factor in the determination
of the nominal exchange rate. He concludes that when changes in the real exchange
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rate are incorporated into the relative version of PPP, PPP is not rejected (see an
outline of this work in next section).
Dornbusch compares the PPP theory with the Quantity theory of money. He says that:
"the analogy with the Quantity theory of money holds particularly in the effects of
monetary disturbances. The latter theory fails to hold exactly when disturbances are
primarily monetary, for instance in the course of hyperinflations, because changes in
the expected rate of inflation generate systematic movements in velocity that break the
one to one link between money and prices. In the same way, monetary disturbances
cause exchange rate movements that at least temporarily deviate from PPP, implying
changes in the exchange rate adjusted relative price levels or 'real' exchange rates. It
is true that when the economy, following a major monetary disturbance, has settled
down again the cumulative changes in money, prices and the exchange rate will tend to
be the same or at least close. In that sense PPP holds. The same is decidedly not true,
however, in the course of the disturbance." (Dornbusch 1987, 1075-76).
5.1.1.6 Developments in PPP
Although the PPP theory, in its simple version, has failed to explain the volatility of
exchange rate phenomenon, it has been the most basic conceptual framework for the
later theories of exchange rate. Later developments of PPP theory replaced the relative
price by the relative money stock via the quantity theory of money to give the
monetary approach to exchange rate determination. In fact the monetary models of the
exchange rate supplement the Purchasing Power Parity relation with money demand
functions and equilibrium conditions in the money markets. As MacDonald and Taylor
(1992) mention: 'since an exchange rate is , by definition, the price of one country's
money in terms of that of another, it makes sense to analyse the determinants of that
price in terms of the outstanding stocks of and demand for the two moneys.' (pp.3)
As the most important theory of exchange rate determination, one can refer to the
monetary (flexible-price, sticky-price, and interest differential) and the portfolio
balance approaches. The former has been argued, among others, by Frenkel (1976),
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Kour (1976), and Mussa (1976,1977), Dornbusch (1976,1983); and the latter has
argued by Branson (1977).
Monetary and Portfolio versions of PPP will be discussed in the next section.
5.1.2 Monetary Models
5.1.2.1 Flexible Prices
By definition, an exchange rate is the relative price of one nation's money in terms of
that of another. So it is rational to think of an exchange rate as being determined by the
outstanding stocks of and the demand for the two Monies, Mussa (1984), Macdonald
and Taylor (1992).
There are four basic assumptions on which this model relies. The first assumption is
that Purchasing Power Parity holds continuously7.
( 5.1.1)	 e, = P d t —fPt
where e is the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate (domestic prices of foreign
currency); pd, is the logarithm of domestic prices and ptt is the logarithm of foreign
prices.
The second assumption is the stability of the money demand functions of the domestic
and foreign countries:
( 5.1.2) ni, = p d 1 + ay d t — fir d t
and
7Mussa (1984) in his works has not regarded this assumption as essential to analysing the role of
monetary variables in influencing exchange rates.
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( 5.1.3) m[ =	 + a s — 13 * rtf
where Ind
 b pc/ b and tit are the logarithm of domestic money supply, domestic price
level, domestic real income and the level of interest rate respectively. Their
correspondents with a superscript f versions are their foreign counterparts.
If we now subtract ( 5.1.3) from ( 5.1.2) to obtain Pd t pC :
( 5.1.4)
m d t	 = pd pif ay d t a * y if /3d rt	 or/
p d t pf = m d t	 ayd t + a* y[ fir d t yr/
After substituting for the price differential from ( 5.1.4) in ( 5.1.1) we get an expression
for the exchange rate:
( 5.1.5) et = m d t —	 — ay d t + a s y[ + fir d t — frrtf
An alternative version of equation ( 5.1.5) maybe made when one assumes homogeneity
in the structural coefficients across countries (a =a*, 13 =fl*) and so
( 5.1.6) e t
 = (Md	 )t a(Y d	 f)t fl(rd —r)
The further assumption made in this monetary model is that uncovered interest parity
holds continuously. That is, the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic currency
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is equal to the domestic foreign interest-differential, so that there are no profitable
incentives to switch between different currencies.
( 5.1.7) Ae se+1 = (r d - rf )t
where
( 5.1.8) Ae fe+1 = ete+ , — et
Having this assumption we can replace for r d-if
 in equation ( 5.1.6). Then we get :
( 5.1.9) et = (m d —m) — a(yd 
—y1 ) 1 + )6 Aete+,
This implies that we can interchange between the expected change in the exchange rate
and the expected change in the interest differential (both of which reflect inflationary
expectations). In other words, equation ( 5.1.7) indicates that the higher interest return
on the domestic market (rd-if) is then compensated for by the expected appreciation in
the foreign currency (or expected depreciation in the domestic currency). Using
equation ( 5.1.8) in ( 5.1.9) we obtain:
( 5.1.10) et
 = (1+p)-1(md—mf)1—a(1+16)-'(yd —yf ), + )3(1+ fill e:+i
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Relaxing the unrealistic restriction of identity of coefficients across countries, we arrive
at: (though 13 =13 * for this to hold)
( 5.1.11) e, = (1 + /3) - ' (m d	— a(1 + fl)_' y d + a * (1+ 13) -1 yf t + 13(1+ fl)' e1
If expectations are assumed to be rational, then by iterating forward, equation ( 5.1.11)
can be expressed in the "forward solution" form (Macdonald and Taylor (1992)):
( 5.1.12) e 1
 (1+ P)' [4]' kind —m f )et+,	 +a*Yred
i=0
These models of exchange rate determination have been criticized by some researchers
for the inadequacy of the assumptions used to derive such models. For example, the
collapse of Purchasing Power Parity in 1970s gave rise to the rejection of this model
by Dornbusch (1980a).
But, despite the divergence from PPP some researchers who have employed the
monetary models have noted that the conditions of monetary markets equilibrium are
more immediately relevant for determining asset prices such as exchange rates, than for
price levels (Mussa 1984).
Since this monetary model of the exchange rate assumes continuous PPP holds; the
collapse of the latter in the years after floating, which has shown itself in the wide
gyrations in the real rates of exchange between many of the major currencies'
(MacDonald and Taylor, 1992, p.6), cast doubts on the validity of monetary models
even as an incomplete model (Mussa, 1984).
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All in all, to improve the empirical performance of these models one should take
account of some shift effects caused by international and exogenous events8.
5.1.2.2 Sticky Prices
The first and most simple version of the monetary approach of exchange rate
determination, according to which prices are assumed perfectly flexible, might be
called the Chicago theory of the monetary approach to the exchange rate (Frankel,
1979). In this view there is a positive relationship between changes in the exchange
rate and changes of the interest rate differential. When there is an increase in the
interest differential in favor of the domestic interest rate, then there is to be expected a
rise in the inflation rate. Such an expectation leads to an immediate depreciation.
The second approach to the monetary or asset models of exchange rate could be called
the Keynesian theory of exchange rate in which the prices are assumed to be sticky, at
least in the short-run (Dornbusch, 1976c).
Based on this viewpoint when the domestic interest rate rises relative to the foreign
rate it could be interpreted as the effect of a decrease in the domestic money supply.
Without any expectation of compensating changes in the price level to keep real
balances (M/P) unchanged, this would lead to a capital inflow, which in turn causes an
instant appreciation in the domestic currency. Thus there is a negative relationship
between the nominal interest rate differential and the nominal exchange rate. In fact the
dynamic aspects of exchange rate determination in this model arise from the
assumption that exchange rates and asset markets adjust faster than the goods markets
(Dornbusch, 1976c).
To explain one kind of sticky-price model we firstly focus on the following equations:
8Changes in oil price, for instance, could cause some changes in money demand and supply and also
some expectations about the exchange rates and other economic situations in home and foreign
countries.
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( 5.1.13)	 m d _ d = cud — c t 21- d
d	 f De
r — r = t-1+1 — e
t e :A — e = a 3 (ë— e)
All variables, except for rd and rf , are in logarithms. Equation ( 5.1.13) is a
conventional money market equilibrium. Equation ( 5.1.14) represents the Uncovered
Interest Parity (perfect asset substitution) assumption. Arbitrage ensures that the return
on domestic investment (rd) must equal the return on foreign investment after
adjustment is made for the expected change in the exchange rate [r f + ( teet+i -0].
Equation ( 5.1.15) says that the exchange rate expected in the next period is the current
rate plus some proportion of the discrepancy between the rationally expected long-run
rate and the current spot rate.
m
d
money supply
p
d domestic price
yd
output
rd domestic interest rate
f
r	 foreign interest rate
e
t+i expectation about exchange rate formed in period t for t+1te
e	 spot exchange rate
E	 long run equilibrium exchange rate
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Combining equations ( 5.1.13), ( 5.1.14) and ( 5.1.15) we get:
m"
_ pd = a hy d _ a 2 [1. f ± a 3 v _ e)](5.1.16)
Total differencing of (5.1.16) and remembering the sticky price situation in which Ap =
0, Ay = 0 and noting that Am = Ae AC. / Am = 1; we have9:
Ae 1 + a 2 a 3( 5.1.17)	 —
Am a 2 a 3
Equation ( 5.1.17) says that with the sticky price assumption the exchange rate will
overshoot. The extent of the overshooting will depend on the interest elasticity of
money demand (a2) and the expectations (a 3) coefficient. To explain more we can
imagine that if the money supply increases the interest rate decreases immediately. To
clear the asset market, the exchange rate devalues (see equation ( 5.1.14)). At the same
time, because of the increasing money supply, people expect inflation sometime in the
future. This expectation amplifies the amount of the devaluation mentioned above. So
in the first period the devaluation is bigger than that require to offset only the interest
rate reduction (see equation ( 5.1.17)).This is just one part of the adjustment procedure.
At this situation Purchasing Power Parity does not hold, because without any changes
in prices (so far) we observe a devaluation in the exchange rate.
In the next period, the price level starts to increase. This phenomenon causes two
movements in our variables:
9 Compare equation (4) and (16) in Dornbusch (1976) for the same results.
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In money market, the increasing price level raises the interest rate proportionately.
This movement in turn motivates the exchange rate to appreciate. So that, finally,
when the price level increases as much the percentage rise in the money supply, the
interest rate would have climbed back to its original level and the exchange rate would
have appreciated up to the point at which Purchasing Power Parity is valid. This is the
end of this story in which we have Am =	 Ae and Ar = 0
5.1.3 Balance of payments model
Based on economic theory this view of exchange rate determination says that in a pure
float framework the exchange rate will equilibrate the flow demand for and the flow
supply of foreign currency. Since the balance of payments must be zero in such a
situation, any current account surplus must be exactly offset by a capital account
deficit. Thus in this theory, the exchange rate will be determined by the variables
which explain the current and capital accounts.
It is evident that many variations are possible depending on how the current and capital
accounts are modelled'. The model below draws on the stock-flow framework.
5.1.3.1 Balance of payments equation:
B CA K
(5.1.18)K=.3-C7+—X0
where B, CA and K are respectively the overall balance of payments, the current
account and the net capital inflows all deflated by initial exports. The elements are all
defined in domestic currency.
1 °See for example Pesaran (1984) for the adjusted Capital and Current Accounts defined for oil
exporting countries.
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5.1.3.2 Current account equation:
CA	 I	 f	 \
( 5.1.19) - = a i v +	 p
d )+ a 2 (yf	CA0
Xo
This says that the current account is explained by the real exchange rate and by relative
output levels. CA 0 represents all other 'exogenous influences on the current
account.
5.1.3.3 Capital account equation:
Now we need to take account of the foreign country's purchases of domestic bonds
(inflow) as well as home purchases of foreign bonds (outflows). ABF and AEFA
respectively stand for these.
( 5.1.20) K = ABF — AEFA
The stock demand by foreigners of domestic bonds is a function of foreign wealth (W*)
and relative returns [(rd-if)-(ee + e)]. The stock demand by residents for foreign bonds
is a function of home wealth (W) and relative returns. So we can derive the equation:
( 5.1.21)- = a AWf — a 4 AWd +a 5 A[(r d —rf) — (e e — e)]
x
where W is the logarithm of wealth and ee is the expected exchange rate in logarithm.
If we combine ( 5.1.21) with ( 5.1.19) and then substitute into ( 5.1.18) we can arrive at
an exchange rate equation:
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B
e = fi1 e_1 + P2 --- )33(131 —P 1 + i g 4(Y d — Yf ) — 16 5 AWf + P6AWd — f3,Afr d —r1 —el
Xo
—fl8Cilo
wherein:
	
a s 	 a, 
fis —/31 — a, + a s	 1 +a5
	
1	 a4 
/32 — ai ± a5	 fi6 — a l + a5
a	 a5 1 
fl3- a, +a 5	 l +a 5
a,	 1 
fl4 - al + a5	 fl8 — a, + a5
This equation says that
• Central bank intervention (B/XO) in the form of purchases of foreign assets will
depress the currency.
• An increase in output at home relative to that abroad will depress the currency.
• An increase in home prices relative to those abroad will depress the currency
• An increase in wealth at home (abroad) will depress (appreciate) the currency.
• An increase in returns favouring the home economy will appreciate the currency and
• An exogenous improvement in the current account will appreciate the currency.
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5.1.4 Conclusion
Despite many works on the exchange rate, many issues remain unresolved.
The PPP theory has been regarded as a key building-block of exchange rate models.
The general consensus which seems to have emerged is that whilst Purchasing Power
Parity may have relevance to the long-run determination of exchange rates, in the
short-run, however, other factors dominate the movement of exchange rates (Argy,
1994; Giovakketi, 1992). Literature highlights various reasons to explain a persistent
deviation from PPP; omitted variables from this relationship and inefficiency in
empirical methods employed are two important explanations we will argue next.
Several works implemented in this area also revealed that this theory can produce
better empirical results by adding some other explanatory variables (Officer, 1976, ...).
In next section a breif investigation on some empirical works in this area will be
introduced.
5.2 Empirical Review on PPP hypothesis
5.2.1 Introduction
The objective of this section is to review the empirical literature on PPP with special
attention to the studies addressing the issue of deviations from PPP. This phenomenon
is sometimes treated as temporary which would vanish in the long run. If this is the
case, the question which immediately arises is of what time interval would be enough
to capture the equilibrium situation, and if it is not, how this deviation can be
explained. Omitted variables from this relationship, inefficiency in empirical methods,
trade barriers imposed on the relations between countries and so on are different
reasons put forward to explain deviation from PPP.
It seems that the results of testing PPP are very sensitive to the nature of the study, to
the features such as the countries under consideration, the time period of the study, the
price index, econometric method and so on.
Empirical work on PPP during recent decades reveals that several methods have been
used to test the validity of this theory. The criteria I have chosen in this regard to
categorise this review is the econometric method applied on these works'.
We can classify empirical work on PPP in three ways. First, before 1987, is the period
with the lack of the cointegration concept. Up to this time, most works on PPP used
simple regression techniques. See for example, Frenkel (1978); Adler and Lehmann
(1983); Roll (1979); Hakkio (1984) ; Mecagni (1986); Rush and Husted (1985). The
results obtained from these works seem mixed. Some of these who found evidence
against this theory attempted to explain the deviation from PPP. The low power of
empirical methods, among others reasons2, was attributed for that.
The second type of studies were initiated from 1987 when the cointegration concept
was introduced by Engle and Granger, and until the appearance of multivariate
cointegration method introduced by Johansen. The main criticism made against the
previous studies is that they have disregarded the fact that the level of the exchange
I Abuaf and Jourin (1990) believe that 'the negative results obtained in previous empirical research
reflect the poor power of the test rather than evidence against PPP.' Q. 157)
2 See some other reasons in previous section.
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rates and price levels are usually non-stationary, and so the estimated coefficients are
not reliable (see chapter 4 for more details in this point). Following this criticism,
researchers tried to analyse the residuals of the models for stationarity or tested for the
stationarity of the real exchange rate directly. Throughout these residual-based works,
the authors have basically used the two-stage cointegration method presented by Engle
and Granger (1987). Example of this groups are: Schotman (1987), Giovannetti
(1987), Corbae and Ouliaris (1988), Taylor (1988), Edison and Klovland (1987),
Enders (1988), Hakkio and Rush (1989), Mark (1990), Fisher and Park (1991), Hogue
(1995), Henricsson and Lundback (1995) and so on.
The third generation started when the Multivariate VAR cointegration approach was
proposed by Johansen (1988). In this approach c endogeneity' is not imposed on the
variables previously. If there are more than two variables in the set of the variables in
the model, the single equation approach is likely misleading, given that the number of
cointegration vectors is unknown. 'Analysing the data in a full system of equations
allows for possible interactions in the determination of [variables under consideration].
This would eliminate the single-equation bias likely to have affected many of the
previous studies' (Johansen and Juselius (1992, p.212)
5.2.2 Review
5.2.2.1 Pre - cointegration studies
A huge number of works using traditional econometric methods have been conducted
by different authors among them: Frenkel (1978); Adler and Lehmann (1983); Roll
(1979); Hakkio (1984) ; Mecagni (1986); Rush and Husted (1985).
Early studies of Roll (1979), Frenkel (1978), and Adler and Lehman (1983) suggest
that the real exchange rate closely follows a random walk which indicates that there is
no tendency for Purchasing Power Parity to hold even as a long run relationship. On
the other hand, more recent studies have reported some evidence that PPP may still be
a valid long run proposition. Huizinga (1987) examines the Spectral properties of ten
different monthly rates and finds some evidence of mean reversion towards PPP.
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Frenkel (1978) in a seminal paper tried to show the existence of different
interpretations of the origin of PPP relationship in the literature. He then implemented
two different formulations of PPP (assuming exchange rate and price differentials as
dependent variables separately in order to test for 'causality') and using 1920s and
1970s data for Dollar/Pound, Franc/Pound and Franc/Dollar. Furthermore, he used
absolute and relative version of PPP for each case. Preliminary, the efficiency of the
foreign exchange markets was analysed by regressing the logarithm of the current spot
exchange rate, et, on the logarithm of the one-month forward exchange rate prevailing
at the previous month, ft.],
et = a + bft_, + u„
He concluded that the obtained results for the above test were consistent with the
hypothesis that during this period the exchange markets under consideration were
efficient'.
To allow for short-run inertia he estimated a partial adjustment equation:
e t = ay + by(p d I pf ) 1 + (1— y)e .
Except for Dollar/Pound, the results were consistent with the homogeneity assumption
(unity of b as the long-run coefficient). The speed of adjustments appeared different
across exchange rates and price indices.
Additionally, he tested the hypothesis that the price differential is more responsive to
the exchange rate if the later has been anticipated than if it has not been anticipated. To
do that, he defined et - ft_t as the unanticipated component of the exchange rate
(forecast error). Then the following relationship was estimated:
3 In the sense that the current exchange rate is the best predictor of the future exchange rate adjusted
difference in inflation rates between two countries (see Roll 1979).
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(p d 1 pf ),= ao +	 + a2 (e, — f,_,)+u„
The more unanticipated is the lead of the exchange rate, the less response is expected
from prices to the exchange rate. In other words, a2 is expected to be negative. The
obtained results are consistent with this hypothesis and in all cases a2 appears negative.
He concludes that
The relationship embodied in the traditional formulations of PPP should not be
viewed as a theory of the determination of exchange rates. Rather, it describes
an equilibrium relationship between two endogenous variables. As such, the
PPP relationship should be viewed as a short-cut rather than a substitute for a
complete model of the determination of prices and exchange rates.' (p. 188)
Having in mind the Frenkel (1978) results, Hakkio (1984) re-examined PPP
hypothesis. He first adds some explanations for deviations from PPP. Imperfect
substitution between goods in domestic and foreign markets, inefficiency of the
bilateral models of exchange rates (in a multi-exchange rate world), suggested
theoretical and empirical reasons for why the real exchange rate should follow a
random walk, and finally the dynamic misspecification of the models under
consideration are the key reasons he states to address the deviation from PPP.
He claims that the poor performance of PPP is based on imprecise estimates of the
slope coefficient in the previous tests. He argued that by using a multi currency model4
one could be able to improve the estimation of that coefficient. The equation he chose
as the base of his work is
= cc,(1 
— Pi ) + fli(Pt I Pit) ± fliPi(Pt-i
	 cit
which is a product of combination of:	 e, =
 a. /3, (p 1 p,)+ p„
and u 	 p, p,_ 1 + et,. (serial correlation in the errors) A three stage least squares
(3SLS) procedure was used to estimate this model. In his view, much of the failure of
4 By this he means testing the PPP doctrine with a multicountry model of exchange rates. He
estimated PPP for four exchange rates (of UK, France, Canada and Japan).
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PPP is due to ignoring the contemporaneous correlation of the deviations from PPP5,
and to account for this problem two sets of instrumental variables were used in the
mode16.
Contrary to the Frenkel (1981)'s finding, he showed that PPP fails in the 1920s but
performs well in the 1970s. To explain this he concludes that:
'The failure of PPP in the 1970s is not really a failure. It results from not using
as powerful procedure as is possible and from not exploiting the
contemporaneous correlation of deviations from PPP.' (p. 275)
His results indicate that PPP holds in the long run, although deviations from PPP are
substantial. This was against the results of some other authors which indicated to
rejecting this hypothesis. The persistence of deviation from PPP came from this fact
that the error term in PPP relationship followed an AR(1) process with a coefficient of
about one. This outcome possibly implies that although there is a closed long run
relationship between changes in nominal exchange rate and changes in prices ratio;
there are still other omitted explanatory variables which play a significant role in
changes of nominal exchange rate.
5.2.2.2 Single Equation Cointegration Method
Schotman (1987), Giovannetti (1987), Corbae and Ouliaris (1988), Taylor (1988),
Edison and Klovland (1987), Enders (1988), Haldcio and Rush (1989), Mark (1990),
Fisher and Park (1991) and Hogue (1995) among others, are the authors who used this
method to test PPP.
5 That is contemporaneous correlation between deviation of different countries' exchange rates from
PPP. The general idea is that if, for example, there is a shock to the French-US exchange rate (so as to
cause a positive deviation from PPP), then, there will likely be a (positive) shock to the UK-US
exchange rate. This correlation may arise for any of several reasons. For example, an unexpected
increase in French real income will tend to appreciate the French franc. If French and UK real income
innovations are positively correlated, then we should also see an apprecition of the UK pound. Hence,
an (unexpected) increase in the dollar/French franc exchange rate conveys useful information about
the dollar/UK pound exchange rate that is ignored in single exchange rate estimation procedures.
6 In one set, constant, time, time squared, lagged exchange rates and lagged of price ratios and in the
second set (with this assumtion that exchange rate can in fact be determined in the asset market) he
added current and lagged values of money and real income to the former set.
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Hogue (1995), for instance, used residual-based two stage Engle-Granger (1987)
cointegration test to test PPP long-run relationship (see chapter 4).
Four less-developed countries located in sub-continent of India, namely: Bangladesh,
India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka were under consideration. The study covers the period
from 1961:1-1990:4. All these countries are protected by tariff and quota systems and
are subject to domestic market distortions. Although relatively more liberalised in
recent times the foreign exchange market is under government regulation and is subject
to intervention by central banks from time to time.
The tests were performed for the entire period as well as sub-periods. The cut-off
point was the fourth quarter of 1973 in which (1) the Bretton Woods system
brokdown and (2) The first oil-shock occurred. He considered the model:
( 5.2.1)	 = a +fig*, +u,
where g, is the index of domestic price level; g*, is the index of US price level; E t is
the domestic currency price of US dollar; u, is a stochastic disturbance, and a and 0
are constants. The PPP hypothesis is valid as a long-run relationship if 0=1 and u, is a
zero mean stationary stochastic process. The model also allows us to determine how
the price level and/or the exchange rate adjust to eliminate any deviation from PPP.
He concluded that the results were opposite to PPP except for the period 1961:1
1973 :4.
When the hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected, the residuals of the equilibrium
regression equation could be used as instruments to estimate an error correction
model. He estimated following ECM models to find which variable adjusts the
deviations from the long-run path of the PPP.
( 5.2.2) (1— L)(g I E), = const.+8
( 5.2.3) (1 — L)g: = const.+8
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( 5.2.4)(1— L)7 = const .+8 ,_,
( 5.2.5) (1— L)(7r: E,) = const .+8 4'c
where	 and a5 	 the OLS estimated of error terms obtained respectively
from ( ) and its alternative: 7- c, = A + 2 1 E1 yc + c o
Table 5.2-1: ECM Results
1961:1-1990:4 1961:1-1973:4
const. EC. const. EC.
term term
0 1.73 -0.123 1.29 -0.141
(1.91) (-2.53) (1.34) (-2.94)
0 1.81 0.072 1.88 0.070
(3.92) (3.15) (3.11) (3.18)
0 5.31 -0.006 2.97 -0.008
(3.79) (-0.82) (3.87) (-2.85)
0 7.14 0.162 4.21 0.181
(4.13) (3.97) (3.10) (3.37)
Source: Hogue (1995); Figures in Parentheses show t-values.
Then he conducted ECM model to estimate the time length within which the complete
adjustment might occur. He found that it takes about 8.5 quarters to complete the
adjustment. The domestic price level did not adjust much so that most adjustment
came through exchange rate devaluation by government decision.
The results indicated that among the four countries (Indian, Bangladesh, Pakistan,
Serilanka), Indian market forces play a more prominent role in determining prices and
exchange rates along with the PPP theory relative to the three other countries involved
in his work.
Finally, he postulated that if we accept the PPP doctrine as a final equilibrium
relationship rather than a price theory of exchange rate determination (Frenkel, 1976),
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the finding of this paper suggests that prices and exchange rates may diverge in the
long-run.
When there are real shocks; in the absence of trade barriers, arbitrage keeps relative
prices between tradable goods across countries, and the PPP is expected to be be hold.
But for non-tradable (because of high transaction cost) this relationship does not hold.
He argued that since the price levels and exchange rates should by all means be treated
as endogenous variables; this may raise the simultaneity problem which could bias the
estimates of cointegrated coefficient to zero.
Usual stationary tests have non-stationarity of the variable under consideration as the
null hypothesis. If the null can not be rejected, it is usual to conclude non-stationarity.
So, no-rejection of non-stationary hypothesis of real exchange rate leads to the
conclusion of the absence of PPP. Hedricsson and Lundback (1995) argue that
although such a conclusion could be correct, it is not always the case. 'It might be the
case that PPP is really true, but as a result of lack of information in the data and/or low
power of the test, the null is not rejected'. (p. 636) On the other hand, when
`stationarity' is embedded as the null, the same reasons may lead to the rejection of the
null when it is in fact true. To gain stronger conclusion, they suggest that one can test
both, the presence and absence of PPP simultaneously. A robust conclusion is then
obtained when these two stationary tests (with opposite nulls) maintain each other. If
the null of stationary' real exchange rate can not be rejected and the null of non-
stationary real exchange rate can be rejected, then it is clear that the real exchange rate
is really stationary. But if these two tests do not support each other a certain
conclusion will be defective. Other possible outcomes have been shown in following
chart:
Some major pitfalls are discovered in procedures that are designed to test a null cointegration (rather
than no cointegration). These defects... support the continuity use of residual based unit root tests.
(Phillips and Ouliaris (1990, p. 165)
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5.2.2.3 Johansen 's Multivariate VAR cointegration method
Engle and Granger (1987) test for cointegration may be valid for assessing
cointegration relationship between two variables; but is not valid in a system with more
than two variables, in which there may exist more than one cointegrating vector.
Cheung and Lia (1993) using a Monte Carlo experiment, compared the power
properties of the ADF and Phillips (1987) Z a
 test with Johansen test and concluded
that the latter appeared relatively more powerful than the former tests.
Using Johansen method they found evidence favourable to long run PPP in high-
frequency (monthly) data for the recent floating exchange rate period. They believe
that some hypotheses maintained in previous works, namely symmetry, proportionality'
and no measurement error in prices, can lead to different results concerning the validity
of PPP in this period9.
Cheung and Lia (1993) mention that previous cointegration analyses of long run PPP
have been primarily based on residual-based tests following Engle and Granger's
(1987) two-step procedure. The residual-based tests have very low power in rejecting
the non-cointegration hypothesis, even when an equilibrium relationship in fact holds in
the long run and when deviations from equilibrium are corrected relatively quickly. The
residual-based tests consistently find little evidence of cointegration between nominal
exchange rates and prices (CPI and WPI) . 'The Johansen test results differed
dramatically from those of the residual-based tests'(p. 186, 187).
Giovannetti (1992) argues that one can consider the presence of cointegration as
supportive evidence in favour of PPP, but PPP may yet fail to hold because the
estimated cointegrated parameters are significantly different from theoretically
expected ones. He argues that 'these cases motivate the use of cointegration versus the
'The symmetry and proportionality restrictions which are usually imposed on PPP hypothesis imply
that in a relationship such as:
e, = a 0 + ad), + ail,: + 1.1,
, = —a,	 (symmetry condition)
1 6'11 = a2 ' 1 (Proportionality condition).
9 See an explanation for measure error in this paper and also Taylor (1988).
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strategy of simply examining the time series behaviour of the real exchange rate'
(p.,95). On the other hand, Cheung and Lia(1993) argued that imposing the symmetry
and proportionality on coefficients (as is expected based on the PPP) may lead to a
failure to find a cointegrated relationship, when there is one in fact, because of existing
of measurement errors in price indices. 'As a result (contrary to the Giovanitti's view
expressed above), the findings of no cointegration can be interpreted as rejections of
the imposed restriction on the underlying equilibrium relationship rather than the
equilibrium condition itself ...finding of non-stationary in the real exchange rate can
indicate a violation of the symmetry or proportionality restriction and still be consistent
with long-run PPP with measurement errors'.
In the case of presence of measurement errors in prices [the theoretical reasons for
rejecting PPP: the symmetry and proportionality [ai = a2 =11 restrictions are not
treated as necessary conditions. He found that, in nine out of ten cases the restriction
of either symmetry or proportionality is rejected statistically. When these restrictions
are not supported by the data, its imposition can bias the test towards finding no
cointegration.
The stability of parameters of cointegrated system was tested by the Hansen test
(1992). In addition to using Johansen's procedure, he tested the stationarity of real
exchange rates directly, using the test of Kwiakowsky, Philips, Schmidt and Shin
(1992). The null hypothesis of stationarity of the real exchange rate could not be
rejected with only a few exceptions.
He did not impose the proportionality restriction. In this regard, Cheung and Lia
(1993) explain that imposing such a restriction, while it is not supported by the data,
may bias the test towards finding no cointegration relationship. Rather, finding a
cointegration relationship among variables involved in PPP without imposing that
restriction is consistent with long-run PPP with the presence of measurement errors in
prices (Taylor, 1988; Cheung and Lia, 1993).
Dutt and Gosh (1995) running Phillips-Hansen Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares
(FM-OLS) 1° and using CPI and WPI indices for six EMS countries; they found
10 This method corrects for both endogeneity in the data and asymptotic bias in the coefficient
estimates. (see Banerjee et. al, 1993 and Hargreaves, 1994 for a description of this method)
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evidence to support the Weak form of PPP (except in one case), but did not get any
supportive results for the Strong form. They consider weak form of PPP where there is
(at least) one cointegrating vector between exchange rate and price differentials; and
strong form when in addition to this condition there is evidence supporting the
existence of a vector (bo, b1, b2)= (0, 1, -1).
In order to examine the absence or the presence of PPP this paper employed two
residual based stationarity tests; the standard DF test having non-stationarity as the null
and a test proposed by Kwiatkowski; et. al. (1992) using stationarity as the null. We
can be sure of the support for PPP only when both the null of stationarity is not
rejected and the null of non-stationarity is rejected.
Purchasing Power Parity appears to fail (using some OECD countries) as a proper
description of the long-run relationship between exchange rates and price levels.
They argue that some authors have tried to test PPP theory through testing the random
walk hypothesis for real exchange rate. If one actually can present that the real
exchange rate follows a random walk process, he could infer that the deviation from
PPP persist. For example Roll (1979) and Adler and Lehmann (1983) used the
relationship below to test whether the real exchange rate has a unit root:
Aref+1 = bo + b1 Are 1 +...+bk Are k+1 pf+i
where k is the number of lags. Roll (1979) used t-ratios and Adler and Lehmann
(1983) used joint f-tests to see if all b's are zero (which implies support to the random
walk hypothesis). They were unable to reject the random walk hypothesis that is the
PPP does not hold.
Abuaf and Jorin (1990) argue that failure to reject the random walk emphasised by
previous authors could be due to the low power of the used tests in their works. The
contribution of their paper is to estimate an autoregression model in a multivariate
setting which would allow for more powerful tests. Their results cast doubts on the
hypothesis that the real exchange rate follows a random walk.
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In and Sugema (1995) applied multivariate cointegrating framework of Johansen and
also band-spectral regression methods using quarterly data to test PPP relationship
between Australia and 11 major trading countries and supported this theory. They used
Classical and Generalised PPP versions", using both CPI and WPI indices for
comparing purpose, and concluded that there is evidence to support this theory. It is
evident that generalised PPP holds for all countries under consideration and for both
CPI and WPI; although the magnitudes of the coefficients varied across countries.
There was no consistency in the magnitudes obtained from the WPI and CPI-based
regressions. The two measures produced different estimates, but they could not
conclude which one is better.
Sarantis and Stewart (1993) have concluded that the hypothesis that exchange rate and
relative prices contain an autoregressive unit root with no deterministic time trend is
accepted for all countries under consideration. This implies that deviation of exchange
rates from their PPP levels persist indefinitely.
The departure from PPP can be due to deviations in productivity differences, changes
in tastes, and shifts in comparative advantages (Baillie and Silover, 1987),
measurement error in the construction of the price indices (Gernberg, 1977) and tariff
and non tariff barriers (Frenkel, 1981b).
Sarantis and Stewart (1993), using cointegration concept, rejected overwhelmingly the
long run purchasing power parity hypothesis for all sterling exchange rates.
5.2.2.3.1 Efficient markets version of PPP
The theory of efficient markets suggests that the current exchange rate will be the best
predictor of the future exchange rate-adjusted for difference in inflation rates between
two countries. Roll's (1979) classical view of efficient markets version of PPP implies
that any observed departure from PPP reflects a disequilibrium in either the commodity
markets or the foreign exchange market.
11 They consider 61 = y oe t + y i ptd + y 2pf  as the Classical PPP when all ys are supposed to be
unity.They also used a weaker definition of the PPP relation, called Generalised PPP, that does not
restrict the magnitude of the coefficients to unity but instead simply restricts the signs.
Ae = a +	 (Ap * — Ap), + u
Canada (-ratio Japan t-ratio
a
R2
DW
Q(24)
ARCH
0.0013
0.5851
0.57
0.03
1.82
22.28
0.47
0.509
1.468
0.005
1.6
20.33
0.38
-0.0098
0.1971
2.79
1.299
0.5588
F-test for a = 0, 13 = 1. Source Lippert and Breuer (1994).
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As an empirical example of this view, Lippert and Breuer (1994) tried to test the
relative PPP for Canada and Japan. They took the position that real factors are omitted
variables from the PPP relationship and are the cause of divergence from PPP. They
viewed the unobservable real exchange rate as a factor in the determination of
nominal exchange rate. At first they tested the original relationship:
Since the results showed no evidence of PPP relationship and since the relative version
of PPP was rejected, they postulated that PPP's failure is due to changes in the real
exchange rate. To do this they introduced the following equation:
AR= a + ,APROD + P 2 APROD * + fl 3 ATECH + 4 ATECH * + fl 5 ACTX +
fl 6 ACTX * + fl 7 APTX + f3 8 APTX * +u
where:
R=
	real exchange rate, the price of US goods in terms of foreign goods;
PROD=
	productivity;
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TECH=	 technology;
CTX= 	corporate tax rates;
PTX= 	personal tax rates;
and * and A denote a foreign country and first difference respectively.
The fitted value from this specification was used as a proxy for the real exchange rate.
Then, they added this variable to original PPP equation. This procedure is consistent
with studies that view the real exchange rate as an unobservable but distinct influence
on the nominal rate.
The amended version of PPP is given below:
( 5.2.6) Ae, = a ± AA +fi2(Apt -AP;)+v,
Some of results obtained form this test are shown in table below:
Canada 1-ratio Japan 1-ratio
a 0.0006 0.234 -0.0067 0.98
Pi 0.9867 3.822 1.0267 5.011
132 0.7015 1.882 0.0652 0.209
R2 0.21 0.28
DW 1.92 1.45
Q(24) 30.04 24.65
Source Lippert and Breuer (1994)
Finally they reported that:
"The results suggest that when real exchange rate changes arising from the real side of
the economy are taken into account, the hypothesised one-to-one relationship between
changes in the exchange rate and the relative inflation differential cannot be rejected
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for Canada. The results support an amended version of relative PPP that allows the
nominal exchange rate to be influenced by changes in the real exchange rate as well as
changes in the relative inflation differential."
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5.3 Modelling Official and Black Market Exchange Rates in Iran
5.3.1 Introduction
The Iranian economy has been disturbed by several violent shocks in recent decades,
Large swings in the revenue from Iran's main export (oil), political revolution and war
are examples of such shocks. Many such factors are likely to have influenced the free
market value of the Iranian Rial. During the 1980s the real official exchange rate
became greatly overvalued, which is indicated by the massive premium of the black
market rate over the official rate. The high black market premium weakened the
balance of payments and gave rise to a crisis and ultimately to a collapse of the official
exchange rate in 1993 1 . The scarcity of foreign currency at the official rate greatly
increased activity on the black market and there could be spill over effects between the
markets2 . In such circumstances the question of whether or not to adjust the official
exchange rate and to what extent to adjust it remain major issues for exchange rate
policy. Therefore, tracking the dynamic process of the relationship between official and
black market exchange rate (i.e. the behaviour of black market premium) is
instrumental for choosing and operating a proper strategy to unify official and black
market exchange rates as a part of any economic adjustment programme3.
For many years a free market for foreign exchange has existed alongside the official
market for foreign exchange in Iran. The official exchange rate has been fixed' and
subject to infrequent changes of nominal value. Sometimes the free market has been
almost dormant, at such times the premium that could be earned in the free market has
been almost zero. But at other times, most notably since the revolution of 1979, the
free market has been the dominant source of foreign exchange. The social and political
unrest starting shortly before the revolution began a rapid depreciation of the black
I 'In March 21, 1993, the multiple exchange rate system was unified, and the exchange rate of the
rial became market determined. Prior to that date, the exchange rate referred to the basic official
exchange rate of the Iranian rial, which was pegged to the SDR.' (IFS, December 1995, p. 310)
2 We were unable to obtain the black market exchange rate for the period since 1990,
  and so our
estimation period ends before the exchange rate reform of 1993.
3 Such an operation is a key policy issue for many developing countries.
4 In February 1975, the pegging of the rial to the dollar was abrogated in order to reduce the rial's
sensitivity to fluctuations in the value of the us. dollar vis-à-vis the other major currencies, and an
SDR peg was adopted at a par value of 82.2 Rials for SDR. In addition, the commercial rate was
allowed to float within a ± 2.25 percent band, The US dollar, nevertheless, remained as the currency
of intervention by the central bank. Throughout this period the parallel market exchange rate floated
closely above the official exchange rate (see chapter 2).
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market exchange rate as the demand for foreign currency exceeded the official supply.
In the post-revolution period, the premium on foreign currency sold in the black
market over currency sold in official markets has been rapidly increasing, from near to
zero shortly before the revolution to over 2000% by 1990. The purpose of this section
is to see if Purchasing Power Parity has influenced either the black market or official
exchange rates; and also to see if there are any links between the two exchange rates.
Throughout this section we have used modern econometric techniques to investigate
static and dynamic components of the processes under consideration. These methods
of modelling usually are more sensible from the economic point of view and less
problematic from the econometric point of view. Since many economic time series
appear to be non-stationary processes, this kind of modelling prevents some of the
problems which potentially could appear when traditional method is applied. (see
chapter 4 for more details)
Our findings are: (1) Purchasing power parity is a relevant model of both exchange
rates in the pre-revolution period, but only applies to the black market rate after the
revolution. (2) Only the black market rate responds to the black market premium. (3)
The official exchange rate does not appear to be influenced by the black market rate.
Broadly, we find support for PPP as the long-run determinant of the exchange rate,
conditional on an asymmetric relationship between the exchange rate and oil revenue.
Oil revenue is found to influence the exchange rate only in the post-revolution period.
Since the revolution higher oil revenue appears to have generated extra demand for
imports and deflected domestic production away from exports, so that in the long run
the exchange rate tended to depreciate. What is perhaps most interesting in this study
is that once this asymmetry is taken into account we find evidence of a long run
economic relationship despite the tremendous shocks and changes the Iranian economy
has been subjected to.
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5.3.2 Alternative Theoretical Frameworks
Several alternatives theories could be used to model exchange rate behaviour. Among
them one of the most basic and simple one is the Purchasing Power Parity theory. We
also examine whether other models of the exchange rate have any relevance in either
pre or post-revolutionary periods. One such relationship is that an exchange rate
responds to the premium earned in the black market, for example, the official rate
becomes devalued if the premium becomes 'excessive'. Another possibility is that
movements of one exchange rate have a spillover effect on the other exchange rate,
such as a devaluation of the official rate influencing the black market rate.
In section 5.3.3 we try to model official and black market exchange rates separately in
the pre and post revolutionary periods. Their possible effects on each other will be also
assessed. In section 5.3.4 PPP is used to model the relationship between the black
market rate and oil revenue. This equation is then used in later chapters to model the
effect of oil revenue upon the Iranian economy. A brief outline of these theories is
provided in next section.
5.3.2.1 Theory
There are numerous mechanisms that could determine exchange rates. One is
purchasing power parity which follows from the assumption that in equilibrium it
should not be possible to profit from buying a good in one country and selling it in
another. In this case the exchange rate adjusts to maintain a constant real exchange rate
in the long run. Either trading in the free market forces an incorrectly valued exchange
rate back to the equilibrium value, or flows of foreign reserves force the authorities to
correct the official exchange rate. In the first case, when the currency is overvalued
falling demand for net exports creates an excess supply of home currency which
depreciates the exchange rate. In the second case, the drain on reserves due to
intervention to support an overvalued currency eventually forces a devaluation. In
either case in the long-run e = k + pci — where k is a constant, e, pd , and pf are,
respectively, the exchange rate, the domestic price level and the foreign price level, all
measured in natural logarithms. Despite a number of objections to the simplistic theory
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of PPP, the model has a good empirical record, especially in high inflation countries
(Dornbusch, 1987).
An alternative relationship is that the government does not permit the black market
premium to rise too high, either because it fears the inflationary consequences or
because as the premium rises it is tempted to sell foreign currency on the free market
to make profit. One possibility is that the official rate may be devalued to reduce the
black market premium. Or, as considered by Culbertson (1975), Dornbusch et. al.
(1983) and Olgun (1984), the black market exchange rate may respond to the premium
earned in the black market.
A third possibility is that a mixture of PPP and the black market premium are relevant.
Or even that the real value of one exchange rate spillover onto the value of the other
exchange rate. This latter may be particularly relevant to the post-revolutionary period
in which the official rate has become excessively overvalued and so increasingly
demand become deviated to the black market. Additionally, real or nominal
appreciation/depreciation in one exchange rate may spill over onto the other exchange
rate, such a model of black market rates is considered by Culbertson 1975. In this
model a devaluation of the official rate produces a depreciation of the black market
rate.
5.3.3 Black Market and Official Exchange Rates: Different Models
5.3.3.1 Exchange Rate Evolution
Before entering into the main stream of the discussion a brief review of the exchange
rate evolution in Iranian economy could be useful. Iranian economy has experienced a
number of shocks during the last three decades. Three boom and bust oil shocks,
revolution, war with Iraq, and some other minor shocks plunged the economy in a
complex situation. Capital flight, destruction, and loss of human capital forced the
economy into internal and external crises.
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Restrictions on the supply of foreign currency whilst demand was increasing made the
black market exchange rate jump. Between 1980 and 1988 Iran fought a hugely
destructive war with Iraq. The diversion of oil revenue earnings towards imports of
armaments increased black market transactions for a given level of oil revenue and so
put downward pressure on the black market rate. A further source of downward
pressure came from the loss of physical and human capital that raised the demand for
imports. The eruption of the war with Iraq forced the authorities to impose a collection
of restrictions, regulations and controls on economy. During this period imports were
restricted quantitatively to save foreign exchange and foreign exchange was allocated
to prevent capital flights.
For more comprehension, it is essential to show the movements of official and black
market exchange rates and the premium of the black market rate over the official rate
during the period under consideration. As Pesaran (1992) describes the premium in the
black market rose from 5.8 percent in 1960 to 21 percent in 1963, and fell back to 4.1
percent in 1966 as financial and economic conditions began to improve. With
increasing economic and political stability and increasing revenues from oil exports, the
black market premium practically disappeared for most of the 1967-1977 period. The
black market premium amounted to 5.6 percent in 1977, 9.2 percent in 1978, and then
jumped to 81.5 percent after the fall of the Shah in 1979.5  Since then the black market
premium has been fluctuating around a steadily rising trend (see Figure 5.3-1).
Between 1979 and 1989 the premium has been rising at a staggering average annual
rate of 42.1 percent, and in November 1989, the black market rate for the dollar
reached its peak at over 20 times the official rate. The high levels of the black market
premium in Iran over the past decade have been sustainable largely because of the fact
that over 95 percent of the country's foreign exchange revenues accrue exclusively to
the government.
5 The capital flights around the revolutionary year (1979) and the prior political tensions are the most
responsible of this jump.
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Table 5.3-1 Exchange Rate Premium CYO'
Year Premium
1960 5.8
1963 21
1966 4.1
1967-1976 •---,0
1977 5.6
1978 9.2
1979 81.5
, 1990 2000
a Rounded values of [(Eb -E) / EV *100
Figure 5.3-1 Exchange Rate Premium(%) (1960 - 1990)
From these figure and table it is obvious that for the pre-revolution period (1960-1979)
the official and black market rates moved nearly side by side. During this period, active
intervention by Bank Markazi (Central Bank) through sales of US dollars in the free
market prevented any lasting disparity. Thus for all intents and purposes, Iran had an
effective unitary exchange system and a virtually convertible currency (Amuzegar 1993
p. 162). Whereas, in the post-revolutionary period (1980-1990), although the oil
revenues during the first five years since the revolution were nearly equal to those
during to the last five years of the Shah's regime, the black market exchange rate
deviated from official rate very sharply. In fact several new developments mentioned
above prevented the exchange system from remaining liberal. In such an environment
the maintenance of a free exchange market, inactive since shortly before the revolution,
was totally terminated, and a dual exchange rate system immediately followed.
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5.3.3.2 Literature
Numerous works have been conducted to analyse the capability of devaluation policies
for eliminating the spread between official and black market exchange rates.
Dornbusch et. al. (1983); Yin and Stoever (1994); Agenor (1991, 1992a); Kamin
(1991) and Edwards and Montiel (1989) are some examples of these works.
What is consistent with the conventional international theory is that an official
devaluation is effective- that is , causes depreciation in free market exchange rate and
brings the official rate closer to the free market rate and thus narrows the black market
premium- when the devaluation is accompanied with restrictive domestic economic
policies. There is some empirical evidence literature supporting this view. For example
Yin and Stoever (1994) using RMB (Chinese currency) obtained some results
compatible with this view. Also Dornbusch et al (1983) showed how an expectation of
future official devaluation leads to an immediate depreciation in the black market and a
subsequent decline in the premium when the official depreciation actually occurs.
However, some evidence suggests that the reduction in the premium will be only
temporary if fiscal and credit policies maintain an expansionary course, thus implying
that a devaluation cannot itself permanently lower the premium (see Agenor, 1992b).
The econometric results presented in Agenor (1991) also support the view that the
parallel rate depreciates less than proportionally immediately after parity change6.
However, Subsequently, the parallel market rate continues to depreciate while the
premium rises, returning in the long-run to its initial level (in six out of 12 countries
under consideration).
Studies by Edwards (1989a), Edwards and Montiel (1989), and Kamin (1991)
covering a large sample of devaluation episodes in developing countries have also
documented these facts.
Also, one of the implications of the Portfolio - balance models, such as Dornbusch et
al (1983) and Phylaktis (1991), is the existence of an equilibrium spread between the
black market and official rates, or so called premium exchange rate (Phylaktis and
Kassimath (1994).
6See Agenor (1992), p. 22 for more details.
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To catch the relationship between black market and official exchange rates Phylaktis
and Kassimatis (1994), considered: ebt = ea + vt , as the long-run relationship
between them, where b and o stand for black and official respectively. Given a constant
premium, 13 should be equal to unity, i.e. that the black market rate depreciates by the
same proportion as the official exchange rate.
They, then, used the error-correction models to test for short and long run adjustments
between these two variables:
Aeb(t) = a l + (eb(t_o — fieco_p ) + Er; Zieb(t_p Egi eeo(f_, ) U, and,
z!te,,(0 = a2 + p2 ( eb(gI) — fleo(t_i) + E Aeb(t_i) Erh Aeo(t_I) + v t
The error correction term appeared significant in six out of seven countries under
consideration (the exception was Indonesia when the dependent variable is the black
market rate), implying that the black market rate adjusts to short-run deviations from
long-run equilibrium. In two cases, Korea and Taiwan, the official rate adjusts also to
short-run deviations from long-run equilibrium.
In Agenor's (1991) monetary model of exchange rate the parallel market exchange rate
is positively related to the official exchange rate (Bhawnani and Kadiyal, 1997).
Agenor (1992a) suggests that the impact of a devaluation on the parallel market
premium is ambiguous, whether one considers an officially fixed exchange rate or a
crawling peg.
Another theoretical framework has been chosen in the literature to investigate the
relationship between official and black market rates is Purchasing Power Parity theory.
Sundar (1994), used official and black market exchange rates to test PPP relationship.
He concluded that PPP can not be rejected for most trading country pairs using official
exchange rates. For non-trading country pairs, PPP can not be rejected using black
market exchange rates.
Chapter 5: Exchange Rate Modelling 	 168
Culbertson (1975), in a PPP environment, put two extra variables: official rate and the
changes of foreign exchange allocated to the market from official holding (which was
assumed equal to change in official reserves holdings), in addition to price deferential,
to the right side of the black market exchange rate equation. Although the coefficients
related to these variables appeared insignificant, he concluded that "the results are
consistent with the theoretical proposition that movements in the black-market rate are
closely associated with Purchasing Power Parity induced changes in the equilibrium
exchange rate".
Bahmani-Oskooee (1993a) tested PPP theory using the Iranian official and black
market exchange rates (19731-198611). The purpose postulated in this work was
comparing the degrees to which official and black market exchange rates could be
explained in a PPP framework. He failed to support PPP when he used official data.
However, he could support this theory when he used black market exchange rate, after
including the effects of the revolution and war with Iraq.
Bahmani-Oskooee (1993) reports that in cointegration analysis, purchasing Power
Parity appears to be a valid model of the black market rate but not of the official
exchange rate. Bahmani-Oskooee tests for cointegrating relationships over the pre- and
post-revolution period together. Since, the economy of Iran has changed so
fundamentally since the revolution an issue we consider is whether or not the findings
of Bahmani-Oskooee apply to the periods separately.
This section shows that purchasing power parity holds for the black market rate but
not for the official rate. To the Iranian case this should be of no surprise as
adjustments to the official rate have been few in the post revolutionary period.
5.3.3.3 Econometrics
We employ simple error correction models to test the alternative exchange rate
models, that is:
( 5.3.1) Ae = a +,8 . Ae
	 +2. (e — e *t-I	 Pit
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Where e * is the equilibrium value of the exchange rate, and j = o denotes the official
rate while j = b denotes the black market rate. Such a model permits slow adjustment
through inertia captured by f3 an adjustment towards equilibrium. If the exchange
rate exceeds the long run value, then we expect an appreciation to restore equilibrium,
hence X <0.
Our data is annual, so that we have at the most 18 observations in the pre-
Revolutionary period and 11 in the post-revolutionary period. For this reason we do
not employ either Johansen's methodology or the general to specific methodology, but
simply test a number of simple models and report the best equation'.
Modelling the official exchange rate presents a further problem. In the official market,
adjustments of the nominal exchange rate were rare in the pre-revolution period, and
so data on det will be dominated by zeros 8 . So that we obtain a clearer picture of the
adjustment process we choose to model the official market exchange rate only in the
periods when a change in the nominal exchange rate took place. For the post-
revolution period this simply means starting our estimation from 1980. For the pre
revolution period we estimate:
( 5.3.2) Ae0+(1) = a,, +20 (eo - e:),_ 1 + pot
where + indicates non-zero values.
7 In next part of this chapter, however, the Johansen's and general to specific methodologies will be
used to model the black market exchange rate in a PPP framework. Also see the results of modelling
official exchange rate using these methods, for comparison purpose, in appendix.
8 A further issue of interest would the determinants of the decision to alter the exchange rate. In the
pre-revolution period the Rial was devalued in 1968, 1969, 1975 and 1976 and revalued in 1967, 1973
and 1977. After the revolution devaluations occurred in 1980-1984, 1988 and 1989 and revaluations
in 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1990.
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5.3.3.4 Resufts9
5.3.3.4.1 Purchasing Power Parity
If the exchange rate adjusts to restore the real rate to the equilibrium value, then e * is
given by the ratio of domestic to foreign prices, pci - pf, where III is the domestic price
level, pf the foreign price level, and both are measured in natural logarithms (see data
defination in section 5.3.6). Thus we estimate equations of the form:
( 5.3.3) Ae j , = a j + p i Aej,_, + [e j _(pd — pf
Our preferred equations are reported below 10 .
Pre-Revolution:
= 2.0— 0.35(e 0 pd pf
(1.71) (-1.7)
= 0.24; 1960 - 1978;
Aeb, = 0.992 + 0.44 Aeo(t_I) — 0.17 (eb Pd F
(2.35)	 (2.4)	 (2.36)
= 0.35; LM(1) = 0.02; 1960 - 1978
Post-Revolution:
Aeof = -.26 + 0.05 (e0 — pd pf
(-0.9)	 (0.88)
-0.02; ; LM(1) = 0.80; 1980 - 1990
9 See appendix for further results.
I° T-statistics in parentheses.
Chapter 5: Exchange Rate Modelling 	 171
Aeb, = 2.33 - 0.31 (eb —Pd
(3.4)	 (-3.70)
= 0.43; LM(1) = 1.83, 1979 - 1990
Before the revolution, the adjustments to both exchange rates are to restore Purchasing
Power Parity, and both X. and A.b are significant at 10% level. When adjustments to the
official rate occur the proportion of the disequilibrium removed is about twice the
amount removed in the black market in the first year of adjustment. But, of course, the
slower initial adjustment in the black market reflects the continuous nature of the
adjustment in the black market.
In the post-revolutionary period a very different picture emerges. The value of X. is
positive, but insignificant from zero, indicating no adjustment to restore a PPP
equilibrium in the official market. However, there is still evidence of PPP being
restored in the black market. The rate of adjustment in the first year is almost twice the
pre-revolution rate, possibly due to the higher post revolution inflation rate which
raises the costs of slowly adjusting the price of foreign currencyll.
5.3.3.4.2 Black Market Premium
In this section we report equations of the form:
( 5.3.4) Aei, = cif + oi (eb — eb ),_,+	 + vfi
These permit the exchange rate to adjust to the level of the black market premium, if
the adjustment is to return the premium to a constant equilibrium rate, then we expect
ab < 0 and a. > 0. The economics behind these adjustments concerns the private sector
and the state sectors responses to profitable opportunities in the black market. If
currency is diverted to the black market to take advantage of higher gains then we
expect a,, < 0. If the authorities use the premium as a guide to setting the official
1i Dornbusch (1987a) reports that when inflation differentials are high strong support is found for
PPP. In terms of cointegration studies this is consistent with a more rapid adjustment to equilibrium.
In fact, it is argued that, when inflation is high, monetary growth could dominate real factors and so
PPP should be supported.
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exchange rate, for example, they may believe that eb contains information about the
appropriate value of eo, then we expect a.> o.
Our preferred equations are:
Pre-Revolution:
Ae:, = -0.01 - 0.05 (eb — e 0),_,
(-0.28) (-0.03)
R2 = -0.2; 1960 - 1978
Aeb, = 0.01 + 0.54 Ae b(Z_l) - 0.34 (eb — e 0),_,
(1.12) (2.73)	 (-2.18)
'K 2 = .32; LM(1) = 0.02; 1960 - 1978
Post-Revolution:
Ae„, -= 0.07 - 0.04 (e b
 — eo)t-1
(1.06) (-1.24)
R. 2 = 0.05; ; LM(1) = 0.48; 1980 - 1990
Aeb, = 0.51 - 0.15 (eb —e0)1_1
(4.10) (-2.35)
R 2 = .29; LM(1) = 1.26; 1979 - 1990
For the pre-Revolutionary period we find 5,, to be incorrectly signed and the
insignificance of ao
 from zero indicates no adjustment, the latter point also applies to
the post revolution period. But the black market is found to adjust to reduce the
premium. This is consistent with studies for other countries such as Phylaktis and
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Kassimatis (1994). The rate of adjustment in the first year for the black market rate is
lower after the revolution, possibly due to the rapid appreciation of the real official rate
as inflation increased and because the government used its control over foreign
currency revenue to maintain a substantial premium by avoiding devaluations even as
the price differential worsened (see Karshenas and Pesaran, 1995).
5.3.3.4.3 Spillovers
The spillovers we consider are that the real exchange rate or change in the nominal
value of an exchange rate may spillover onto the other exchange rate. We also consider
whether the premium is required in addition to the real rate to explain exchange rate
movements. Theoretically, we should expect some sort of spillovers, as disequilibrium
in one market implies disequilibrium in at least one other market. For example, if the
official exchange rate is overvalued, we may expect the higher demand for foreign
currency in the black market will tend to depreciate the black market rate.
Pre-revolution period:
Aeb, = 0.83 + 0.42 Aeb(( _i) + 0.53 Leo(f) - 0.14 rebt_i
(2.12)	 (2.52)	 (2.00)	 (-2.12)
R.' = 0.47; LM(1) = .35; 1960 - 1978
Aeb+, = 2.26 — 0.3Aeb(f_i) — 0.15 re 0( ,_, ) — 0.24reb( ,_0 + 1.
(0.99)	 (-0.38)	 (-0.05)	 (-0.08)
1960 - 1978
Post-revolution period:
Aeb, = 2.55 - 0.17 Aeb(,_, ) - 0.42 Aeo() - 0.009 reo,_, - 0.33 reb,
(1.56)	 (-0.64)
	
(-0.42)
	 (-0.05)	 (-2.20)
-1Z2 = 0.29; LM(1) = 1.31; 1979 - 1990
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Aeb, = 2.78 - 0.05 reo,_, - 0.34 reb,_,
(1.89)	 (-0.35)	 (-2.54)
R 2 = 0.38; LM(1) = 1.4; 1979 - 1990
Aeo, =.86 + 0.7Aeb(,_,) — 0.02 re 0( ,_ 1) — 0.12reb(„ ) + p,
(0.84)	 (0.74)	 (-0.19)	 (-1.12)
= -0.15; ; LM(1) = 0.09; 1980 - 1990
For the black market rate over the pre-revolution period we find that the devaluation
of the official rate causes the black market rate to depreciate, but by less than the
percentage change in the official rate 12 . This is consistent with a number of studies (e.g.
Dornbusch, 1983; Agenor, 1991; Yin and Stoever (1994); Agenor, 1992b) that report
that official devaluations cause the black market rate to depreciate, as the opportunity
for profit from switching currency from the official market to the black market
declines. The premium is not found to be significant and the black market rate is
determined by PPP in the long run. In the post revolution period we find no evidence
of spillovers from the official rate to the black market rate. One possible explanation
for this is that at the hugely over valued official rate currency from official sources was
too scarce to influence the black market rate. We find no evidence of spillovers onto
the official market rate in either period.
12 This implies that the size of black market premium would fall after a devaluation; though this
reduction is expected to be only temporary if fiscal and monetary policies maintain an expansionary
direction. (see Agenor, 1992a)
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5.3.4 Black Market Rial and the PPP: the Effect of Oil Revenue on the black
Market Exchange Rate
5.3.4.1 Introduction
This section examines the relevance of purchasing power parity for the black market
exchange rate in Iran over the whole period since 1960. The longer estimation period
allows us to formally test for cointegration and to test hypotheses on the cointegrating
vectors. We find evidence supporting the strong version of PPP; the exchange rate,
domestic and foreign prices constitute a unit cointegrating vector, once we permit an
asymmetric long run influence for oil revenue. This particular asymmetry is that the
exchange rate is insensitive to oil revenue prior to the revolution, but depreciates if oil
revenue rises after the revolution. The asymmetry is explained by the income effects of
oil revenue raising imports as the economy stagnated after the revolution; but being
met by domestic production in the pre-revolution boom. Furthermore, easy access to
foreign financial markets before the revolution made it more practical to support
official exchange rate.
According to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) a nation's exchange rate equates the
price of imported goods to the price of domestic goods. Numerous tests of this
hypothesis have been performed, motivated in recent years by developments in time
series modelling, such as cointegration. The consensus that seems to be emerging is
that PPP is most relevant to long-run movements in exchange rates. In the short-run
other factors are likely to be dominant, such as capital flows, productivity shocks,
foreign currency earnings, and where a parallel market exists (such as in Iran) the
interaction between the official exchange rate, official reserves and the black market
price. Many such factors are likely to have influenced the free market value of the
Iranian Rial, for the Iranian economy has been disturbed by several violent shocks in
recent decades, for example, large swings in the revenue from Iran's main export (oil),
political revolution and war. In addition, during the 1980s the real official exchange
rate became greatly overvalued, which is indicated by the massive premium of the
black market rate over the official rate (in this decade the Iranian economy has
experienced a multiple rate system with a dozen of several exchange rates each one has
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been officially defined for a specific area of imports or exports (see Amuzegar, 1993
for more details). The scarcity of foreign currency at the official rate and increase in
demand for imports caused by stagnation in domestic output greatly increased activity
on the black market and there could be spill over effects between the markets 13 . The
objective is to test whether or not PPP holds as a long-run relationship in the Iranian
free market for the dollar, despite these events.
There is some recent evidence on the behaviour of the black market Rial. Bahrnani-
Oskooee (1995a) finds that the depreciation can be explained in terms of a monetary
model of the exchange rate, in which greater domestic income causes the exchange
rate to appreciate. In an earlier paper, Bahmani-Oskooee (1993a) reports support for
PPP in a cointegration framework, but his estimation technique did not permit the
testing of the parameter restrictions imposed by PPP. Our estimation strategy does
permit such tests, and we go further than Bahmani-Oskooee to model the short-run
determinants of the exchange rate 14 . Broadly, we find support for PPP as the long-run
determinant of the exchange rate, conditional on an asymmetric relationship between
the exchange rate and oil revenue. Oil revenue is found to influence the exchange rate
only in the post-revolution period. Next subsections are organised as follows: section 1
considers the likely determinants of the black market rate in Iran; section 2 discusses
the empirical methodology; section 3 presents the results and section 4 concludes.
5.3.4.2 PPP and the Determinants of the Black Market Value of the Rial
If we denote the price of foreign currency in terms of the Rial by E, domestic prices by
PI and foreign prices by P
	
PPP predicts a constant real exchange rate:
( 5.3.5) E* Pf I P d = K
13 We were unable to obtain the black market exchange rate for the period since 1990, and so our
estimation period ends before the exchange rate reform of 1993.
14 Modern econometric techniques allow us to distinguish between short and long-run effects of the
process under consideration.
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where K is a constant, which we can arbitrarily set to 1. If we use lower cases the
denote the natural logarithm of a variable then ( 5.3.5) becomes:
( 5.3.6) e = p d — pf
Thus we expect the exchange rate to have a unit price differential elasticity. An
equation such as ( 5.3.5) will represent long-run equilibrium exchange rate. In the short-
run a multitude of shocks could push the exchange rate away from the long-run
equilibrium, and in the long-run the real exchange rate could also be influenced by
permanent changes in the economy. Some researchers suggest that one reason
responsible for failing to support PPP hypothesis, is the omission of relevant variables
from the PPP relationships 15 . (See previous sections of this chapter for more discussion
in this concern)
15 In explaining the PPP theory, three alternatives are distinguished in literature:
1. In the most extreme we can expect:
pd
E= pit f
where Et indicates to short run equilibrium exchange rate in period t (number of units of domestic
currency per unit of foreign currency). In this expression, the exchange rate cannot deviate even
temporarily from the current value of Ptd/Ptf. Empirically this interpretation of the PPP theory has
been rejected repeatedly.
2. In the second extreme(Cassel's form), the Pd/Pf component is but one variable to explain the
exchange rate:
pd
E, =
Pt"
where f refers to "an arbitrary increasing function with respect to the explicit independent variable,
with the ellipse denoting space for additional explanatory variables" (Officer 1976).
Cassel allows room both for random influences and for other explanatory variables in the f function.
Several variables, other than Pd/Pf , , were put forward by some contributors in literature. Some of them
are accounted as systematic influences on the exchange rate, such as trade restrictions, speculation in
foreign exchange market, anticipation of greater inflation in a country than in another, changes in
relative prices within a country, the intervention of government in the foreign exchange market (these
variables are mentioned in Cassel's writings about PPP (for more see Officer, 1976)
3. In the third view of explaining the PPP, working from the first extreme, one can replace P d/Pf by a
weighted average of the current and past values of Pd/Pf.
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A number of factors are likely to have raised the long run real exchange rate for the
Iranian Rial. There has been a massive loss of productive capacity since the 1979
revolution which has increased Iran's demand for imported goods 16 . Prior to the
revolution Iran's economy had been growing rapidly (over 1963-78 the average
growth rate of non-oil output" = 11.7%) partly through a policy of import
substitution, and as a consequence of the opportunities for investment opened up by
higher oil earnings in the 1970s the growth rate was rising. Since the revolution
production has stagnated (average growth rate of non-oil output = 1.2%) as a
consequence of both the revolution, the costly and protracted war with Iraq, and
falling oil revenue 18 . Events associated with the revolution reduced productive capacity
in a number of ways. Firstly, the emigration of factory owners and skilled workers
(Ghasimi 1992). Second, the isolation of the economy from the outside world- due to
sanctions and frozen assets - reduced the inflow of foreign technology (Karshenas
1995). Third, the introduction of policies that failed to encourage production
(Karshenas and Pesaran, 1995). In the Iran-Iraq war much human and physical capital
was lost, and infrastructure destroyed. Finally, falling oil revenue reduced government
revenues and hence the ability of the state to invest in industry and infrastructure
(Ghasimi 1992; Karshenas 1995; Karshenas and Pesaran 1995, Mazarei 1996). Hence,
after the revolution Iran moved from a position of import substitution to one of more
import dependence. This greater demand for imports relative to exports would raise
the equilibrium real exchange rate, that is the value of K in equation
16 Since the revolutionary years (especially after the Iran-Iraq war was launched in 1980) the share
of consumption in the national expenditure of Iran has increased, whilst national income and
industrial output have stagnated. This has produced a considerable increase in demand for imported
goods (see Behdad, 1988 for more discussion).
17 Calculated at constant 1990 prices from: Bank Markazi Iran (Central bank of Iran), Annual
Economic Reports and Balance sheet; several issues.
18 Stagnation had, in fact, started since 1977 in the end of Fifth Plan (1973-77). (see chapter 2 and
Looney, 1985, p. 100)
19 The loss of oil revenue reflected falling world prices, government decisions to conserve oil and
international political developments.
20 Import dependence began to rise immediately prior to the revolution as higher consumption raised
the demand for imports ( Karshenas, 1995) but due to Iran's large foreign reserves the exchange rate
remained stable. However, in the post-revolution years the increasing import demand coincided with a
great scarcity of foreign exchange put downward pressure on the black market exchange rate.
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Portfolio adjustment following the revolution and warn also depreciated the free
market rate as Iranian assets were frozen and capital fled Iran either to find safer
investments or as the emigrants turned to the black market to obtain foreign currency.
Because of the war this capital flight persisted throughout the 1980s. However, we
have been unable to distinguish between the effects of capital flight and lost productive
capacity22.
There is some ambiguity about the possible effects of greater oil revenue on the black
market rate, and furthermore given the structural changes that have occurred in Iran
the effects of oil on the exchange rate could differ between the post-Revolution and the
pre-Revolution eras. Since oil earnings are the authorities main source of foreign
currency, then higher oil revenue increases the amount of currency that could be
provided at the official rate. The consequent reduction in demand for currency on the
free market would cause an appreciation of the black market exchange rate. This effect
may be more important after the revolution as the authorities have had difficulties
borrowing to support the exchange rate and so have become more dependent upon oil
revenue as a source of foreign exchange. The ambiguity in the effect of oil arises as a
result of the spending of the extra income earned by oil. If higher incomes increase
the demand for (net) imports24, then this must depreciate the exchange rate 25 . This
effect could be larger since the revolution as the economy has had difficulties in
meeting extra demand for goods, and the greater scarcity of foreign currency has
forced people to turn to the black market for hard currency to buy imported consumer
goodsm . In the short run the extra reserves may cause an appreciation of the exchange
rate, but in the long run the spending effect may be dominant. Thus the effect of higher
21 Agenor (1991) considers portfolio adjustment to secure private assets to be a key determinant of the
black market exchange rate.
22 We could of course try to model the effect of lost productive capacity, however, measuring the loss
of productive capacity has proved difficult. The main problem is that prior to the revolution the
growth in output was unbalanced (Pesaran, 1982) and the rapid growth that occurred was likely to be
in excess of the true long-run rate. (see chap 6 for modelling output)
23 For more discussion see Dutch disease interpretation in chapter 3.
24Due to increased demand for foreign goods and the diversion of exports to the home market.
25 Edwards (1986d) concludes that to avoid a boom-induced real apprecition, the government should
not spend too much on non-traded goods. He warns, however, that this advise may encourage to spend
most of the revenue on arms and weapons, that has occured in many countries.
26As the authorities strictly ration the uses of official reserves.
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oil revenue could be to cause a short-run appreciation followed by a long-run
depreciation, at least since the revolution.
5.3.4.3 The Model and Econometric Methodology
Our estimating equation is of the error feedback form:
Ae, = ao + a l (L)Aef_i + a2 (L)Apid + a,(L)Apir + a4 DR, +
(5.3.7)
a 5 (L)Aoil, + a 6 oilt _ i + a,[e — (/1P d ± 13 2Pf
 )]1 + et
where oil, is the log of real oil revenue (see Data Sources in 5.3.6), DR, is a dummy
variable for the post revolution period, DR, is equal to 1 from 1979 and 0 otherwise, A
and L are respectively the difference and lag operators, and s t is a random error term.
For PPP to hold in the long-run we require co <0 (that is cointegration) and PI = =
1. The discussion in the previous section suggests that a4 >0, as <0, c(.6 >0. Initially we
assume that the parameters are invariant over time, but later we allow for differing
values before and after the revolution. If domestic and foreign prices, the black market
exchange rate, and oil revenue are I(1) and cointegrated, then estimation of (5.3.7) by
least squares is valid. We employ a non-linear estimation technique to obtain estimates
of the I3s together with their standard errors. (see chapter 4 for an explaining of this
technique)
Table 5.3-2 Phillips-Perron Unit Root for Stationarity
Variables	 Level	 First difference
za
	 z,	 4,
1.7 3.79 -7.06
0.36 0.65 -5.91
1.41 1.11 -22.77
-3.2 -1.59 -26.62
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5.3.4.4 Results
5.3.4.4.1 Data: order of integration and cointegration
We first test the orders of integration in the data. The Phillips-Perron 27 test for unit
roots was applied and the results are shown in Table ( 5.3.2).
Notes:
RATS software was used to produce these results.
Z, and Za are Perron and Phillips test statistics for Unit roots respectively with and
without deterministic trends. The 5% critical values (for 25 observations) are -3.0
without trend and -3.6 with trend. The number of lagged difference terms in each
equation is 4. No. of observations for lavels =31
The variables all appear to be 41). As an initial test for cointegration Johansen's
technique was employed. The inferences are sensitive to the maximum lag length, and
we report the results for a lag length of 4, since Banerjee, et al. (1993, p. 286) and
Gonzalo (1990) have shown that the Johansen method is more sensitive to under-
parametrisation than to over-parametrisation.
The full results are reported in Table 5.3-3 to Table 5.3-6. We find evidence of one
cointegrating vector for e, pf and pd , with correctly signed parameters and the
restriction of relative prices can not be rejected(131 = -132= 13, x2(1) = 1.74) (Table 5.3-
3). But when relative prices are imposed the restriction of a unit coefficient (13 = 1, X2
27 When the data under consideration includes one or more structural break this test is usually more
suitable compared with its altarnatives.
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(1) = 11.94) is rejected (Table 5.3-4). With e, pr, pd and oil we find 2 cointegrating
vectors, but the second vector makes little sense. Relative prices can be imposed on the
first cointegrating vector (x2 (1) = 0.11), but a zero coefficient on oil cannot be
rejected (x 2 (1) = 0.16) (Table 5.3-5), and when relative prices are imposed a unit
relative price coefficient (13 = 1) is strongly rejected (x 2 (1) = 12.66 )28 (Table 5.3-6).
The Johansen results show that even conditional on oil revenue strong Purchasing
Power Parity does not hold even though the black market exchange rate, relative prices
and oil revenue constitute a cointegrating vector. For comparison purpose Engle-
Granger method for cointegration was also implemented and the results are reported in
Table 5.3-7 and Table 5.3-8. If all variables in the model are 41) then in Engle-Granger
(1987) terminology the necessary condition for PPP (weak form) is the existence of a
stationary error structure. But the necessary and sufficient condition for PPP (strong
form) is the existence of a vector (a, 13 1, 132), such that the error term is a stationary
process and (a, Pi, 02) = (0, 1, -1). Tests for non-stationarity of variables were
conducted and reported in previous section. We estimate equation:
eb = a + /3p" + fl 2 pf +ydr + p„ using OLS and test the residuals for stationarity
(Table 5.3-7). We cannot reject the non-stationarity hypothesis of the residuals
(RESID1) (ADF St. = -2.3; Pillips-Perron St. = -2.8) 29 . Then, our (oil revenue
variable) was added to the long-run equation and E.G. procedure was repeated (Table
5.3-8). In this case results of ADF and PP tests for non-stationarity hypothesis of the
residuals (RESID2) reject the null and produced PP St. = -4.4 (significant in 1%) and
ADF St. = -2.6 (significant in 10%). These results clearly introduce the oil revenue as a
necessary variable that should be included in PPP relationship to get a cointegrated
vector.
However, PPP can also be tested by estimating equation (5.3.7). The advantage of this
test is that it is less sensitive than Johansen's method to misspecification in the full
system of equations. We use this equation to show that PPP is not rejected once we
allow for an asymmetry in the response of the exchange rate to oil revenue.
28 All of the Johansen estimates include the post -revolution dummy as an additional 1(0) variable.
29 Result of Pillips-Perron test (-2.8) is insignificant in 1% and 5% but significant in 10%.
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5.3.4.4.2 An Error Feedback Equation
Our preferred equation is reported below. It is free from serial correlation and provides
a reasonable fit to the data. We find that oil revenue only appears significantly in the
equation when it is allowed to interact with the post revolution dummy variable. We
believe this is due to a reduction in the ability of the economy to absorb the increased
demand which greater oil revenue generates. Before the revolution the economy was
growing rapidly, import substitution was being encouraged and foreign currency
reserves were plentiful, thus extra demand was met by increased domestic production
with little consequence for the exchange rate. But after the revolution, as production
stagnated3° extra aggregate demand caused higher inflation, increased the demand for
imports and diverted non-oil exports to the domestic market. With the official
exchange rate becoming increasingly overvalued in real terms, increased oil revenue
raised the demand for foreign currency in the parallel market, and caused the black
market exchange rate to depreciate31 . We find no evidence of any other pre- and post-
revolution asymmetries in the slope parameters:
Ae, = 1.40 — 0.47Ae t_ 1 — 0.66Ae,_ 4
 + 0.05(DR)oilt_ 1 +
(2.45) (4.79)	 (7.22)	 (3.70)
0.50DR, — 0.25 [e — (0.72 p d - 0.80pf )]
(6.98)	 (4.09)	 (2.09)	 (1.42)
Period :1965-1990; TV = 0.93; SER = 0.0601; LM(1) = 0.12; LM(4) = 6.35;
A = 0.007.
Notes: Numbers in brackets are absolute t-ratios, SER is the standard error of the equation, LM(x) is a
Lagrange multiplier test statistic for serial correlation of up to order x, and A the test statistic for first
order ARCH. None of LM(x), or A exceeds the 5% critical value.
30 Arguably the productive capacity of Iranian economy actually fell after the revolution. According to
Pesaran (1995) over the period 1978-1988, the real output and investment fell by annual average rates
of 1.8 and 6.6 per cents, respectively. See also Pesaran (1992).
31 Without the oil variable interacting with the dummy the equation performs very poorly, there is no
evidence of a long-run relationship, and essentially the rial is determined by an auto-regression with
an intercept shift after the revolution. We found no significant pre-revolution effects for the oil
variable.
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The positive value of a4 is consistent with a fall in the equilibrium real exchange rate
following the revolution and is also consistent with depreciation caused by the flight of
capital. Cointegration is present (a 7
 < 0) since in absolute value the t-statistic on a7
exceeds Mackinnon's critical value32(-3.58). The imposition of relative prices on the
long-run equilibrium is not rejected (13i = -132 = 1 3 , x2 (1) = 0.07), and neither is a unit
price differential elasticity ( 13 = 1, x2
 = 1.25 ). Thus, we find PPP to be a valid model
of the long-run exchange rate conditional on a shift in the real exchange rate and the
asymmetric long-run effects of higher oil revenue. This gives us the final equation:
Ae, = 1.74 — 0.42Ae1 _ 1 — 0.63Ae + 0.05(DR)oil f_,
(6.57) (4.63)	 (7.13)	 (3.97)
+0.45DR, —0.30 [e — (p d — pf
(7.57)	 (6.66)
1965-1990; R 2 = 0.90; SER = 0.060; LM(1) = 0.01; LM(4) = 4.24; A= 0.10
The long-run solution (ignoring the constant and dummy) is :
e = (p d — pf )+ a (oil)
where a = 0 before the revolution and a = 0.17 from 1979.
Finally, the dynamics of the equation are far from smooth, with the depreciation of the
Rial being negatively related to past depreciations. We suspect that this finding, which
we find to be very robust, is due to a mixture of policy responses and expectations of
such responses. In particular, the government has tended to raise revenue by selling
dollars in the black market (Pesaran 1992). If government sales of dollars are greater
32 MacKinnon's critical values have been reproduced by Banerjee et al (1993).
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when the Rial has depreciated quickly, then this may partly explain the dynamics, as
this intervention would slow down the rate of depreciation.
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Table 5.3-3 Johansen Maximum Liklihood Procedure (Non-trended Case)
List of Variables included in the cointegrating vector: eb,	 pf, Intercept. DR is
included in VAR as an 1(0) variable. Maximum lag in VAR =4
A:
Cointegration LR test based on Maximal Ei envalue of the Stochastic Matrix.
Null
(Alternative)
Statistic 95% C. Value 90%	 C.
Value
r=0
(r=1)
42.29* 22.00 19.77
r<=1
(r=2)
10.55 15.67 13.72
r<=2
(r=3)
1.96 9.24 7.53
B:
Cointegration LR test based on trace of the Stochastic Matrix.
r=0
(r>=1)
54.8* 34.91 32.00
r<=1
(r>=2)
12.51 19.96 17.85
r<=2
(r=3)
1.96 9.24 7.53
Johansen Test; Estimated
Cointegrated Vectors (Normalised in
Brackets)
Restricted Cointegrated Vectors in
Johansen Estimation
VECTOR 1 pi -Fp, =0
eb -1.3 6
(-1.00)
-1.07
(-1.00)
pd 2.30
(1.69)
2.21
(2.07)
Pf -1.54
(-1.13)
-2.21
(-2.07)
Intercept 7.15
(5.25)
8.04
(7.83)
LR Test of Restrictions:
X2 (1) = 1.74
Notice: Star (*) indicates significant at 95% probability.
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Table 5.3-4: Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure (Non-trended Case)
List of Variables included in the cointegrating vector: eb,( pd- pi, Intercept. . DR
is included in VAR as an 1(0) variable. Maximum lag in VAR = 4
A:
Cointegration LR test based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix.
Null
(Alternative)
Statistic 95% C. Value 90%
Value
C.
r=0
(r=1)
35.71* 15.67 13.75
r<= 1
(r=2)
.27 9.24 7.52
B:
Cointegration LR test based on trace of the Stochastic Matrix
r=0
(r>=1)
35.98* 19.96 17.85
r<=1
(r>=2)
.27 9.24 7.53
Johansen Test; Estimated	 I
Cointegrated Vectors (Normalised in
Brackets)
Restricted Cointegrated Vectors in
Johansen Estimation
VECTOR 1 13=1
4 -1.08
(-1.00)
- .63
(-1.00)
(pa-/) 2.2
(2.03)
.63
(1.00)
Intercept 8.13
(7.52)
3.69
(5.82)
,
LR Test of Restrictions:
x2 (1) = 11.94
,
Notice: * indicates significant at 95% probability.
Chapter 5: Exchange Rate Modelling	 188
Table 5.3-5 Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure (Non-trended Case)
List of Variables included in the cointegrating vector: eb, pd, pf, oil, Intercept. DR
is included in VAR as an 1(0) variable. Maximum lag in VAR =4
A:
Cointegration LR test based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix.
Null
(Alternative)
Statistic 95% C. Value 90% C. Value
r=0
(r----1)
47.48* 28.14 25.56
r<= 1
(1=2)
41.30* 22.00 19.77
r<=2
(r=--3)
9.12 15.67 13.75
r<=3
(r=4)
3.68 9.24 7.53
Table 5.3-5, continued
B:
Cointegration LR test based on trace of the Stochastic Matrix.
r=0
(r>=1)
101.64* 53.12 49.65
r<= 1
(r>=2)
54.16* 34.91 32.00
r<=2
(r=3)
12.80 19.94 17.85
r<=3
(r=4)
3.68 9.24 7.53
Table 5.3-5, continued
Johansen Test; Estimated Cointegrated
Vectors (Normalised in Brackets)
i	 Restricted Cointegrated Vectors in Johansen
I	 Estimation
VECTOR 1 VECTOR 2 131 +132 =0 oil-coefficient --0
(Imposed on vector 1)
eb -1.38 1.92 -1.09 -1.04
(-1.00) (-1.00) (-1.00) (-1.00)
d
P 2.15 0.95 2.24 2.27
(1.56) (0.49) (2.05) (2.18)
Pf -1.27 -7.09 -2.24 -2.42
(-0.92) (-3.70) (-2.05) (-2.32)
oil -0.29 1.83 -0.07 0.00
(-0.21) (-0.96) (-0.06) (0.00)
Intercept 7.77 4.53 8.43 8.48
(5.63) (-2.36) (7.74) (8.13)
LR Test of Restrictions: LR Test of Restrictions:
X2 (1) = 0.11 X2 (1) = 0.16
Notice: * indicates significant at 95% probability.
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Table 5.3-6 Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure (Non-trended Case)
List of Variables included in the cointegrating vector: eb,
	
d_ pf), oil, Intercept.
DR is included in VAR as an 1(0) variable. Maximum lag in VAR=
A:
Cointegration LR test based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix.
Null Statistic 95% C. Value 90% C. Value
(Alternative)
r=0
(r=1)
39.63* 22.00 19.77
r<=1
(r=2)
18.16* 15.76 13.75
r<=2
(r=3)
3.24 9.24 7.53
B:
Cointe ration LR test based on trace of the Stochastic Matrix
r=0 61.03* 34.91 32.00
(r>=1)
r<= 1 21.4 19.96 17.85
(r>=2)
r<=2 3.23 9.24 7.53
(r=3)
Johansen Test; Estimated
Cointegrated Vectors
(Normalised in Brackets)
Restricted Cointegrated Vectors in Johansen
Estimation
VECTOR 1 VECTOR 2 13=1 0=1
(only on first Vec.)
eb -1.09 -.59 .55 .55
(-1.00) (-1.00) (-1.00) (-1.00)
pd -pf 2.65 .64 -.55 -.55
(2.44) (1.08) (1.00) (1.00)
oil .12 -.14 .07 .07
(.11) (-.24) (-.13) (-.13)
Inter 8.2 4.54 -3.36 -3.36
cept (7.55) (7.74) (6.16) (6.16)
LR Test of LR Test of Restrictions:
Restrictions: X2 (1) = 12.67
X2 (1) = 12.67
Notice: * indicates significant at 95% probability.
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Table 5.3-7 Engle-Granger Method of Cointegration (Model 1)
LS // Dependent Variable is eb
Sample: 1960 1990
Included observations: 31
Variable Coefficien	 t-Statistic
t
Wald Test:
Null
Hypothesis:
131 =1
a 8.254344	 10.66054
pd 1.626000	 11.01179 F-statistic 17.97310
1p -2.034115	 -6.966038 Chi-square 17.97310
dr 0.893696	 5.394483 Null
Hypothesis:
132 = -1
R-squared 0.970442 F-statistic 12.54175
Adjusted R-squared 0.967158 Chi-square 12.54175
S.E. of regression 0.189729 Null
Hypothesis:
131 + 132 = 0
Sum squared resid 0.971917
Log likelihood 9.681219 F-statistic 4.959108
Durbin-Watson stat 0.990372 Chi-square 4.959108
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
LS II Dependent Variable is D(RESID1)
ADF Test	 -2.269678	 1% Critical	 -3.7076
Statistic	 Value*
5% Critical	 -2.9798
Value
10% Critical
	 -2.6290
Value
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Phillips-Perron Test Equation 
LS II Dependent Variable is D(RESED1)
PP Test-	 -2.832445	 1% Critical	 -3.6661
Statistic	 Value*
5% Critical	 -2.9627
Value
10% Critical	 -2.6200
Value
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
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Table 5.3-8 Engle-Granger Method of Cointegration (Model 2)
LS II Dependent Variable is eb
Sample: 1960 1990
Included observations: 31
Wald Test:
Variable
	 Coefficient	 t-Statistic Null 131 = 1
Hypothesis:
a	 5.339865	 5.031810 F-statistic 0.508982
pd	 1.134260	 6.027207 Chi-square 0.508982P r
P	 -0.570656	 -1.171529 Wald Test:
our	 -0.218755	 -3.479894 Null 132 = -1
Hypothesis:
dr	 0.645855	 4.124752
F-statistic 0.776907
R-squared
	 0.979835 Chi-square 0.776907
Adjusted R-
	
0.976732 Wald Test:
squared
S.E. of	 0.159697 Null 131 + 132 =0
regression Hypothesis:
Sum squ. resid	 0.663082
Log likelihood	 15.60798 F-statistic 3.121281
Durbin-Watson	 1.616552
stat
Chi-square 3.121281
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
LS II Dependent Variable is D(RESID2)
ADF Test	 -2.569073	 1% -3.7076
Statistic	 Critical
Value*
5% -2.9798
Critical
Value
10% -2.6290
Critical
Value
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
LS II Dependent Variable is D(RESID2)
PP Test	 -4.384261	 1% Critical	 -3.6661
Statistic	 Value*
5% Critical	 -2.9627
Value
10% Critical	 -2.6200
Value
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
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5.3.5 Conclusion
In the first part of this chapter we considered the relevance of simple economic models
to the determination of the official and black market Rial/Dollar exchange rate. We
also considered how the behaviour of these exchange rates differed before and after the
revolution. Our findings are: (1) Purchasing power parity is a relevant model of both
exchange rates in the pre-revolution period, but only applies to the black market rate
after the revolution. (2) Only the black market rate responds to the black market
premium. (3) The official exchange rate does not appear to be influenced by the black
market rate.
Perhaps the most likely explanation of these findings is that since the revolution the
Iranian government has used its monopoly over foreign currency earned from oil
revenue to maintain a very profitable high premium on the black market exchange rate.
In contrast, in the pre-revolution period the government had ample revenue from oil
and credit from abroad to avoid financing expenditure from gains in the black market.
In the second part of this chapter we have shown that the black market exchange rate
in Iran can be modelled in a PPP framework once the effects of the revolution, war and
oil revenue are taken into account. There is reason to believe that the effect of oil
revenue on the black market exchange rate has been asymmetric. During the pre-
revolution boom the black market rate seems to have been insensitive to oil revenue,
but as the economy stagnated following the revolution so the black market rate became
sensitive to oil revenue. Since the revolution higher oil revenue appears to have
generated extra demand for imports and deflected domestic production away from
exports, so that in the long run the exchange rate tended to depreciate. What is perhaps
most interesting in this study is that once this asymmetry is taken into account we find
evidence of a long run economic relationship despite the tremendous shocks and
changes the Iranian economy has been subjected to.
To have a more comprehensive picture of the oil revenue's impact on the Iranian
economy the relationship between other macro key variables and oil revenue must be
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discussed. In next chapter we try to model inflation, non-oil gdp growth and real
money balances in connection with oil revenue fluctuations.
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5.3.6 Data Definition
Data Definitions and Sources
Variable	 Definition	 Source
Eb
	 Free (black) market
Exchange rate of Iran
(average annual rate:
Rials per US Dollar)
Pd
 Consumer Price Index
for Iran (Calculated for
1990=100)
Pf Consumer Price Index
for US (Calculated for
1990=100)
Oil	 Oil revenue obtained
from oil exports (Billions
of Rial)
DR	 A dummy variable for	 -
post-revolutionary
period: 0 for pre-
revolution and 1
thereafter.
1965-1987: World
Currency Yearbook. For
1960-64 and 1988-
1990, observations
have been provided by
Bahmani-Oskooee.
Original data from: IFS
several issues
Original data from: IFS
several issues
IFS several issues
IFS = International Financial Statistics (IMF)
5.3.7.1.1 Spillovers
LS II Dependent Variable: Aeo
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1990
Included observations: 29 after adjusting endpoints
Spillovers 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic
C 0.269466 0.673381
Aeb(-1) 0.063939 0.969711
Aeo(-1) 0.290215 1.479691
reo(-1) -0.010632 -0.283650
reb(-1) -0.035150 -1.007248
R-squared 0.159094
Adjusted R-squared 0.018944
S.E. of regression 0.054844
Sum squared resid 0.072190
Log likelihood 45.78921
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.031840
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5.3.7 Appendix: Official and black Market Exchange Rates (Further Results)
Notes: re indicates to real exchange rate and b and o refere to black and official markets respectively.
5.3.7.1.2 PPP
LS // Dependent Variable is Aeo
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1990
Included observations: 29 after adjusting endpoints
PPP
Variable	 Coefficient	 t-Statistic
-0.070530	 -0.583157
Aeo(-1)	 0.309698	 1.610671
reo(-1)	 0.011926	 0.549780
R-squared	 0.109934
Adjusted R-squared	 0.041468
S.E. of regression	 0.054211
Sum squared resid	 0.076410
Log likelihood	 44.96537
Durbin-Watson stat.	 1.845196
Notes: re indicates to real exchange rate and b and o refere to black and official markets respectively.
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5.3.7.1.3 Premium
LS // Dependent Variable: Aeo
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1990
Included observations: 29 after adjusting endpoints
Black Market Premium
Variable	 Coefficient	 t-Statistic
0.001430	 0.113719
Aeo(-1)	 0.306962	 1.608249
(eb(-1)-eo(-1))	 -0.007857	 -0.750667
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat.
0,118688
0.050894
0,053944
0.075659
45.10868
1.856184
Black Market Exchange Rate
Dep. Var.: Aeb
cons.
	 Aeb(_i) Aeom reo(t_i) reb(t-1)
1960-78	 .41	 .51
(.97)	 (3.18)
.63
(2.53)
.28
(1.91)
-.35
(-2.80)
Price differential restriction: 131=- 02; x2=1.13. Real exchange rate
restriction: 0=1; x2=.29. R2 (adj.)= .56, DW = 2.57
For the whole period there is no response from official exchange rate to the black
market premium. PPP is not supported by data when official exchange rate is used as
dependent variable. There is no any sign of spillovers from black market depreciation
onto official exchange rate. To see a picture of developments in exchange rate market
during the whole period refer to the plotted nominal and real exchange rates in chapter
2.
As these pictures show in pre-revolution period two rates have been moving along
with each other without a considerable gap between them. This could likely be an
indication of existing a long-run equilibrium in the market in that time. Post
revolutionary (and war) period shows an opposite story, i.e., there is a serious and
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growing gap between black and official exchange rates implying that official exchange
rate has been kept on an overvalued level.
5.3.7.2 Official Exchange Rate: Further Results
5.3.7.2.1 Johansen Test for Cointegration
As for the black market the Johansen procedure was applied to test whether there is
any cointegrating vector among variables under consideration (eo, , pf)• Four lags
were chosen as the short-run dynamics in this procedure. This lag-length was
confirmed by applying the general to specified method too. We find two significant
cointegrated vectors between variables, however, the signs of obtained coefficients are
inconsistent with what the PPP relationship indicates to (Table 5.3-9). The restrictions of
relative prices (13 1 + 13 2 = 0) and unit coefficient [(13, 132) = (1 4)] were imposed on
cointegrated vectors. The related results indicate that these restrictions are irrelevant
(x2 (2) =15.73 and X2 (4) = 34.49, respectively).
5.3.7.2.2 Relative PPP
As it was mentioned before, relative PPP is the alternative framework through which
one can possibly explain the behaviour of an exchange rate, especially when he could
not find any supportive evidence for a long-run relationship among the interested
variables through strong PPP. In fact relative PPP allows us to investigate for any
short-run relationship among those variables:
4	 4	 4
( 5.3.8) Aeo = c +ZaiiXe0() +E JAPd	 EroPtf h + DRtj=1 p--0	 h=0
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Table 5.3-9 Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure (Non-trended Case)
List of Variables included in the cointegrating vector: eo, pd, pf and Intercept.
DR is included in VAR as an 1(0) variable. Maximum lag in VAR = 4
A:
Cointegration LR test based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix.
Null
(Alternative)
Statistic 95% C. Value 90% C. Value
r=0
(r=1)
27.78* 22.00 19.77
r<=1
(r=2)
22.58* 15.67 13.75
r<=2
(r=3)
7.23 9.24 7.53
Table, continued
B:
Cointegration LR test based on trace of the Stochastic Matrix.
r=0
(r>=1)
57•59* 34.91 32.00
r<=1
(r>=2)
29.80* 19.96 17.85
r<=2
(r=3)
7.23 9.24 7.53
Table, continued
Johansen Test; Estimated Cointegrated
Vectors (Normalised in Brackets)
:	 Restricted Cointegrated Vectors in Johansen
11	 Estimation
VECTOR 1 VECTOR 2 pi +02 =0 01 = 1 & 13 2 =-1
(Imposed on vectors)
eo -.69 11.94 -3.80 -2.17 -2.14 -.81
(-1.00) (-1.00) (-1.00) (-1.00) (-1.00) (-1.00)
pd
-.11 3.04 -.98 .91 2.14 .81
(-.16) (-.26) (-.26) (.42) (1.00) (1.00)
Pf -1.43 -8.35 .98 -.91 -2.14 -.81
(-2.07) (.73) (.26) (-.42) (-1.00) (-1.00)
Intercept 7.77 -28.98 15.20 10.37 12.22 5.12
(11.28) (2.52) (4.00) (4.77) (5.71) (6.33)
LR Test of Restrictions: LR Test of Restrictions:
X2 (2) =15.73 )C2 (4) = 34.49
Notice: * indicates significant at 95% probability.
By dropping the more insignificant coefficients sequentially we finally obtained the
following model as the relative PPP for official exchange rate:
Ae = a + a Ap dt-1 + a Ap dt-2o( , )	 0	 3 DRV(-1)+2 + a 2 (e	151 1 pd -
1.27	 .51	 .54 .17 -.17 -.56 -.75
(t - ratio) (2.23) (2.53)
	 (2.82) (3.86) (-1.38) (-1.36) (-.94)
R-SQ.(adj.)=.50, DW=2.43., 131 + 02 =0, x2(1)= 1.53
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Ae o = c + fi	 +fl24pif-1 — DRV
-.04	 .13	 .73	 -.03
(t - rati o)(-2 . 22) (.76) 	 (2.13)	 (-1.13)
R 2 =.13, DW = 1.48, LM(1) = 1.54
These final results still suffer from the wrong signs and show a weak power of
explanation (R-SQ.=%13).
5.3.7.2.3 Short and long-run causation
We also applied the simultaneous method, as it was conducted for black market
exchange rate, to investigate the short and long-run relationships among the variables.
This investigation again shows an unsupportive evidence for PPP for the official
exchange rate.
As we can see from the above results, although the error correction term has a correct
sign but is insignificant again indicative of the lack of long-run relationship among the
variables in this model. Further, the long-run coefficient of domestic prices has a
wrong sign and all of long-run coefficients are insignificantn.
All obtained results using several estimation methods indicate that the official exchange
rate explains the reality, as it is expected based on PPP theory, very poorly.
33 After imposing symmetry restriction on domestic and foreign prices, i.e. 13 (pd
 - pt), we got a
wrong sign coefficient: 13 = - .62 (t-ratio = -1.45). The null hypothesis of 13 =1, x2 (1) = 14.43.
66.1 Introduction
A considerable literature on the economic impact of a natural resource now exists.
These studies consider how a boom in one sector of the economy influences the
remaining sectors of the economy. The most well known strand of this research is the
'Dutch disease' literature, in which the resource boom squeezes the non-boom tradable
goods sector as the real exchange rate appreciates. In addition, there is a direct
squeeze on the non-boom section as resources shift to the boom sector.
The process by which a resource boom affects the economy is complex and messy, and
depends upon such things as the ownership of the resource, how state revenues are
used, and the structure of the economy in question. Given these considerations, it is
not surprising that there is a broad range of models of 'Dutch disease'. The purpose of
this chapter is to examine how oil booms and slumps have affected the Iranian
economy, in particular growth of the non-oil sector and inflation.
6.2 Dutch Disease
This term refers to the effects of the boom sector revenues on the other economic
sectors including the non -oil tradable (Lagged) sector and the non-tradable sector
(see, for instance, Corden, 1984).
In the general model of Dutch disease, a resource boom has two effects on the
economy. First, there is the resource movement effect. This is the drawing of mobile
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factors of production away from other sectors of the economy to the booming sector.
This process tends to reduce the output in the non-boom tradable and non-tradable
sectors. Second, there is the spending effect. The boom raises incomes and so raises
demand for tradable and non-tradable goods. The prices of the former are fixed by
world markets, but the latter prices tend to rise with domestic demand. The result is a
real appreciation of the exchange rate which stimulates the production of non-
tradables i and deters the production of tradables.
A number of reasons may make an oil economy deviate from these stylised patterns.
Price controls and import liberalisation can limit the appreciation of the real exchange
rate by deflecting demand onto imports. Next, if traded sectors are able to respond
strongly to investments financed by oil revenues, product market pulls towards the
non-traded sectors may be counterbalanced, particularly if labour markets are slack so
that expanding non-traded sectors do not draw labour from the traded sectors. Finally,
the overall impact of higher public spending on growth may be low if the quality of
investment projects declines with accelerating spending, or if subsidies and other
expenditures drain resources from the public investment programme2.
From this general simple model of the Dutch disease, there are some alternative
channels through which a boom can be accommodated. First, if the boom sector does
not show a strong participation in the domestic factor market, the resource movement
effect would not be effective (see for example, Buiter and Purvis, 1983; Fardmanesh,
1991a and 1991c; van Wijnbergen, 1981 and Neary, 1985). The oil sector in the oil
exporting developing countries, for instance, is considered as an 'enclave' (Pinto,
1987) a capital-intensive and hyper-technologic sector (with minimum competition
with the non-oil economy) and so there does not emerge a considerable resource
movement effect in such economies'.
I The magnitude of this recovery, however, depends on the related elasticities operating in this
process: income-elasticity of demand for non-traded goods, output-elasticity of supply with respect to
the real wage and so on.
2 The results of Gelb (1986)'s studies suggest that the impact of expanded investment on growth of
non oil GDP has been unsatisfactory during the (oil boom of) 1972-81 compare with 1967-72. (see
Gelb, 1986, p. 79)
3 See also McKinnon (1976) for supporting the 'enclave nature' of the oil sector in oil-exporting
developing countries.
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Neary (1985) discusses a model of Dutch disease where there may be both de-
industrialisation and real depreciation (instead of real appreciation implied in the core
model). But he claims that nobody has yet presented a plausible model which
simultaneously had an increase in manufacturing output and a depreciation in the real
exchange rate following a boom.
Fardmansh (1991c) argues that in some oil exporting developing countries the oil
boom appeared to give rise to growth in non-oil traded (manufacturing) goods, the
opposite to what the simple Dutch disease model predicts. Instead it was the
agriculture sector which faced a considerable reduction in its share in GDP. He
explains that although the expenditure effect could undermine the traded goods sector,
a rise in the world price of manufactured goods relative to agricultural products (the
world price effect) following the oil boom may dominate the negative effect mentioned
above and leads to an expansion in manufactured output. The observed expansion of
the non-oil traded sector in most oil-exporting developing countries has been explained
by other authors by other reasons: For example Neary and van Wijnberg (1986)
consider this sector in these countries as a protected sector and so put that sector
under the non-traded category. Benjamin, et. al. (1989) attributed the unexpected
phenomenon to the ' imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign goods as
well as to their linkages with the rest of the economy.' (p.90). They argue that, in a
typical agricultural country, the importable sector is the industrial one, which is
somewhat insulated from foreign competition by reason of the fact that its products are
imperfect substitutes for imported goods. They show that in some cases this sector
may actually expand its output in the wake of an oil boom 4. Gelb (1986) in a
comparative study of this issue, pointed out that Indonesia has been successful in using
oil revenues to expand the non-oil tradable sector manufacturing sector. Usui (1996)
confirms that the 1978 devaluation undertaken in Indonesia has been instrumental in
this achievement.
Empirical evidence shows that oil booms have not always been followed by a decline in
the non-oil tradable goods sector. Explanations for this finding include: government
protection of some parts of the economy (van Wijnbergen, 1986); active government
4 Their findings explain why the agricultural sector contracted in all oil exporting countries during the
period 1974-82, while the industrial sector actually expanded in all but two of the countries.
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policies to prevent a decline (e.g. Gelb, 1986 and Usui 1996 in the case of Indonesia);
and the impact of oil price shocks on the inflation rates of non-oil exporters
(Fardmanesh, 1991c).
Resource booms can also have monetary effects. Monetary aspects of the boom are
parallel forces by which the boom revenue is accommodated into the domestic
economy (Edward, 1986b, 1986d ) and which reinforce the real effects. The foreign
reserves earned from the boom could give rise to an expansion of the money supply.
Noorbakhsh (1990) argues that conversion of oil revenues from foreign exchange
proceeds into domestic currency becomes the most significant source of increases in
the money supply in the oil exporting developing countries. But he also continued that
the magnitude of change in the domestic money supply depends on the magnitude of
foreign exchange proceeds from oil exports and the extent to which the money
authorities sterilise these proceeds to neutralise their effect on the domestic money
supply. Aghevli and Sassanpour (1982) argue that " Unlike domestic taxes, foreign
revenues in the form of royalties on natural resources do not induce a reduction in
disposable income, and their domestic spending leads to the creation of additional
money." (p.'792) However, the consequences of such a boom depends upon the
responses of money demand to the boom. If the change in money demand is equal to
the supply response then the monetary effects may be of little consequence for the rest
of the economy'. Furthermore, in the case of oil it is not certain that a money supply
expansion will follow the boom. In developing countries oil revenue typically accrues
to the state; only if the state injects this money into the economy, for example through
raising the budget deficit, will the money supply expand (see Morgan, 1979). This
raises the possibility of some deflationary pressure following the boom if the money
supply fails to expand as fast as money demand.
In the context of Dutch Disease models it is important to consider the characteristics
of the Iranian Economy. Firstly, the revenue from oil sales accrues to the state, which
5 If this revenue accrued to the government and is deposited in the Central bank there will be no
increase in the domestic money supply unless the govenunent spends at home out of the increased
revenues or domestic credit to the private sector is increased. In the case that this revenue accrued to
the private sector and is deposited in the commercial banks, the domestic money supply will increase.
In the absence of any increase in public spending the increase in net foreign assets of the central bank
is exactly offset by the reduction in net domestic credit to the government (reduction in budget deficit
or dept of government to the central bank). So the money supply will increase as government domestic
spending monetises the boom revenue.
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sells the dollars earned to the Central Bank for Rial. This revenue is then used to
finance government expenditure. To some extent the effect of oil revenues on the
economy will depend upon how the government uses the revenue. Clearly, investment
in industry and infrastructure could offset the adverse effects of resources moving from
the non-oil sector to the oil sector. Second, the oil sector of the Iranian economy can
be considered an enclave of the economy (see Pinto, 1987), which is highly capital
intensive and has low linkages to the rest of the economy. This would act to reduce the
resource movement effect. Third, following booms the commitments of government
have been extended, and current and investment expenditures have been raised, usually
in excess of the absorption capacity of the economy. Such a procedure could lead to
more pressure on domestic prices. Prices of traded goods are mainly determined
externally and so most of the inflationary pressure is reflected in higher prices for non-
traded goods. The rise in relative prices of non-traded goods (real appreciation)
increases the relative demand for imports. The long run effect of high oil revenue could
be, then, to depreciate the nominal exchange rate as imports rise.
A further complication is the exchange rate system. Iran has operated a system of
multiple fixed exchange rates. Alongside the fixed official market has existed a free
market for foreign exchange. Sometimes there has been little free market activity but at
other times the free market has been the dominant source of foreign currency (see
chapters 2 and 5). Generally, the free market has been the dominant source of currency
for marginal transactions. This is particularly true of recent years, as foreign exchange
has been strictly rationed at the hugely overvalued official exchange rate. Thus, we
expect to find the influence of the free market rate upon economic activities to
dominate the effects of the official exchange rate.
A final complication is the massive disruption caused to the economy by the revolution
and the war with Iraq. Both events resulted in large losses of human and physical
capital. The consequence of these events is a huge loss of productive capacity, which is
indicated by an average annual rate of investment of - 6.29% (according to Mazarei,
1996), and an increasing dependency on imports. This switch from a booming
economy to an almost collapsing one presents a number of problems for our study, in
particular it is possible that some effects of oil may have become stronger or weaker
since the revolution. For example, as the ability of the economy to absorb demand fell
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following the revolution, the inflationary impact of oil revenue may have risen. We
consider this possibility by using a post-revolution dummy to incorporate parameter
shifts.
6.3 The Model for Estimation
The equations of primary interest determine the rate of growth of non-oil output and
the rate of inflation. We represent the general equations in error-correction form.
Amoy, = 5 , + 8 2 (rnoy — rnoy * ),_, + 8 3 (2)Are, + 8 4re  + 8 5(2)Aoil,
+8 6 (2)Arnoy f_, + 6. .7 DR+ ,u,
AP,d = fl n + fl(2)(Apf + Ae): +fl(2)A(ms —Ind), +/3(p" pd. ), 1
( 6.2)
+fiAoilf_1 + fl i6(2)Ap `,i_i +v,
where A is the difference operator and A, is the lag operator.
Non-oil output growth is given by equation ( 6.1). Output in excess of the long run
trend (rnoys) is expected to slow growth down, 52 <0. The spending effect of the
boom operates through the real exchange rate (re). Both 5 3 and 54 are expected to be
positive. The resource effect is picked up by 5 5 , which should be negative according to
the standard Dutch Disease Model.
Inflation is determined by equation ( 6.2). Inflation tends to be higher if foreign prices
are rising faster than the rate of appreciation of the Rial; if growth in the supply of
money exceeds growth in money demand; and if the price level is below the
equilibrium value. We experiment with 2 long run equilibrium for prices. These are an
inverted money demand function and an inverted PPP relationship. Finally, growth in
oil revenue is permitted to influence inflation directly, as well as indirectly through
monetary effects.
( 6.1)
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To complete the model we need to consider the influence of oil revenue on the other
variables in equation ( 6.1) and ( 6.2). The exchange rate is given by equation ( 6.3) (for
a detailed discussion on modelling exchange rate see chapter 5). In the long run the
real exchange rate is assumed to be a function of oil revenue, and the domestic-foreign
price differential (through Purchasing Power Parity). This makes the real exchange rate
dependent upon oil revenue. To restore the equilibrium real exchange rate a 7 <0.
Aebt = a0 + a,(L)Aet  + a 2 (L)Ap fd + a 3 (L)Apf + a 4 DRt +( 6.3)
a 5 (L)Aoilt + a,[e — (fi 1 pd + )6 2 pf + I) 3 oil)]_, +e
where oil, is the log of real oil revenue, DR, is a dummy variable for the post revolution
period, DR, is equal to 1 from 1979 and 0 otherwise, A and L are respectively the
difference and lag operators, and c t
 is a random error term. For PPP to hold in the
long-run we require a7 <0 (that is cointegration) and Pi = -132 = 1. The discussion in
the previous section suggests that a4 >0, a5 <0, 133>0. Initially I assume that the
parameters are invariant over time, but later we allow for differing values before and
after the revolution. If domestic and foreign prices, the black market exchange rate,
and oil revenue are 41) and cointegrated, then estimation of ( 6.3) by least squares is
valid. I employ a non-linear estimation technique to obtain estimates of the 13s together
with their standard errors.
A(m—p d ) t = r0 + /INgin — pd V1+r2PAPtd_i +r3(A)A.Y1+( 6.4)
ra On — P d —y) 11
 + r5 (2)Aoi/t + noilt_i +17DR+v1
( 6.5) API = qo ± Ili (2)W-1 + 712 (a )Aoi/Pt + wt
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where again A is the difference operator and A, is the lag operator.
The growth of money is given in equation ( 6.4). This is a conventional money demand
function with the addition of oil revenue terms to pick up this influence on money
creation. The long run effect can be interpreted as coming from the demand for money
which is expected to rise in a boom (see for example Buiter and Miller, 1981). The
effects of Aoil could come from the demand for money but may also be responses to
money supply shocks when prices are sticky (see more discussion in next section of
this chapter). Finally, foreign inflation is determined by oil price inflation, and we
expect 112 >0.
With the exception of equation ( 6.5) all of the equations include an intercept dummy
for the post-revolution period. This may capture: a fall in the underlying growth rate in
equation ( 6.1); changes to the underlying inflation rate in ( 6.2); either a shift in the real
exchange rate in ( 6.3) or simply an accelerated rate of depreciation; and either a shift in
the tendency for government deficits to be converted into money growth in ( 6.4) or a
shift in the demand for money.
6.4 Estimation
Estimation of the full system is infeasible given the shortage of data'. Rather, we
proceed by estimating single equations. Even with the single equations it is not possible
to apply Hendry's general-to-specific approach to modelling'. Rather we must try
alternative specifications and settle on those which appear to best correspond to
general economic theory whilst having acceptable statistical properties. We then test
the best equations for shifts in the slope parameters since the revolution, and then test
any cross equation restrictions before settling on our preferred specifications.
6 A system of all equations except money equation is estimated and the obtained results are reported
in next chapter. These results are then used to simulate key indigenous variables.
7 However, where it is applicable we choose this methodology as the strategy of the estimation.
Table 6-1 Phillips-Perron Unit Root for Stationarity
Variables	 Level	 First difference
Za	 z	 za
y -2.83 -2.11 -14.30
m
d
P
0.17
1.7
0.35
3.79
-27.00
-7.06
Pf 0.36 0.65 -5.91
eb 1.41 1.11 -22.77
oil -3.2 -1.59 -26.62
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We first test the orders of integration in the data. The Phillips-Perron test for unit roots
was applied and the results are shown in table below. The variables all appear to be
41).
Notes:
RATS software was used to produce these results.
Zt
 and Za are Perron and Phillips test statistics for Unit roots respectively with and
without deterministic trends. The 5% critical values (for 25 observations) are -3.0
without trend and -3.6 with trend. The number of lagged difference terms in each
equation is 4.
6.4.1 Exchange Rate
A detailed discussion of exchange rate estimation has been reported in chapter 5. To
see a broad picture of our models, we repeat an outline of our principal findings on
exchange rate. Our preferred equation is taken from the previous chapter and allows
the black market exchange rate to have an asymetric response to oil revenue, the
equation is reported below:
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Ae, = 1.74 — 0.42Ae 1_ 1 — 0.63Ae 1_4 + 0.05(DR)oilt_1
(6.57) (4.63)	 (7.13)	 (3.97)
+0.45DR1 —0.30 [e — (p d — pf
(7.57)	 (6.66)
1965-1990; 17 2 = 0.90; SER = 0.060; LM(1) = 0.01; LM(4) = 4.24; A = 0.10
6.4.2 Money
Theoretical and empirical works conducted on money are very huge and various. The
dominant feature of the literature suggests that given a target or forecast for the rate of
price increase, and an assumption concerning the potential of an economy for real
economic growth, a certain rate of monetary expansion will then be consistent with the
growth in demand for money implied by these assumptions. If a forecast or objective
for the likely balance of payments outcome is then added, the appropriate rate of
domestic credit expansion can be determined. Credit expansion above or below this
rate will cause a divergence of monetary growth from the planned rate, resulting in
inflationary or deflationary pressures and tending to bring about a deterioration or
improvement in the balance of payments. (Crockett and Evans (1990)
In the absence of a well-developed capital market, monetary assets play a doubly
important role in developing countries since they are not only used for transaction
purposes, but are also the major form in which savings are held.
In many developing countries the financial system is characterised by the absence of
organised markets for securities and equities, by capital controls, and by legal ceilings
on bank borrowing and lending rates- a situation that gives rise to parallel markets for
foreign exchange and informal loan markets.
Many researchers have tried to appropriately model money market in developing
countries. For example, Aghevli, Khan, Narvekar, and Short (1979); Mackenzie
(1979); Morgan's (1979); Galibs (1979). Other relevant studies: Hynes (1967),
Adekunle (1986); Perlman (1970); Fan and Lin (1971), Khetan and Waghmare (1971)'
Wong (1977) and Paljarvi and Russo (1978).
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Khan and Knight (1982) introduce a 'standard' model for developing countries as:
rm * = ay + fkre
where rm*, y and g indicate real money balance, real output and inflation respectively,
and e refers to expectation. Hanson and Neal (1987) used actual rate of inflation while
others like Darrat (1986), Khan and Knight (1982) used adaptive expectations
framework or as a more general distributed lag on past prices to estimate expectations.
Honahan (1994) discusses that when the expectations proxy is equal to or closely
correlated with the actual inflation it is difficult to use time series to test for an effect
of inflation expectatins on the demand for money. The main problem in recognising the
sensitivity of money holdings to yield is that because changes in prices may appear in
dynamic demand for money equations even if the demand for money is not yield
sensitive, it is not normally possible to make valid inferences about the inflation
sensitivity of equilibrium demand for money. Some evidence support a negative
relationship between demand for money and expected rate of inflation, especially in
hyper inflation countries. (Cuthbertson and Barlow 1991)
Aghevli (1977a) specified and tested a money equation for Indonesia in 1968-73
period using a partial adjustment framework. His results appeared consistent with
theoretical expectations, although they are suspected to spurious regression problems.
Phylalctis and Taylor (1991) found evidence supportive of the hypothesis of
cointegration between real money balances and current inflation.
Fair (1987) and Gupta and Moazzami (1990) using data of some developed and
developing countries found a robust result supporting the hypothesis that adjustment
of actual to desired demand for money is in nominal term rather than real terms.
8 Spencer (1985) tested the generally implicit assumptions regarding the role of the price level in
money demand equations for the US. These are that money demand adjusts to changes in price level
without lag and that the price level elasticity of the demand for real money balances is zero. His
results indicates a rejection of the first assumption. This results also support the zero price level
elasticity assumption before 1973 and for whole period (1952-82) once the 1973 shift in money
demand was accounted for.
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Milbourne (1983) tested the hypothesis that the rate of inflation plays an independent
(of its effect through its influence on the nominal interest rate) role in the demand for
money. His result show that this hypothesis is rejected once an appropriate
specification of demand for money is used.
Bahmani-Oskooee (1996) using Iranian data, estimates demand for money equation
applying Johansen's methodology. He concludes that the more stable long-run demand
for money in Iran would include real M2, real GDP, the inflation rate, and the black
market exchange rate as its arguments. His results produces a positive coefficient for
BMER variable implying that as the Iranian rial depreciates, demand for M2 increases,
supporting the wealth effect argument in the literature.
Theory:
We consider the money market behaviour in the most common formulation of money
demand as:
( 6.6) rm, = ao + al y, + a,r, + ut
rm , y, and r indicate logarithms of: real money, real GDP and interest rate
respectively and u refers to an error term. Due to some problems with measuring
interest rate data for developing countries like Iran we follow other authors such as
Crockett and Evans (1990), Morgan (1979), Looney (1985) and Bahmani Oskooee
(1995a) and use the inflation rate as a proxy for the interest rate.
Buiter/Miller (1981) in a Dutch disease model framework amended the money demand
equation above for Dutch Disease analysis. In this formulation " the long-run
equilibrium real money stock must be higher (post-oil) because of the increased
transaction component of the money demand since, in the short-run, nominal money
balances and prices (and hence the real money stock) are fixed, all adjustment is borne
by the nominal and hence the real exchange rate." (Cuthbertson and Taylor, 1990, p.
233). The LM equation is written as:
A ( n — 13)1-7-  fi 0 + if 3 ' MAY t + fi 2( L)AI 3 t ± 13 3( L)An I t ±( 6.8)
Ai(n— p—a i noy— a2oil), + ti I 1
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( 6.7) rm, = (2 0 + a l noy + a 2 oil, + a 3r,.
where rm, noy, oil and r indicate respectively to real money balance, non-oil GDP, oil
revenue, and interest rate.
To account for the dynamics of money demand, a simple error correction model for
money balances is written as:
where L indicates the lag operator.
If the money balances in the last period exceeded the equilibrium value, (rm -ainoy-
azoil)t. i , then, to achieve equilibrium, the growth in money balances should fall hence
134 < 0. Pi, 132 and 13 3 can be interpreted as short run elasticities.
In devising a financial programme for an economy, however, modifications must be
made to take into account, as far as possible, the special circumstances of individual
cases. In particular, it is important to refine the underlying estimate of the demand for
money beyond simple (but often useful) assumption such as that the demand for money
grows in step with nominal income, that is the assumption of constant velocity.
6.4.2.1 Previous Evidence
Previous evidence on money demand modelling show that there are two key
determinants of the demand for real money balances: a scale variable providing some
measure of the volume of transactions in the economy and an opportunity cost variable
measuring the return (expected or actual) on holding money relative to alternative
assets, real or financial.
The coefficients of the various determinants of the demand for money vary between
economies with different structural characteristics. So, estimates of the determinants of
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the demand for money obtained from data for industrial countries cannot be utilised
with confidence for the purpose of making policy prescriptions in developing
countries.
The available statistical estimates for a number of important variables in the demand
for money equation concerned the most developing countries are generally less reliable
than those for more developed countries.
The principle issues in constructing a demand for money function relate to the
definition of the money stock and appropriate specification of the income and
opportunity cost variables. In addition, it remains for consideration whether in
particular cases other variables might systematically affect the demand for money, and
whether provision should be made for the lagged adjustment of actual money holdings
to the desired money stock.
Theoretical and empirical evidence is not so conclusive as to lead to an exclusively
appropriate money stock definition in a money demand equation. It is sometimes held,
however, that to be operationally useful, a money stock definition should comprise an
aggregate that the monetary authorities can adequately control.
Crockett and Evans (1990) argue that in many developing countries available policy
instruments apply principally to the volume of credit extended by the banking system,
which would tend to make the total liabilities of the banking system (M2) easier to
control than a particular component.
Oil exporting countries usually have important oil sectors, which in a number of cases
account for as much as half of total GDP. Crockett and Evans (1990) suggest that
decisions on the volume of oil that is produced and on its price neither affect nor are
affected by monetary creation, and there is no direct effect on the liquidity of the
private sector. The oil sector of these countries is perhaps best regarded as an
"enclave" of the whole economy, and is best disregarded when constructing a time
series of income that is considered to influence the demand for money. Any possible
oil-revenue effect on money creation can occur through direct and indirect means.
When such revenue accrues to the government, the rise in foreign assets has no
immediate monetary impact, since it is directly offset by a rise in government deposits.
However, if the government injects the oil revenue into the economy by converting its
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foreign reserves into domestic currency (usually through Central Bank) and undertakes
a higher level of expenditures or subsidies for goods and services, then oil revenue
automatically translates into domestic liquidity.
An opportunity cost variable in a demand for money function is intended to measure
the yield on money against other assets that might be held. An interest rate is usually
used for this propose, especially where the financial market is adequately developed. It
is also often argued that inventories of real assets are an alternative form in which
wealth can be held, and hence, that the expected inflation rate should enter as a
determinant of money demand. Among developing countries, it is quite widely
accepted that an interest rate is in practice an unsatisfactory measure of the
opportunity cost of holding money9. So, it seems appropriate to estimate money
demand functions using a measure of expected inflation as the opportunity cost of
holding money. Instead of experimenting extensively with different distributed lag
proxies for expected inflation, it is often assumed that the expected inflation rate equals
the actual rate.
In considering an oil-exporting country, a further question is which measure of price
inflation should be used. The GDP deflator is the most general measure of prices
within an economy but may be inappropriate for a number of reasons. First, the
aggregate GDP deflator reflects changes in the price of oil exports, and, as argued
already, the oil sector should be regarded as essentially an enclave within the non-oil
economy. Second, the GDP deflator captures changes in the price level of domestic
output only. Since we are using the inflation rate as a measure of the opportunity cost
of holding money compared with buying goods, the inflation measure should also
include changes in the prices of imported goods. For this reason, the consumer price
index (CPI) may be a theoretically preferable construct to the GDP deflator as a
measure of the opportunity cost of holding money balances. But even the CPI should
be used with caution because of the poor quality of the data, and the subsidisation
processes which are implemented in these countries.
9 Firstly, because financial markets outside the banking system are not well developed, so that the
possibilities of substitution between money and other financial assets are limited. Secondly, because a
more practical objection is that observed interest rates are often centrally determined and remain
unchanged for long periods. Furthermore, in certain of countries, the payment of interest is legally
prohibited (like Iran, at least in post-revolution period).
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Expectations on coefficients
On the basis of theoretical considerations and empirical work performed for other
countries some values might be proposed for the coefficients. For the income elasticity,
there are three possibilities. When it is supposed that the velocity of circulation
increases along with the income increasing (economies of scale), then, the income
elasticity would be less than unity. Other theories consider money as a luxury good
and that the capacity and desire to hold liquid balances increases more than
proportionately with income and wealth. Finally some discuss that the estimated
income elasticity of the demand for money may be greater than unity because of the
upward bias induced by marketisation (because of the gradual absorption of nonmarket
sector into the market sector of a developing economy) (Crockett and Evans, 1990).
Thus, we can say little more than that the income elasticities should not be much below
one, but could be significantly greater than one. Empirical works in this area show that
income elasticity tend to be lower for a narrow definition of money than for a broad
one.
For the opportunity cost coefficient in money demand equations, economic theory
suggests that an increase in the expected rate of inflation would reduce the
attractiveness of money balances. For broad money, whose yield can be adjusted to
offset inflationary expectations this effect may appear weaker than for narrow money
with zero nominal yield. Empirical works especially in developing countries, have
established that the demand for money responds with a lag to changes in its underlying
determinants, however, it is more difficult to capture lagged patterns of response when
only annual data are available.
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Evidence
The basic model has been used by Crockett and Evans is as follow:
rm = a 0 + oc i Apd + a v2,
where rm indicates real money balances, Ap d
 changes in price level (inflation) and y
real income. By using real money, in fact, they assumed that the elasticity of demand
for nominal money balances with respect to inflation is unity. With the annual data they
used, such a restriction is unlikely to be too strong. They also used non-oil income as
the scale variable when an oil exporting country was the case. By this they assumed
that the monetary effect of oil-induced part of income is neutral.
On the whole, the estimates for equations using broad money are better determined
than those using narrow money
They estimated demand for money equations for nineteen Middle East countries and
reported that although the statistical properties of the estimated equations vary widely,
a reasonably well-determined equation was estimated (except for Pakistan). A
significant income elasticity appeared in all of them. The common theme of all of the
results, they suggested, is a range of income elasticity between 1.0 and 1.5 (in an
individual estimation method)m.
They found it difficult to detect an influence of inflation on the demand for money.
Only in three cases out of nineteen (including Iran) was the inflation variable significant
with the correct (negative) sign.
The reported result for Iran:
rml= —2.71— 0.71dp d +1.14noy
(-4.8)	 (-1.5) (13.8)
= 0.95; SEE = 0.06; DW = 1.76; sample: 1960 - 78
1 ° With pooling data they found income elasticity in the range of 0.8 and 0.9 for narrow money and of
0.9 and 1.00 for broad money.
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rm2 = —4.17— 0.7 dp d 1.44noy
(-6.8)	 (-1.8) (14.8)
1Z 2 = 0.94; SEE = 0.051; DW = 1.26; sample: 1960 - 78
where,
rm I = natural logarithm of real narrow money
rm2 = natural logarithm of real broad money
dpd = inflation (first difference of natural logarithm of price level)
noy = natural logarithm of real non-oil GDP
As can be seen these results suffer from possible serial correlation problem and the
coefficient related to inflation is not adequately significant. There are also spurious
regression problems as real money and income are likely to be non-stationary. The
long-run income elasticities of real money in two equations appeared highly significant
and for broad money the elasticity is more than that of narrow money (1.44 against
1.14).
Morgan (1979) implemented some econometric experiments to test the money demand
equation for five oil exporting countries. The results indicate that a stable relationship
exists between the demand for real liquid balances and real non oil GDP. He used a
partial adjustment version of money demand equation. The produced results for Iran is
reported as follow:
log(M / P), =	 0 + Act, log NOY, + (1 — 2) log(M,_, / J)
-4.60
	 0.79	 0.51
( -3.98) (3.24)	 (2.81)
= 0.997; SEE = 0.041; DW = 2.34; Long - run 1ED = 1.61, sample: 1960-76
In above equation:
M = nominal stock of liquidity
P =
	 price level
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NOY = real non-oil GDP
TED = Long-run income elasticity of demand for money
One possible reason for the income elasticity of demand for money being more than
one is that a country in the stage of developing "is experiencing a spread of monetary
institutions, a spread of the money-way of doing things" (Friedman, 1971).
Pesaran (1995) estimated money demand for Iran in the pre and post-revolutionary
periods. Over the period 1979/80-1988/89, the money supply (M2) and the index of
the retail prices grew by annual average rates of 20.1 and 19.0 per cents respectively.
The smaller rate of increase in the real money balances over the post-revolutionary
period is largely explained by the negative output growth experienced during the
period. It is, however, important to note that the revolution seems to have significantly
affected the relationship between money supply growth, output and inflation which
could have important consequences for the efficacy of monetary policy in relation to
the control of inflation.
Estimated models (M2):
Pre-Revolution: 1960 1978:
log(M2 I P), = -2.29 + 0.7151og(M2
 / P),1
 + 0.521logY, - 0.71A logF;
(-3.98) (7.85)
	 (3.75)	 (-6.10)
k2
 = 0.997, SER = 0.044, z„ 2 (1) = 0.16
This regression implies a long-run income elasticity of demand for money of around
1.83 [S.E. = 0.134]. Pesaran (1995) maintains that this estimate is robust to the
possibility of unit root in real money balances, output and inflation.
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Post-revolution ( 1979-1993):
log(M, I P), = 1.481 + 0.7151og(M2
 / P).., + 0.116logY, - 0.208A log P,
(1.35)	 (4.49)	 (1.08)	 (-1.18)
k2 = 0.755; SER = 0.042; zs2c = 0.32
The long-run income elasticity of demand for money implied by this regression is only
0.408 (0.296), and is much less precisely determined than the one obtained for the
period before the revolution. In both regressions the inflation variable has the correct
sign; indicating that a rise in inflation has the expected dampening effect on the demand
for real money balances.
The long-run income elasticity of demand for money appears to have declined from
around 1.83 before the revolution to around 0.41 after the revolution. This suggests
that the same rate of expansion in private sector liquidity is likely to have more
inflationary consequences after than before the revolution. The low income elasticity of
demand for money after the revolution is also indicative of the serious inefficiencies
that exist with in the banking sector.
6.4.2.2 Our results
Equation ( 6.4) has been used as an essential model to estimate the money demand
during the period under consideration (1960 1990). We divide the real GDP into two
parts, non-oil GDP and oil revenue, so that we can estimate the elasticity of real money
balances to these two parts separately. By this way we can also implicitly test for the
neutrality of oil revenue effect on money creation which is debated in the literature.
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A(m— p d ), = 70+ ri (A)A(m—pd),_i + r2(2)AP1 -F r3(iDAYt ±
r4(m — P d — C 0 i nOY — (02°i1) t-1 + Y 5 0A0ilt ± y 6DR
We first follow Morgan (1979), Crockett and Evans (1990) and Looney (1985), using
non-oil GDP instead of total GDP in money demand equation assuming the neutrality
of oil revenues on money creation. Further, by adding oil revenue to the variables in
money equation, we test the neutrality hypothesis of oil-revenue effect on money. The
results show that the oil-revenue elasticity of money demand, although significantly
greater than 0, is dramatically less than that of non-oil GDP (0.21 compare with 0.83)
(below) 11 . The null hypothesis of serial correlation of the residuals is strongly rejected
(LM(1) = 0.80; LM(4) = 4.56). Moragan (1979) and Crockett and Evens (1990)
obtained an income elasticity of the demand for money over than unity. Our results,
however, confirm that this value equal to one.
noy= non-oil gdp (log, of real gdp - oil revenue)
LS II Dependent Variable is DRM
Sample: 1962 1990
Included observations: 29
Convergence achieved after 29 iterations
Arm, = —2.9 + 0.32DR — 0.48(rm — 0.83noy — 0.21oi/),_,
( 6.9)	 (-3.57) (3.58) (5.73) (7.23)
	 (3.63)
R 2 = 0.70; DW = 2.29; LM(1) = 0.80; LM(4) = 4.56
11 I also tested this model with total GDP. The obtained results are reported in appendix 1.
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Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM(1) Test:
F-statistic	 0.653126	 Probability	 0.427278
Obs*R-squared 0.800767 	 Probability	 0.370864
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM(4) Test:
F-statistic	 0.934049	 Probability	 0.464308
Obs*R-squared 4.564745 	 Probability	 0.334939
Wald Test:
Null Hypothesis:pi = 1
F-statistic	 2.113730	 Probability	 0.158936
Chi-square	 2.113730	 Probability	 0.145983
Wald Test:
Null Hypothesis:pi = 1, q2 = 0
F-statistic	 11.39538	 Probability	 0.000332
Chi-square	 22.79076	 Probability	 0.000011
Wald Test:
Chapter 6: Oil Revenue Effects on Inflation, Growth and Money	 222
Null Hypothesis: pi = cp2
F-statistic	 14.12399	 Probability	 0.000968
Chi-square	 14.12399	 Probability	 0.000171
Wald Test:
Null Hypothesis: (P2 = 0
F-statistic	 13.19463	 Probability	 0.001326
Chi-square	 13.19463	 Probability	 0.000281
We found strong supportive evidence for conventional model of real money balances.
We found no short-run oil revenue effect on changes of real money 12 . An adjusted
version of Buiter-Miller model chosen as the long-run equilibrium money demand.
Non-oil income elasticity of demand for money appears more robust and higher (0.83,
SE=0.115) than the oil revenue elasticity (0.21, SE=0.057). This finding indicates that
the monetary effect of oil revenue is much weaker than that of other parts of real GDP,
that is non-oil GDP. This results also partly confirms the assumption of other
researches such as Crockett & Evans (1990), Morgan (1979) and Looney (1985) of
the sense that oil revenue is neutral in the money market. The obtained significant and
positive 77 is likely indicative of an upward shift in the growth rate of real money
balances since the revolution. But, ro and 77 may also be part of a long-run relationship
such as rm=yo + y7 dr + 0 noy + 92 oil. In this case 77 shows an increase in the level
of money balances rather than its growth.
6.4.3 Inflation
Sources of inflation:
Research on price inflation behaviour is one of the major area of macroeconomic
studies. Many scholars have devoted great effort to explaining the origins and
12 We added doil to our final money equation to find any contemporaneous effect of oil on real money
balances, no siginificant coefficient was produced [0.03 (t-stat.=1.07)].
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dynamics of inflation in developed and less developed countries. Like other economic
fundamentals, several theories have appeared to explain the mechanism of price
adjustments.
Many researchers have investigated sources of inflation in developing nations. Two
general frameworks dominate the inflation literature associated with the developing
countries. Some have relied upon the structuralism approach in which many
macroeconomic variables, including the inflation rate, are linked through a system of
relationships. Otani (1975), Lipschitz (1984), Baer (1987), Lim (1987), Togan (1987),
and Anderson et al. (1988) are examples of studies that have used the structuralism
model of inflation.
For high inflation countries, many have relied upon the monetarist model of inflation,
in which the inflation rate is related to the rate of change of the money supply in excess
of the rate of increase of domestic output. The monetary model introduced originally
by Harberger (1963) has been applied to Asian countries by Bomberger and Makinen
(1979), Sheehey (1979) and Saini (1982). It has been applied to Latin American
countries by Nugent and Glezakos (1979), Ize and Javier (1985) and McNeils (1987).
Three other studies, i.e. Rana and Dowling (1985), Darrat and Arize (1990) and
Bahmani-Oskooee and Malixi (1992), have applied the monetarist model augmented
with imported inflation and exchange rate depreciation to some LDCs.
Bahmani-Oskooee (1995b) employed a model called 'augmented monetarist model'
outlined by equation:
Aptd
 = a + f3A(m— y), + rApir + AAeb, + e
He examined if there is cointegration relationship among variables. Variables included
in cointegration test are logarithms of CPI, M2, real GDP, black market exchange rate
(BMER), and world export prices, plus a dummy variable for revolution (0 for pre and
1 for post-1978) and trend. He obtained only two cointegrating vectors when log CPI
and log BMER were chosen as the dependent variables.
He conclude that inflation in Iran is not only a monetary phenemenon; it is also a result
of the depreciation of the Iranian rial in the free market and of imported inflation°.
13 As a matter of comparison, our results in this section reveal that this is the PPP relationship which
explains Iranain price movements in the long run, althogh a resonable correlation emerges between
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The influence of exchange rates on inflation is explained by the fact that movements in
the exchange rate affect the price of imported intermediate goods.
Cagan (1979) summarised three propositions as the conditions for rising inflation.
First, the expansion of aggregate expenditures faster than the flow of goods and
services pulls up prices and supports a rising price level. Second, excess aggregate
demand may originate from a variety of developments, such as an increasing
government budget or a vigorous cyclical expansion in private expenditures. And,
third, a rise in the money balances is necessary to support, and given time will produce,
excess aggregate demand. However, he emphasises that the 'monetary expansion as
necessary and sufficient for inflation makes money a proximate cause but not in any
simple sense the fundamental cause of inflation.' (p. 10)
Aghevli and Khan (1978) deal with a hypothesis indicating that while government
expenditures rise concomitantly with inflation, government revenues would tend to fall
behind in real terms owing to collection lags. The financing of this inflation-induced
deficit would then increase the money supply and generate further inflation. Thus the
increase in supply of money would both cause inflation and would be the result
thereof.
Sargent and Wallace (1973), Frenkel (1977) and Jacobs (1977) Dutton (1971) and
Aghevli and Khan (1978) examine the two-way causality between money and prices in
high inflation countries.
Sargent and Wallace (1973), Frenkel (1977) and Jacobs (1977) argue that it is more
appropriate to view the causation as running both ways, that is money increase
produces price inflation and vice versa.
According to the monetarist view, in a money demand equation (discussed in previous
section) it is in fact the price level that is being determined if money is exogenous.
Monetarists argue that inflation is a consequence of a continually expanding money
supply in a condition in which the government is unable to meet its increasing fiscal
commitments through an efficient system of taxation and the rate of change in real
inflation and monetary disequilibrium (displayed by Amy) in short run. Therfore, we may introduce
our inflation model as an 'augmented PPP model' rather than 'augmented monetary model' as
Bahmani-Oskooee (1995b) claimes. We believe even his results partly comfirms our claim when he
finds only two cointegrating vectors with CPI and BMER (and not money) as dependent variables.
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money supply. Government intervention with the free market, distortions in the price
system, and an overvalued exchange rate are the active elements of this environment.
Equation ( 6.4) in Money section (previous one) can be expressed as:
Aon—p), = flo +P 1 (L)Ay + P2( L)Apt +fi3(L)A(n—p)1+( 6.10)
At On— /3-01-1
Assuming price level as the dependent variable, this expression can be rearranged as:
( 6.11) AP/ = y0 + ri (L) A.Yt + r2 ( L)Apt_i + r3(L)Aint + Min — p — y),
The basic monetarist contention is: 1) that the causal relation runs from money to
prices and output; 2) any persistent increase in money relative to output is a sufficient
for inflation; 3) the magnitude and length of inflation is dependent on the magnitude
and persistence of monetary growth; 4) the occurrence of inflation is independent of
the level of employment in the economy, and 5) it is the increasing growth rate of
money which holds inflationary pressures.
Although theoretical models have been developed to study the macroeconomic
problems, including the inflation, associated with a booming sector mostly in the
context of Dutch Disease literature, empirical examinations of such models are not
frequently conducted.
A selective mix of monetarist and structuralism models of inflation in oil exporting
developing countries were discussed in El-Mallalch and Atta (1979), Kernan and Al-
Malik (1979), Johony et. al. (1986), Moosa (1986), Looney (1988), Salih et al. (1989)
and Noorbakhsh (1990).
Noorbakhsh (1990) suggests that since non-oil GDP does not grow at a sufficient rate
to balance the increasing aggregate demand", consequently, sluggish aggregate supply
14 Because of inefficiency of existing real capital and its insignificant contribution to the growth of
non-oil GDP.
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and rapidly increasing aggregate demand stimulated by rapid growth of the money
supply may become a very significant source of inflationary pressure in the oil-
exporting countries.
The question that repeatedly comes up is whether price behaviour should be
characterised by a cost push or demand pull mechanism or alternatively, a blend of
what appear to be competing hypotheses. The later option is supported in Laidler and
Parkin (1975).
The issue of whether Iran's inflation was the consequence of the cost push or the
demand pull mechanism on prices is important largely from the difference between the
recommendations for anti-inflationary policy.
6.4.3.1 Previous Evidence
Higher inflation after 1973 in Iran is considered as a reflection of the rapid increase in
oil revenues in 1973/74. Aghevli and Sassanpour (1982) argue that despite a high
growth rate in real GDP during this period, overspending of oil revenues by
government led to a high level of inflation:
1960-1972
	
1973-1977
Real Output Growth	 9%	 13%
Inflation
	
2%
	 13%
Source: Aghevli and Sassanpour (1982)
As can be seen from this table the inflation rate increased in average about 11% while
output growth rate shows only around 4% during these two periods".
15 Our data on real gdp shows even negative growth rate between these two periods (see chapter 2)
ont-
reven
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The following inflation equation for non-tradable goods was estimated:
= 1.16 + 0.37 rm t_i - 0.45 Y t + 0,6 (Pt pn)t-1
(1.7)	 (2.4)	 (2.1)	 (3.6)
R2 = 0.64; DW = 1.87 (corrected for autocorrelation)
where p" and p show price of non-tradables and tradables respectably.
Higher oil revenues since 1973 were instrumental in improving the growth of the
economy, because of limitations on excess capacity in the economy, the higher growth
rates were accompanied by higher rates of inflation in the prices of non-traded goods.
He concluded that there is a constant real wage in the long-run indicating that inflation
and wage move side by side and in the same direction.
Edwards (1986b) suggests that if a resource-based increase in reserves is not fully
sterilised, the monetary base will increase, and inflation will likely be a result. Real
appreciation then could be one of the side effect of this increase (independent of
nominal exchange rate behaviour). He tested a model to deal with the effects of an
increase in commodity export prices (Coffee in Colombia) in which the inflation
equation is defined as:
= + + a,A,(e + pf ),+arAy, ,u,
—0.006	 0.71	 -0.04	 0.31
(-0.73)	 (2.67)	 (-0.36)	 (2.18)
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pf here referees to the price of tradable goods and Ax to the rate of change in variables.
With the exception of income growth the coefficients are significant and have the
expected signs. The obtained results show that an increase in the rate of money
creation of 100% resulted in an increase in inflation of around 70%. On the other hand,
according to the coefficient of (de+ Apf), a higher rate of devaluation or higher world
inflation, or both, (imported inflation) was passed on in almost one third to price
increases.
Salih (1993) used a simple reduced form equation similar to the Edwards' model to
model the inflation of Kuwait. He obtained the results as following:
Apt = Ge o + alAp,„,(,)+ a2 AAl2 1 + p,
1.45	 0.23	 0.1
(13.29) (7.35)	 (7.57)
R 2 = 0.87, sampl: 1970:2 - 1987:4
These results confirm the results of Edwards (1986b) mentioned above.
According to Mashayelchi (1991) oil revenues affect price level through two major
ways. First, through government revenues, and second through foreign exchange
availability and imports 16 . Foreign exchange revenue from oil exports together with the
formal exchange rate determine government revenue. When oil revenue decreases so
do government revenues. This causes the budget deficit to increase and to raise the
monetary base. As the monetary base becomes larger, money supply rises and raises
the money supply-demand ratio and the price level.
16 Since oil revenue form a substantial part of total government revenue, any fall in foreign exchange
earnings from oil is restricted to an increase in liquidity resulting from the budget deficit. The main
source for financing budget deficit is borrowing from banking system. Only when oil revenue is
injected over than absorptive capacity of the economy, then, it could increase inflationary pressure
(Looney, 1985).
• Mg.iitglX
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Second effect an oil revenue drop comes from the subsequent decline in net foreign
exchange revenues which gives rise to a fall in imports. Fewer imports decreases total
supply which again (finally) leads to an increase in price level.
On the other hand when oil revenues increase, oil-induced increases in government's
expenditure accompanied by rising of the imports of primary and intermediate goods
provided a fair situation for producers to increase their supply. However, due to
general shortage of skilled workers and infrastructure capacity in certain key areas, the
supply of domestically produced goods could not increase at the same rate as the
demand. Inflationary pressures, therefore, mounted while at the same time the
feedback effect of the oil price increases- an acceleration in world inflation- resulted in
increased import prices. (Looney, 1985)
Iran, for instance, experienced a high inflation rate during the pre-Revolutionary
period after 1973/74 oil boom. Initially, the greatest inflationary pressures were
concentrated in the construction and housing sector (non-tradables consistent with the
Dutch disease prediction), which led to inflation in this sector and then spilled over to
other sectors.
Looney (1985) tested some versions of monetary models of inflation. The growth of
money relative to output and cost of holding real balances will generate an increase in
the rate of inflation. The growth of real income will cause decreases in the rate of
inflation. In his model Looney (1985) used real non-oil GDP instead of real GDP.
In oil exporting countries direct policies are the typical policies to control inflation
rate. These policies basically depend on the government revenues which as I mentioned
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before mainly depends on the oil revenues. Morgan (1979) distinguished some direct
policies to control inflation in oil-exporting countries. Policies like expansion of direct
subsidy payments on a wide range of goods and services; introduction or expansion of
indirect subsidies through the pricing policies of public enterprises; reduction or
elimination of several categories of domestic taxation (like import duties) and abolition
of user charges for government-supplied services in health, education etc. He argued,
however, that although such policies may have been used as the means of breaking
rising price expectation, the actual experience inflation of these countries revealed only
little success. This may support the view that any decline in price expectations would
probably be short-lived if it were produced by policies involving a direct increase in the
domestic budget deficit and domestic liquidity.' (p. 76) Because there is a close
relationship between the domestic budget balance, liquidity expansion and inflation.
6.4.3.2 Our results
Equation ( 6.2) has been used as an essential model to estimate the domestic inflation
during the period under consideration (1960-1990). Obtained results are reported
below:
= + P;(2)(Aivf + Ae), + fl,V)A(m s — m d ) t
 + fl,i(P d Pds)t-i
+	 + f3
LS II Dependent Variable is DPD
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1990
Included observations: 29 after adjusting endpoints
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations
Aptd = —0.67 + 0.997Ag 1 + 0.18Amy 1 + 0.4ip 1
 — 0.07Aoll1 _ 1 + 0.11(reb — 0.15DRoil)t_1
(-2.72) (2.50)	 (2.73)	 (3.16)	 (-4.36)
	 (2.80)	 (5.37)
R 2 = 0.79; DW = 2.52; LM(1) = 3.7; LM(4) = 8.8
0.3
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Pctual, Fitted and Residuals
— RPddiral	 Actual	 Fitted I
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM(1) Test:
F-statistic
	
3.071318
	 Probability	 0.094274
Obs*R-squared 3.700180	 Probability	 0.054407
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM(4) Test:
F-statistic	 1.973390	 Probability	 0.141912
Obs*R-squared 8.840548 	 Probability	 0.065211
Wald Test:
Null Hypothesis: 13's = 0
F-statistic	 18.98534	 Probability	 0.000252
Chi-square	 18.98534	 Probability	 0.000013
To establish the reliability of the model by conventional criteria, it was tested for serial
correlation and for coefficient restriction. Breusch-Godfrey's Long-run multiplier test,
for serial correlation up to fourth order, yields a chi-squared statistics 8.8, which is
insignificant.
In the short run a rise in foreign prices inflation is matched by an equal rise in domestic
inflation. Only in the long run does inflation respond to the domestic price of foreign
goods. Our estimated exchange rate equation offers some explanation for this as the
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exchange rate is found to respond only to the level of foreign prices, and not to foreign
inflation.
We found that a long-run relationship for prices based upon Purchasing Power Parity
is considerably more robust than the inverted long-run money demand equation.
Hence, when the real exchange rate is overvalued, then inflation tends to fall. There is
some degree of inertia in the inflation process, indicated by the significant lagged value
of inflation. Excess money growth adds to inflation. We prefer the ratio of money
growth to real income growth as a proxy for excess money, though we also
experimented with the lagged residuals of a money demand equation. There is no
significant contemporaneous effect of oil on inflation [-0.009 (t-stat=-0.51)]. Growth
in oil revenue is found to reduce inflation, after one year lagr.
A remaining issue for our analysis of the impact of oil revenue on the economy is
whether higher oil revenue leads to excessive expansions of the money. The problem is
that we cannot identify the money supply and demand equations. If prices adjusted
fully within one year to the excess creation of money then we would find no
contemporaneous correlation between real money holdings and oil revenue, which is
our finding. The fact that there is also no contemporaneous correlation between
inflation and oil revenue or excess money holdings suggests that there is not a quick
adjustment of prices to excess money. Another possibility is that with sticky prices
agents may willingly hold excess money until prices rises have risen to absorb the
excess money (see Laidler 1976). But there is no sign of oil revenue influencing money
holdings except in the long run, thus we find no evidence of such short run buffering
behaviour.
17 We believe that oil effects on inflation come about in two ways, namely, supply side (direct effect)
and demand side (indirect effect). Any increase in oil revenue is in fact an increase in real output
which normally alleviates inflation rate. (Due to the weighty dependence of the country's industries
on imported goods, the availability of foreign exchange is linked to import increases and economic
growth) On the other hand oil revenue constitutes the main part of government revenues and finances
the main body of its expenditures. More oil revenues usually means more expenditure and (when it is
injected in the economy over the productive capacity) higher inflation. We take the ratio of money
growth to real income growth as a proxy for indirect effect and growth in oil revenue as a proxy for
direct effect.
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6.4.4 Non-oil Growth Rate:
As we mentioned in previous sections a rapid increase in aggregate demand induced by
oil revenues can improve the productive capacity of the economy in the form of a
higher rate of change in non-oil GDP. This is achieved by efforts to increase the rate of
domestic capital formation and by importing capital goods and services from abroad.
Absorptive capacity is a crucial constraint on the success of this strategy, rigidities in
capacity can limit the growth rate of non-oil GDP, and ultimately intensify the
inflationary pressure in these countries.
An increase in oil revenues, in an oil exporting country, primarily prevails higher
growth rates without a considerable inflation. The relative stability in inflation in this
stage is due to the fact that the increase in income levels leads to an increase in the
demand for money, matching the increase in money supply associated with higher
government expenditure (expenditure motivation of oil revenue). After a period
however, restrictions on the absorptive capacity and inflexibility in the supply side of
the economy set in, slowing down the growth of output and leading to an excess
supply of money and to higher domestic inflation" (see Aghevli and Sassanpour 1982
and also Looney, 1985 for the case of Iran).
Another way through which oil revenues can affect non-oil GDP is the possible
response of exchange rate to any change in oil revenues. We discussed this topic in
previous chapters. Changes in the exchange rate can, by affecting the balance of
payments and inflation rate, in turn, change the growth rate of output. For example, as
Dornbusch (1986a) argues, a devaluation can potentially improve exports and then
total output. But, on the other hand, devaluation makes imported goods more
expensive which in an import-dependent economy has a contractionary effect on
output (see Gylfason and Risager (1984). Knigman and Taylor (1978) and Hanson
(1983) consider the circumstances in which a devaluation can lead to a contractionary
effect on output. Lizondo and Montiel (1989) conclude that a devaluation has an
equivocal effect on output.
18 Pinto (1987) stresses that 'with oil revenues accruing to the government, the composition and
timing of public spending were crucial in the adjustment to the boom. (p. 443)
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In an innovative study of 12 developing countries Edwards (1986a, p.507) concluded
that output-reduction effect of devaluations seems to be short-run phenomenon which
is completely reversed in the long-run. In an analysis of time series data over 1960-90
Rhodd (1993, p. 300) assessed the evidence for a single country, and concluded: 'Real
devaluation in Jamaica tends to be contractionary in the short-run but expansionary in
the long-run'. In contrast to Edward's conclusions, therefore, Rhodd's conclusion
emphasised the expansionary effect of real devaluation in Jamaica. However,
specification and technical problems with the way the long-run effects were estimated
provide grounds to question the validity of Rhodd's conclusions.
As was found by Edwards (1986, p. 506) and according to previous findings of Barro
(1979) and Edwarrds (1983) the terms of trade have no detectable effects on real
output in developing countries.
Improving the model specification produced evidence which supports the Edwards
(1986) conclusion of a neutral impact on output rather than the argument of
significantly expansionary long-run effects. (Boyed, 1996, p. 411)
van Wijnbergen (1986) constructs a simple macroeconomics model to elucidate three
alternative channels by which a devaluation can exert a contractionary effect on
aggregate supply. The first channel arises when, as is typical in many developing
countries, imported goods play a significant role in the production process. This
contractionary effect may be partly offset by possibilities of substitution between
imported inputs and domestic factors in production and by the expansionary effects of
expenditure switching. A second contractionary channel is created when real wages are
indexed to some index such as the consumer price index, that accounts for both
domestic and foreign goods. An increase in competitiveness implies that foreign goods
become more expensive than domestic goods. If real wages are indexed to a
consumption basket that includes foreign goods, this implies that real product wages
rise and that the improvement in competitiveness occurs at the expense of domestic
production. The third contractionary channel is a result of the effect of the increase in
the price level on the real volume of bank credit. In many developing countries, firms
finance fixed and working capital requirements through bank loans. The rise in the
price level associated with a devaluation leads to a rise in nominal demand for bank
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credit, which , given a fixed nominal money supply, leads in turn to a rise in real
interest rates and thus a rise in the interest component costs (see Edwards and Liaquat,
1986).
The dimension, nature and outcome of all economic plans in Iran have been very much
influenced by the development in the world energy scene and the fluctuations in Iran's
foreign exchange earnings from oil sector.
Oil revenues go directly to the government, so that they permeated into the economy
via the second-round effects.
Composition of the non-oil GDP by major economic sectors (percent)
1961/62 1969/70 1975/76
Agriculture 34.6 25.9 14.8
Industries and mines 19.9 26.3 30.6
Services 45.5 47.8 54.6
Non-oil GDP 100 100 100
Source: Bank Markazi: Annual Reports
Our results indicate that, although the overall growth remained high, the rapid increase
in 1973-74 was mainly reflected in higher inflation and higher imports.
Agevli and Sassanpour (1982) argue that although the higher oil revenues since 1973
have been instrumental in improving the growth of the economy, they led, however, to
a much higher inflation and interrupting of the non-oil exporting sector.
Output and prices during the 1960-72 period with that during the 1973-77 period
highlights the impact of higher oil prices on the economy: the average growth of
output rose from 9 to 13%. The higher growth of output, however, was partly at the
expense of the traded sector. Consequently. the non-oil exports all but vanished.
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6.4.4.1 Our Results
Equation ( 6.1) has been used as an essential model to estimate the rate of growth of
non-oil output during the period under consideration (1960 1990). A variety of
experiments including various definitions of the trend of potential real non oil GDP
have been conducted. We were unable to find any evidence for an influence of the
deviation of output from trend, not surprising given the unbalanced nature of the
recent decades19.
Our results are presented below. We find that increasing oil revenue decreases the rate
of growth of non-oil output by about a 1/4 of the growth rate of oil revenue. There is a
long lag on this effect, which probably reflects the slowness of the resource transfer to
the oil enclave and also government spending to stimulate the non-oil sector. The only
evidence of a spending effect is through growth in the real exchange rate, a real
depreciation produces extra growth, but this effect is not significant from zero at the
10% level. This finding is consisted with the finding of Edwards (1986a) which is
indicative of neutrality of devaluation on real output, and may be explained by the
stimulus given to products by falling costs of imported inputs. Finally, the underlying
growth rate has changed from a high positive rate before the revolution to a slightly
negative rate since the revolution. This is consistent with the rapid pre-revolution
expansion, the post-revolution stagnation, and the strongly negative rates of
investment since the revolution.
Amoy, = 0.16— 0.25Aoi/1 _4 — 0.22DR + 0.26Areb(f_o
(3.74) (-3.62)	 (-3.00)	 (1.49)
= 0.34, DW = 2.3, LM(1) = 0.57, LM(4) = 5.4
Amoy, = 0.15— 0.23Aoi/f_4 — 0.17DR
( 3.43) (-3.34)	 (-2.53)
= 0.30, DW = 2.27, LM(1) = 0.45, LM(4) = 5.75
19 We modelled the long-run trend in output as a simple trend, and also as a split trend in which the
increments reflect the relative average growth rates before and after the revolution.
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6.4.5 Foreign Inflation
We find that a rise in oil prices raises foreign prices, and that there is considerable
inertia in the process. In the ion run a 10% rise in oil prices raises foreign inflation by
just over 1%.
4	 4
Apt. = a o +Ea„Apft-i Ea2iAodp,1
i=1
	
i=0
Api = 0.01 + 0.67Apf:1 + 0.04Aollp
(3.14) (8.58)	 (5.77)
LM(1) = 2.04; LM(4) = 5.01; A = 0.35; DW = 1.52; IV = 0.82
6.5 Conclusion
A transitory (and in post-revolution, a persistent) rise in oil revenue suppresses
inflationary pressure in Iranian economy. This finding is consistent with that of
Mashayelchi (1991) and contradictory to the implications of core Dutch disease model.
There is still the suspicion of possible inflationary effect of oil boom which can occur
by overspending and monetisation of oil-induced foreign exchange into domestic
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economy. The significant coefficient of dmy or its equivalent in the obtained results in
inflation equation may partly pronounce this possibility. At a given level of real output,
money supply changes are the measure of excess demand and so this term implies that
shifts in money supply will affect prices only if they cause output to rise above its long-
run trend. We found that a long-run relationship for prices based upon Purchasing
Power Parity is considerably more robust than the inverted long-run money demand
equation. Hence, when the real exchange rate is overvalued, then inflation tends to fall.
We could not find any significant expansionary effect of oil boom on real non-oil GDP.
Looney (1982), covering pre-Revolutionary period, found that non-oil real GDP did
not respond significantly to the change in oil exports. Our results do not show any
instantaneous oil effect on non-oil real GDP too. Yet we found a long-lagged
contractionary effect of oil on that. There is no side effect from real depreciation on
non-oil GDP. This confirms the finding of Edwards (1989) and contradict those of
some other authors who find an expansionary effect (such as Gylfason and Schmid
(1983), Dornbusch (1986)) or contractionary effect (such as Krugman, Taylor (1978)
and Hanson (1983) and Gylfason and Radetzki (1991)).
Money market does not respond to foreign exchange increase induced by oil revenues
in short-run, however, we come down with a small elasticity of real money balances to
oil revenues in long-run.
Iranian economy has become more sensitive to the oil revenues in post-revolutionary
period.
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6.6 Appendix 1
Model ( 6.9) with gdp instead of non-oil gdp
LS // Dependent Variable is DRM
Sample: 1962 1990
Included observations: 29
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations
DRM=C(1)+C(3)*DR+C(6)*(RM(-1)-C(7)*y(-1))+C(8)*oil(-1)
Coefficient Std. Error	 t-Statistic Prob.
C(1)
-2.961282 0.813110	 -3.641923 0.0013
C(3) 0.324313 0.089085	 3.640483 0.0013
C(6)
-0.484041 0.083116	 -5.823693 0.0000
C(7) 0.850988 0.115624	 7.359986 0.0000
C(8) 0.093230 0.023406	 3.983239 0.0005
R-squared 0.748102 Mean dependent var 0.086590
Adjusted R-
squared
0.706119 S.D. dependent var 0.117290
S.E. of regression 0.063584 Akaike info criterion -5.355209
Sum squared
resid
0.097029 Schwarz criterion -5.119468
Log likelihood 41.50132 F-statistic 17.81913
Durbin-Watson
stat
2.286846 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001
Model( 6.9) but including the first observation which seems peculiar and so decreases the Rbar-
sq. to 58%
LS // Dependent Variable is DRM
Sample (adjusted): 1961 1990
Included observations: 30 after adjusting endpoints
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations
DRM=C(1)+C(3)*DR+C(6)*(RM(-1)-C(7)*NOY(-1))+C(8)*Oil(-1)
Coefficient
	 Std. Error	 t-Statistic	 Prob.
C(1)
-3.732350 0.985948 -3.785544 0.0009
C(3) 0.361967 0.112937 3.205028 0.0037
C(6)
-0.520880 0.105268 -4.948133 0.0000
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C(7) 0.959463 0.118964	 8.065123 0.0000
C(8) 0.092698 0.028898	 3.207797 0.0036
R-squared 0.640407 Mean dependent var 0.077842
Adjusted R-
squared
0.582872 S.D. dependent var 0.124815
S.E. of regression 0.080612 Akaike info criterion -4.885194
Sum squared
resid
0.162459 Schwarz criterion -4.651661
Log likelihood 35.70975 F-statistic 11.13076
Durbin-Watson
stat
2.081477 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000025
Model ( 6.9) including doil(-1) and drm(-1)
LS II Dependent Variable is DRM
Sample: 1962 1990
Included observations: 29
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations
DRM=C(1)+C(3)*DR+C(6)*(RM(-1)-C(7)*NOY(-1))+C(8)*Oil(-1)
+C(4)*DRM(-1)+C(5)*D0i1(-1)
Coefficient Std. Error
	 t-Statistic Prob.
C(1) -3.053576 0.842726
	 -3.623451 0.0015
C(3) 0.335208 0.094951
	 3.530336 0.0019
C(6) -0.520590 0.094515
	 -5.508027 0.0000
C(7) 0.808812 0.112653
	 7.179656 0.0000
C(8) 0.119120 0.029773	 4.000991 0.0006
C(4)
-0.096200 0.114143	 -0.842802 0.4084
C(5) -0.027132 0.031232	 -0.868717 0,3944
R-squared 0.757333 Mean dependent var 0.086590
Adjusted R-
squared
0.691151 S.D. dependent var 0.117290
S.E. of regression 0.065183 Akaike info criterion -5.254613
Sum squared
resid
0.093474 Schwarz criterion -4.924576
Log likelihood 42.04267 F-statistic 11.44319
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Durbin-Watson	 2.027139
stat
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000008
77.
Exchange rate premium as opportunity cost for holding money
LS // Dependent Variable is DRM
Sample(adjusted): 1961 1990
Included observations: 30 after adjusting endpoints
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations
DRM=C(1)+C(3)*DR+C(6)*(RM(-1)-C(7)*NOY(-1))+C(9)*(EB(-1)-E0(-1))
Coefficient
	 Std. Error	 t-Statistic	 Prob.
C(1) -3.912936 1.084888	 -3.606766 0.0013
C(3) 0.426234 0.125894	 3.385673 0.0023
C(6)
-0.423366 0.118304	 -3.578630 0.0014
C(7) 1.265589 0.092875	 13.62686 0.0000
C(9)
-0.067278 0.031951	 -2.105655 0.0454
R-squared 0.568862 Mean dependent var 0.077842
Adjusted R-
squared
0.499880 S.D. dependent var 0.124815
S.E. of regression 0.088268 Akaike info criterion -4.703738
Sum squared
resid
0.194782 Schwarz criterion -4.470205
Log likelihood 32.98792 F-statistic 8.246513
Durbin-Watson
stat
2.051474 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000220
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6.7 Appendix 2
Unrestricted PPP
LS II Dependent Variable is DPD
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1990
Included observations: 29 after adjusting endpoints
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations
DPD=C(1)+C(2)*DPF(-1)+C(3)*DMY(-1)+C(4)*(EB(-1)-C(8)*PD(-1)-C(
9)*PF(-1)-C(5)*DROIL(-1))+C(7)*D0i1(-1)
Coefficient	 Std. Error	 t-Statistic Prob.
C(1) -0.929765 0.392465	 -2.369039 0.0275
C(2) 1.028013 0.512479	 2.005961 0.0579
C(3) 0.136203 0.074881	 1.818935 0.0832
C(4) 0.088836 0.048010	 1.850378 0.0784
C(8) 1.139515 0.641969	 1.775031 0.0904
C(9) -2.473582 1.408120	 -1.756656 0.0935
C(5) 0.230550 0.086803	 2.656021 0.0148
C(7) -0.064272 0.018917	 -3.397638 0.0027
R-squared 0.826988 Mean dependent var 0.103998
Adjusted R-
squared
0.769317 S.D. dependent var 0.082448
S.E. of regression 0.039599 Akaike info criterion -6.228940
Sum squared
resid
0.032930 Schwarz criterion -5.851755
Log likelihood 57.17041 F-statistic 14.33983
Durbin-Watson
stat
2.164296 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001
Wald Test:
Null Hypothesis: C(8)=1
F-statistic	 0.047229	 Probability	 0.830054
Chi-square
	
0.047229	 Probability	 0.827956
Wald Test:
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Null Hypothesis: C(9)=-1
F-statistic	 1.095139	 Probability	 0.307232
Chi-square	 1.095139	 Probability	 0.295335
Wald Test:
Null Hypothesis:C(8)=1 C(9)=-1
F-statistic	0.890152	 Probability	 0.425528
Chi-square	 1.780303	 Probability	 0.410594
Wald Test:
Null Hypothesis:C(8)+C(9)=0
F-statistic
Chi-square
1.683192
1.683192
Probability	 0,208573
Probability
	 0.194501
Imposing opposite coefficient restriction
LS // Dependent Variable is DPD
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1990
Included observations: 29 after adjusting endpoints
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations
DPD=C(1)+C(2)*DPF(-1)+C(3)*DMY(-1)+C(4)*(EB(-1)-C(8)*(PD(-1)-
PF(-1))-C(5)*DROIL(-1))+C(7)*D0i1(-1)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C(1) -0.480212 0.347953 -1.380107 0.1814
C(2) 1.653374 0.440147 3.756414 0.0011
C(3) 0.153450 0.079611 1.927504 0.0669
C(4) 0.100576 0.051001 1.972043 0.0613
C(8) 0.219185 0.707969 0.309597 0.7598
C(5) 0.187537 0.064091 2.926083 0.0078
C(7)
-0.078430 0.018838 -4.163415 0.0004
Chapter 6: Oil Revenue Effects on Inflation, Growth and Money	 244
R-squared 0.792497 Mean dependent var 0.103998
Adjusted R-
squared
0.735906 S.D. dependent var 0.082448
S.E. of regression 0.042370 Akaike info criterion -6.116123
Sum squared
resid
0.039495 Schwarz criterion -5.786086
Log likelihood 54.53457 F-statistic 14.00380
Durbin-Watson
stat
1.997371 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002
Wald Test:
Null Hypothesis: C(8)1
F-statistic	 1.216375
Chi-square	 1.216375
Probability	 0.281992
Probability	 0.270073
•
• •	
7.5,7, •
Unrestricted PPP: replacing dmy with residuals form money equation.(see the model in the
inflation section in this chapter)
LS II Dependent Variable is DPD
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1990
Included observations: 28 after adjusting endpoints
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations
DPD=C(1)+C(2)*DPF(-1)+C(3)*(RESIDRM3(-1)+DPD(-1))
+C(4)*(EB(-1)-C(8)*PD(-1)+C(9)*PF(-1)-C(5)*DROIL(-1))
+C(7)*D011(-1)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob,
C(1) -0.542380 0.297347 -1.824063 0.0831
C(2) 1.160563 0.378184 3.068776 0.0061
C(3) 0.376659 0.082927 4.542068 0.0002
C(4) 0.058020 0.033842 1.714456 0.1019
C(8) 0.874576 0.788554 1.109088 0.2806
C(9)
-1.979316 1.558770 -1.269794 0.2187
C(5) 0.270588 0.112425 2.406831 0.0259
C(7)
-0.084883 0.014291 -5.939699 0.0000
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R-squared 0.895254 Mean dependent var 0.107712
Adjusted R-
squared
0.858593 S.D. dependent var 0.081453
S.E. of regression 0.030630 Akaike info criterion -6.736624
Sum squared
resid
0.018763 Schwarz criterion -6.355994
Log likelihood 62.58246 F-statistic 24.41975
Durbin-Watson
stat
2.303843 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Wald Test:
Null Hypothesis: C(8)1
F-statistic	 0.025299	 Probability	 0.875220
Chi-square	 0.025299	 Probability	 0.873625
Wald Test:
Null Hypothesis: C(9)-1
F-statistic	 0.394710	 Probability	 0.536943
Chi-square	 0.394710	 Probability	 0.529834
Wald Test:
Null Hypothesis:C(8)=1 C(9)=-1
F-statistic	 0.693633	 Probability	 0.511384
Chi-square	 1.387267	 Probability	 0.499757
Wald Test:
Null Hypothesis: C(8)+C(9)=0
F-statistic
	
1.044635	 Probability	 0.318951
Chi-square
	
1.044635	 Probability	 0.306746
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Imposing opposite coefficient restriction
LS II Dependent Variable is DPD
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1990
Included observations: 28 after adjusting endpoints
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations
DPD=C(1)+C(2)*DPF(-1)+C(3)*(RES1DRM3(-1)+DPD(-1))
+C(4)*(EB(-1)-C(8)*(PD(-1)-PF(-1))-C(5)*DRO1L(-1))
+C(7)*D0i1(-1)
Coefficient Std. Error	 t-Statistic Prob.
C(1) -0.286147 0.232942	 -1.228409 0.2329
C(2) 1.458122 0.312870	 4.660479 0.0001
C(3) 0.410890 0.080454	 5.107127 0.0000
C(4) 0.061494 0.034391	 1.788058 0.0882
C(8) 0.136301 0.813751	 0.167497 0.8686
C(5) 0.234317 0.089081	 2.630391 0.0156
C(7) -0.093393 0.013065	 -7.148501 0.0000
R-squared 0.885750 Mean dependent var 0.107712
Adjusted R-
squared
0.853107 S.D. dependent var 0.081453
S.E. of regression 0.031218 Alcaike info criterion -6.721202
Sum squared
resid
0.020466 Schwarz criterion -6.388151
Log likelihood 61.36655 F-statistic 27.13460
Durbin-Watson
stat
2.215285 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Wald Test:
Null Hypothesis: C(8)1
F-statistic
	
1.126527	 Probability	 0.300572
Chi-square
	
1.126527	 Probability	 0.288517
Imposing unit restriction on price differentials
LS II Dependent Variable is DPD
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1990
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Included observations: 28 after adjusting endpoints
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations
DPD=C(1)+C(2)*DPF(-1)+C(3)*(RESIDRM3(-1)+DPD(-1))
+C(4)*(REB(-1)-C(5)*DROIL(4))+C(7)*D0i1(-1)
Coefficient	 Std. Error	 t-Statistic Prob.
C(1) -0.523960 0.201691
	 -2.597836 0.0164
C(2) 1.320540 0.318620
	 4.144563 0.0004
C(3) 0.466955 0.077926	 5.992260 0.0000
C(4) 0.088314 0.032566	 2.711822 0.0127
C(5) 0.143524 0.028359	 5.060985 0.0000
C(7) -0.087011 0.013206	 -6.588658 0.0000
R-squared 0.868033 Mean dependent var 0.107712
Adjusted R-
squared
0.838041 S.D. dependent var 0.081453
S.E. of regression 0.032780 Akaike info criterion -6.648469
Sum squared
resid
0.023640 Schwarz criterion -6.362997
Log likelihood F-statistic
59.34829 28.94173
Durbin-Watson
stat
1.774603 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM(1) Test:
F-statistic	 0.160736
	 Probability	 0.692530
Obs*R-squared 0.212686 	 Probability	 0.644670
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM(4) Test:
F-statistic	 0.312427	 Probability	 0.865903
Obs*R-squared 1.817784 	 Probability	 0.769227
Wald Test:
Null Hypothesis: C(7)=-0
F-statistic
	
43.41042	 Probability	 0.000001
64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 BO 82 84 86 88 90
Fitted	 IResidual	 - • Actual
Chapter 6: Oil Revenue Effects on Inflation, Growth and Money
	
248
Chi-square	 43.41042	 Probability	 0.000000
Actual, Fitted and Residuals: Model ?
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To test if the significance of C(3) in these models is related to AR(1) nature of DPD, I
reestimated an unrestricted version of the final model as:
LS II Dependent Variable is DPD
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1990
Included observations: 28 after adjusting endpoints
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations
DPD=C(1)+C(2)*DPF(-1)+C(3)*RESIDRM3(-1)+C(8)*DPD(-1)
+C(4)*(REB(-1)-C(5)*DROIL(-1))+C(7)*D0i1(-1)
Coefficient	 Std. Error	 t-Statistic Prob.
C(1) -0.508106 0.211847	 -2.398463 0.0258
C(2) 1.289283 0.339757	 3.794726 0.0011
C(3) 0.443035 0.109318	 4.052713 0.0006
C(8) 0.490581 0.108686	 4.513732 0.0002
C(4) 0.085591 0.034329	 2.493290 0.0211
C(5) 0.146499 0.031134	 4.705432 0.0001
C(7) -0.086565 0.013557	 -6.385389 0.0000
R-squared 0.868670 Mean dependent var 0.107712
Adjusted R-
squared
0.831147 S.D. dependent var 0.081453
S.E. of regression 0.033470 Akaike info criterion -6.581877
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Sum squared
resid
0.023525 Schwarz criterion -6.248826
Log likelihood F-statistic
59.41601 23.15043
Durbin-Watson
stat
1.841900 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Wald Test:
Null Hypothesis:C(3)=C(8)
F-statistic	 0.101824	 Probability
	 0.752804
Chi-square	 0.101824	 Probability	 0.749651
The obtained results show that the AR(1) hypothesis of DPD is invalid and the
restriction imposed on DPD plus RES1D of DRM equation is valid.
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Inflation Model 2: Inverted money demand function.
LS // Dependent Variable is DPD
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1990
Included observations: 29 after adjusting endpoints
Convergence achieved after 22 iterations
DPD=C(1)+C(2)*DPD(-1)+C(3)*DMY(-1)+C(4)*(RM(-1)-C(5)*y(-1))
+C(7)*D0i1(-1)
Coefficient Std. Error	 t-Statistic Prob.
C(1)
-0.216879 0.281753	 -0.769748 0.4493
C(2) 0.348154 0.159833	 2.178237 0.0399
C(3) 0.116717 0.061164	 1.908258 0.0689
C(4) 0.022326 0.023155	 0.964203 0.3450
C(5)
-0.831842 2.182008	 -0.381228 0.7065
C(7) -0.054583 0.016090	 -3.392288 0.0025
R-squared 0.798620 Mean dependent var 0.103998
Adjusted R-
squared
0.754841 S.D. dependent var 0.082448
S.E. of regression 0.040823 Akaike info criterion -6.215037
Sum squared
resid
0.038330 Schwarz criterion -5.932148
Log likelihood 54.96881 F-statistic 18.24234
Durbin-Watson
stat
2.074275 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
LS // Dependent Variable is DPD
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1990
Included observations: 28 after adjusting endpoints
Convergence achieved after 15 iterations
DPD=C(1)+C(2)*DPF(-1)+C(3)*(RESIDRM3(-1)+DPD(-1))
+C(4)*(RM(-1)-C(5)*y(-1))+C(7)*D0i1(-1)
Coefficient	 Std. Error	 t-Statistic	 Prob.
C(1)
-0.236617 0.255590 -0.925766 0.3646
C(2) 0.440835 0.270094 1.632156 0.1169
C(3) 0.408836 0.096157 4.251759 0.0003
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C(4) 0.016598 0.017837	 0.930534 0.3622
C(5) -1.304500 2.960449	 -0.440643 0.6638
C(7) -0.073430 0.014716	 -4.989789 0.0001
R-squared 0.853746 Mean dependent var 0.107712
Adjusted R-
squared
0.820507 S.D. dependent var 0.081453
S.E. of regression 0.034509 Akaike info criterion -6.545674
Sum squared
resid
0.026199 Schwarz criterion -6.260202
Log likelihood 57.90916 F-statistic 25.68466
Durbin-Watson
stat
1.525184 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
LS II Dependent Variable is DPD
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1990
Included observations: 28 after adjusting endpoints
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations
DPD=C(1)+C(2)*DPF(-1)+C(3)*(RESIDRM3(-1)+DPD(4))
+C(4)*(RM(-1)-C(5)*NOY(-1))+C(7)*D0i1(-1)+C(8)*Oil(-1)
Coefficient	 Std. Error	 t-Statistic Prob.
C(1) -0.376506 0.252180	 -1.493007 0.1503
C(2) 0.747239 0.307161	 2.432727 0.0240
C(3) 0.354545 0.096213	 3.684986 0.0014
C(4) 0.040662 0.021537	 1.887994 0.0729
C(5) -1.061977 1.047113	 -1.014195 0.3220
C(7) -0.057399 0.016557	 -3.466710 0.0023
C(8) -0.031657 0.017614	 -1.797286 0.0867
R-squared 0.873656 Mean dependent var 0.107712
Adjusted R-
squared
0.837558 S.D. dependent var 0.081453
S.E. of regression 0.032829 Akaike info criterion -6.620582
Sum squared
resid
0.022632 Schwarz criterion -6.287531
Log likelihood 59.95788 F-statistic 24.20216
Durbin-Watson
stat
1.820117 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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LS // Dependent Variable is DPD
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1990
Included observations: 29 after adjusting endpoints
VINV = m -p - y
DPD=
 C(1)+C(2)*DPD(-1)+C(3)*DRM(-1)+C(4)*D011(-1)
+C(5)*VINV(-1)
Coefficient Std. Error	 t-Statistic Prob.
C(1) 0.278099 0.152588	 1.822550 0.0809
C(2) 0.663253 0.155721	 4.259249 0.0003
C(3) 0.212931 0.069572	 3.060572 0.0054
C(4) -0.055295 0.016099	 -3.434582 0.0022
C(5) 0.039366 0.021777	 1.807673 0.0832
R-squared 0.789951 Mean dependent var 0.103998
Adjusted R-
squared
0.754943 S.D. dependent var 0.082448
S.E. of regression 0.040814 Akaike info criterion -6.241856
Sum squared
resid
0.039980 Schwarz criterion -6.006115
Log likelihood 54.35769 F-statistic 22.56473
Durbin-Watson
stat
1.867706 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
LS // Dependent Variable is DPD
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1990
Included observations: 28 after adjusting endpoints
DPD=C(1)+C(2)*DPF(-1)+C(3)*(RESIDRM3(-1)+DPD(-1))
+C(7)*D011(-1)
Coefficient	 Std. Error	 t-Statistic	 Prob.
C(1) 0.022533 0.013867 1.625017 0.1172
C(2) 0.732215 0.248526 2.946231 0.0070
C(3) 0.532881 0.073806 7.220069 0.0000
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C(7) -0.085135 0.013776	 -6.180095 0.0000
R-squared 0.820990 Mean dependent var 0.107712
Adjusted R-
squared
0.798613 S.D. dependent var 0.081453
S.E. of regression 0.036553 Alcaike info criterion -6.486433
Sum squared
resid
0.032067 Schwarz criterion -6.296118
Log likelihood 55.07978 F-statistic 36.69018
Durbin-Watson
stat
1.318044 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
77.
M2
LS // Dependent Variable is DPI)
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1990
Included observations: 29 after adjusting endpoints
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations
DPD= C(1)+C(2)*DPD(-1)+C(3)*DRM(-1)+C(4)*D0i1(-1)
+C(5)*(R1/IQ(-1)-C(6)*y(-1))
Coefficient Std. Error	 t-Statistic Prob.
C(1) 0.119726 0.345074	 0.346958 0.7318
C(2) 0.521572 0.185628	 2.809762 0.0099
C(3) 0.167230 0.078932	 2.118660 0.0451
C(4)
-0.055249 0.015617	 -3.537691 0.0018
C(5) 0.042046 0.023104	 1.819820 0.0818
C(6) 0.608943 0.747658	 0.814467 0.4237
R-squared 0.806882 Mean dependent var 0.103998
Adjusted R-
squared
0.764900 S.D. dependent var 0.082448
S.E. of regression 0.039977 Akaike info criterion -6.256931
Sum squared
resid
0.036757 Schwarz criterion -5.974043
Log likelihood 55.57629 F-statistic 19.21965
Durbin-Watson
stat
1.874506 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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LS // Dependent Variable is DPD
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1990
Included observations: 29 after adjusting endpoints
DPD= C(1)+C(2)*DPD(-1)+C(3)*DRM(-1)+C(4)*D011(-1)
+C(5)*(RMQ(-1)-y(-1))
Coefficient Std. Error	 t-Statistic Prob.
C(1) 0.313893 0.137142	 2.288822 0.0312
C(2) 0.567693 0.167575	 3.387687 0.0024
C(3) 0.190272 0.068558	 2.775361 0.0105
C(4) -0.054421 0.015356	 -3.543930 0.0017
C(5) 0.047662 0.020944	 2.275727 0.0321
R-squared 0.803709 Mean dependent var 0.103998
Adjusted R-
squared
0.770994 S.D. dependent var 0.082448
S.E. of regression 0.039455 Akaike info criterion -6.309601
Sum squared
resid
0.037361 Schwarz criterion -6.073860
Log likelihood 55.33999 F-statistic 24.56690
Durbin-Watson
stat
1.839019 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
LS // Dependent Variable is DPD
Sample(adjusted): 1962 1990
Included observations: 29 after adjusting endpoints
DPD=
 C(1)+C(2)*DPD(-1)+C(3)*DRM(-1)+C(4)*D0i1(-1)
+C(5)*(RMQ(-1)-NOY(-1))
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C(1) 0.304851 0.135156 2.255550 0.0335
C(2) 0.572473 0.167618 3.415345 0.0023
C(3) 0.189556 0.068841 2.753552 0.0111
C(4) -0.054983 0.015336 -3.585256 0.0015
C(5) 0.046297 0.020647 2.242339 0.0344
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R-squared 0.802689 Mean dependent var 0.103998
Adjusted R-
squared
0.769804 S.D. dependent var 0.082448
S.E. of regression 0.039557 Akaike info criterion -6.304417
Sum squared
resid
0.037555 Schwarz criterion -6.068677
Log likelihood 55.26483 F-statistic 24.40887
Durbin-Watson
stat
1.844753 Prob(F'-statistic) 0.000000
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Oil and Inflation
LS // Dependent Variable is DPD
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1990
Included observations: 28 after adjusting endpoints
DPD=
 C(1)+C(2)* DPD(-1)+C(3)* DPD(-2)+C(4)* DOW
+C(5)*DOJ1(-1)+C(6)* DO1L(-2)
Coefficient Std. Error	 t-Statistic Prob.
C(1) 0.037755 0.016939	 2.228850 0.0364
C(2) 0.657868 0.213980	 3.074436 0.0055
C(3) 0.083298 0.203360	 0.409610 0.6861
C(4)
-0.015373 0.019953	 -0.770463 0.4492
C(5)
-0.067623 0.019496	 -3.468548 0.0022
C(6) 0.008639 0.024160	 0.357574 0.7241
R-squared 0.688219 Mean dependent var 0.107712
Adjusted R-
squared
0.617359 S.D. dependent var 0.081453
S.E. of regression 0.050385 Akaike info criterion -5.788717
Sum squared
resid
0.055850 Schwarz criterion -5.503244
Log likelihood 47.31175 F-statistic 9.712452
Durbin-Watson
stat
2.009171 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000053
Wald Test:
Null Hypothesis: C(4)=0 C(5)=0 C(6)=0
F-statistic	 4.544114	 Probability	 0.012649
Chi-square	 13.63234	 Probability	 0.003451
LS // Dependent Variable is DPD
Sample(adjusted): 1963 1990
Included observations: 28 after adjusting endpoints
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations
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DPD=C(1)+C(2)*DPF(-1)+C(3)*(RESIDRM3(-1)+DPD(-1))
+C(4)*(REB(-1)-C(5)*DROIL(-1))+C(7)*DOIL(-1) +C(8)*DOIL
+C(9)*DOIL(-2)
Coefficient Std. Error	 t-Statistic Prob.
C(1) -0.569844 0.210144	 -2.711688 0.0134
C(2) 1.284572 0.323850	 3.966566 0.0008
C(3) 0.516230 0.088207	 5.852491 0.0000
C(4) 0.095847 0.033892	 2.828013 0.0104
C(5) 0.151267 0.029427	 5.140481 0.0000
C(7) -0.088655 0.013542	 -6.546842 0.0000
C(8) -0.009110 0.014545	 -0.626330 0.5382
C(9) 0.014197 0.017085	 0.830921 0.4158
R-squared 0.877526 Mean dependent var 0.107712
Adjusted R-
squared
0.834660 S.D. dependent var 0.081453
S.E. of regression 0.033120 Akaike info criterion -6.580263
Sum squared
resid
0.021939 Schwarz criterion -6.199633
Log likelihood 60.39341 F-statistic 20.47143
Durbin-Watson
stat
1.903365 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Wald Test:
Null Hypothesis: C(7)=0 C(8)=0 C(9)=0
F-statistic	 14.69099	 Probability	 0.000027
Chi-square	 44.07298	 Probability	 0.000000
77.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we presented parameter estimates obtained, using single
equation method. In that chapter we also argued that oil revenue changes do not
appear to create disequilibrium in the money market. This indicates that to trace the oil
revenues effects upon the economy we can exclude the money equation from the set of
equations without a significant side effect on the final conclusion. Money demand
equation, hence, was excluded and, then, in order to get more efficient results the other
remaining equations (domestic inflation, growth rate, exchange rate, and foreign
inflation) were estimated jointly using a system equation method (see next section). We
found that the jointly estimated models appear more consistent and precise.
Consequently, these results were chosen to undertake the simulation exercise. The
simulation results plus plots for selected key variables are presented in the following
subsections and in the appendices. The exercise considers several scenarios by making
various assumptions on oil revenue changes (and its related oil prices) within and out
of sample.
Despite obtaining satisfactory results, there is no guarantee that when simulated as a
system of equations, the model will perform reasonably well in tracking the historical
data. For the dynamic simulation exercise, any lagged endogenous variables are
replaced by their respective simulated values, making it highly probable that the
exercise may find evidence of stability which would otherwise have been undetected,
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As the system of the equations is allowed to run further into the future, any systematic
errors will be compounded, making the simulated values deviate progressively from the
actual values. Since we have focused on the impact of oil and have ignored the effects
of many variables that we deemed important it is likely that simulations will not
provide a particularly close fit to the data. However, we should be concerned if the
model fails to pick up major turning points or has systematically large errors. The
examination of the model performance in tracking the historical data is presented in
subsection 7.3.1
We then proceed to examine the response of our endogenous variables to different
time paths for our exogenous variables, oil revenue and oil prices. We keep the oil
price and oil revenue constant at the levels prior to the first oil shock (1973/74) and
simulate the interested endogenous variables (SM1).
The current policy of spending of oil revenue in Iran is to inject the revenue in the
domestic economy through budget deficits. By rising oil revenue the state would raise
public expenditures but when oil revenues crash down it is difficult for the state to
diminish the expenditures and so accepts a budget deficit policy. Through this policy
all oil shocks would automatically be passed to the domestic economy. We simulate an
alternative policy for spending oil revenues which could have been implemented by the
authorities during 1974-1990. By this policy the state would not establish each year
public expenditure based on the same year oil revenue, but base on a long run
expectation of oil revenues. Rather than the government allowing the whole of a
revenue shock to impact upon the economy, we assume the government took a larger
term view and smoothed the flow of oil revenue into the economy, so that the extra
demand should not greatly exceed the absorptive capacity. We simulate this by
assuming a constant growth rate of oil revenue spending equal to the growth rate over
the whole period. Oil prices are picked as the actual ones (SM4) (see appendix 1 for
related table and graph of this projection).
In the previous chapter we argue that oil revenue changes do not appear to create
disequilibrium in the money market. This conclusion would allow us to assume that
after any oil shock the monetary diseqiulibrium could be ignored. We impose this
conjecture by assuming DMY=0 in all simulation exercises except the tracking one
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(SMO). Also we chose a 'base path' defined as a dynamic simulation run of the model
when this presumption (DMY=0) is imposed (SM00). Values obtained from this
simulation represent the effect of oil revenue on the variables of interest, and are used
to judge our simulation results obtained from different scenarios.
For out of sample cases (1991-1999) we implemented three alternative scenarios: No
oil shock since 1990 (SM5); temporary oil shock in 1991 (SM6) and permanent oil
shock in 1991 (SM7).
For convenience, the multiple-equation model we will use in the simulation exercise is
presented below. For a full definition of the variables and coefficients refer to chapter
6.
7.2 System of equation method
To get more efficient results, all final models except money demand model taken from
previous chapter were restimated using STIR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression)
method l . Full results are reported below. All coefficients confirm the results obtained
in previous chapter and appear more precisely with lower standard errors.
Equation: APtd = g + r2 Apf t-i + P13Am.Y,A + r4 (reb — P3DRoil)1
d+13Aoilt_ 1 ± r6 APt-i ± vt
Observations: 29
R-squared	 0.831412	 Mean	 0.103998
dependent var
Adjusted R-	 0.785434	 S.D.	 0.082448
squared
	
dependent var
S.E. of	 0.038191	 Sum squared	 0.032088
regression	 resid
Durbin-Watson 2.587987
stat
1 In the case that the disturbances of the equations are correlated this method of estimation produces
more efficient results compared with equation-by-equation method. (see Maddala 1992 for example)
When each residual is regressed on the others only growth and foreign prices appear to be correlated.
However, given our small samples we proceed to use SUR estimation. In fact the parameter estimates
differ little between SUR and OLS.
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Aeb, = a o + a l Ae,_, + a l4 Aet_ 4 + a 4DR, +
Equation:
a,(reb —	 +&
Observations:
26
R-squared
	
0.921563	 Mean	 0.109057
dependent var
Adjusted R-	 0.901954	 S.D.	 0.193775
squared	 dependent var
S.E. of	 0.060676	 Sum squared	 0.073630
regression
	 resid
Durbin-Watson 1.821665
stat
Equation: AA/. = rlo	 + 77 2 Aoilp, +
Observations: 29
R-squared	 0.835765	 Mean	 0.050829
dependent var
Adjusted R-	 0.823131
	 S.D.	 0.030423
squared	 dependent var
S.E. of	 0.012795	 Sum squared	 0.004256
regression
	 resid
Durbin-Watson 1.458855
stat
Equation: Amoy, = 5 1 + 8 54 Aoilt_ 4 + 8 7DR+ fit
Observations:
26
R-squared
	 0.322341	 Mean	 0.044243
dependent var
Adjusted R-	 0.263414	 S.D.	 0.155004
squared	 dependent var
S.E. of	 0.133031	 Sum squared	 0.407039
regression
	 resid
Durbin-Watson 1.932583
stat
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Estimation Method: Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Sample: 1960 1990
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
13 ' i -0.679942 0.214928 -3.163583 0.0021
132 1.057036 0.345360 3.060680 0.0029
03 0.173452 0.057049 3.040392 0.0031
06 0.414753 0.102345 4.052510 0.0001
0 '4 0.113899 0.035020 3.252360 0.0016
03 0.156675 0.018742 8.359459 0.0000
13' 5 -0.071344 0.013145 -5.427686 0.0000
ao 1.804874 0.223066 8.091208 0.0000
all -0.437282 0.071702 -6.098573 0.0000
a14 -0.597157 0.069192 -8.630446 0.0000
a4 0.477238 0.038839 12.28748 0.0000
co -0.309535 0.037831 -8.181994 0.0000
110 0.013518 0.003843 3.517293 0.0007
111 0.683284 0.066589 10.26129 0.0000
12 0.041075 0.006576 6.246393 0.0000
81 0.103714 0.032726 3.169139 0.0021
854 -0.175781 0.046426 -3.786292 0.0003
•57 -0.094920 0.046257 -2.052018 0.0430
Determinant residual covariance
	 4.97E-12
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7.3 Within Sample Dynamic Simulations
7.3.1 Tracking of the model
In order to test the reliability of the model for tracking the movements of the
endogenous variables, a dynamic simulation of the model was conducted over the
period 1960-1990, using the parameters estimated obtained using SUR (seemingly
unrelated regression) method (reported above) and the actual values of the exogenous
variables. Under this simulation procedure the lagged endogenous variables are
generated by the model and the errors are accumulated over time2.
The results from the dynamic simulation of the four structural equations are presented
in Tables 7.1 and 7.2. In addition we present graphical representations of the tracking
performance of the model for both changes and levels of variables. To help the
evaluation of the model performance, RAIS (root-mean-square) percent errors, mean
simulation error and mean percent errors are calculated for all of the endogenous
variables'. Some of these errors are large (especially for non-oil output), but that is not
surprising given the simplistic nature of the model (see Tables 7.3 and 7.4) and that in
general short run models of growth do not perform well. In addition, actual and
simulated values for the endogenous variables are plotted in Figures 7.1 to 7.10 for the
historical simulation. The graphical representations, help us evaluate how well our
proposed structural equations reproduce the turning points in the historical data.
Judging from the statistics presented in Tables 7.3 and 7.4, the tracking performance of
the equations is reasonable. All the computed values for RMS% error in levels are
small. The evidence points to the non-oil real gdp as the worst fitting equation,
unsurprisingly perhaps. Looking at the graphic representation for the non-oil real gdp,
there is a notable deviation of the simulated from the actual series during the 1970s.
2 This dynamic simulation can be contrasted to a static one, where the values of lagged endogenous
variables are assumed to be exogenous given and, consequently, the errors are confined to a single
period.
3 See appendix 2 for an illustration of these criterion.
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The exchange rate equation tracks the actual values during pre and post-revolution
periods well. Except the non-oil real gdp growth rate equation, the remaining three
equations, namely black market exchange rate, domestic prices and foreign prices,
achieve impressive tracking records. Apart from a few data points, the equations
reproduced the historical data with a high degree of precision. However, in several
cases the turning points fail to be reproduced. Obviously, many of these failures are
attributed to non-economic factors which affected the Iranian economy during the past
two decades (see chapter 2).
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Table 7-1 Within Sample Simulations: Tracking of the model (levels): 1960 1990*
obs eba ebs noya noya pd a /Id s reba reba
1960 4.38 4.38 9.05 9.05 1.57 1.57 5.94 5.94
1961 4.46 4.46 9.08 9.08 1.59 1.59 6.00 6.00
1962 4.52 4.52 9.16 9.16 1.59 1.59 6.07 6.07
1963 4.52 4.52 9.22 9.22 1.61 1.61 6.06 6.06
1964 4.41 4.41 9.34 9.34 1.63 1.65 5.94 5.94
1965 4.39 4.38 9.47 9.44 1.67 1.65 5.91 5.93
1966 4.37 4.33 9.58 9.55 1.65 1.68 5.93 5.88
1967 4.34 4.33 9.64 9.63 1.67 1.72 5.91 5.89
1968 4.34 4.38 9.81 9.68 1.69 1.75 5.93 5.94
1969 4.35 4.34 9.94 9.78 1.72 1.79 5.97 5.91
1970 4.37 4.36 10.02 9.88 1.72 1.82 6.04 5.94
1971 4.37 4.32 10.10 9.91 1.77 1.86 6.03 5.90
1972 4.35 4.29 10.34 10.02 1.84 1.91 5.97 5.88
1973 4.27 4.31 10.42 10.11 1.93 2.04 5.86 5.83
1974 4.22 4.29 10.31 10.17 2.07 2.15 5.79 5.80
1975 4.22 4.33 10.16 10.20 2.19 2.24 5.75 5.85
1976 4.28 4.33 10.60 10.39 2.29 2.35 5.76 5.81
1977 4.31 4.32 10.71 10.45 2.53 2.53 5.62 5.70
1978 4.34 4.38 10.31 10.33 2.64 2.67 5.61 5.67
1979 4.85 4.85 10.26 10.24 2.74 2.81 6.13 6.09
1980 5.30 5.40 10.20 10.33 2.93 2.93 6.52 6.60
1981 5.71 5.73 10.21 10.34 3.14 3.12 6.81 6.81
1982 6.11 6.06 10.37 10.24 3.32 3.29 7.10 7.03
1983 5.90 6.07 10.54 10.27 3.50 3.43 6.74 6.94
1984 6.23 6.19 10.51 10.34 3.61 3.57 6.99 6.98
1985 6.39 6.41 10.56 10.35 3.66 3.64 7.15 7.17
1986 6.52 6.50 10.43 10.37 3.83 3.80 7.12 7.12
1987 6.91 6.79 10.44 10.42 4.08 4.06 7.30 7.18
1988 6.86 6.91 10.36 10.32 4.33 4.24 7.04 7.15
1989 7.15 7.06 10.37 10.44 4.53 4.44 7.17 7.15
1990 7.24 7.34 10.49 10.68 4.61 4.50 7.24 7.39
• 'a' and 's' denotes actual and simulated values respectively.
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Table 7-2 Within Sample
Areb"	 Are;
Simulations:
Apd a	Apd s
Tracking of the
Aeba	Aebs
model (changes).
Api a 	Apf s
1960 1990*
Anoya 	 Anoysobs
1960 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1961 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03
1962 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.08
1963 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.06
1964 -0.12 -0.12 0.02 0.04 -0.11 -0.11 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.12
1965 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.10
1966 0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.05 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.11
1967 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.08
1968 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.17 0.05
1969 0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.10
1970 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.10
1971 -0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.04 0.00 -0.05 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.03
1972 -0.06 -0.02 0.07 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.05 0.24 0.11
1973 -0.11 -0.05 0.09 0.13 -0.08 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.09
1974 -0.07 -0.02 0.14 0.11 -0.04 -0.02 0.11 0.11 -0.11 0.06
1975 -0.04 0.04 0.12 0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.09 0.09 -0.15 0.03
1976 0.01 -0.04 0.11 0.11 0.06 -0.01 0.06 0.08 0.44 0.19
1977 -0.15 -0.11 0.24 0.18 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.06
1978 0.00 -0.03 0.11 0.14 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.06 -0.40 -0.12
1979 0.51 0.41 0.10 0.13 0.51 0.48 0.11 0.07 -0.06 -0.09
1980 0.39 0.51 0.19 0.12 0.45 0.54 0.13 0.09 -0.05 0.09
1981 0.29 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.41 0.33 0.10 0.08 0.01 0.00
1982 0.29 0.22 0.17 0.16 0.40 0.33 0.06 0.06 0.16 -0.10
1983 -0.36 -0.09 0.18 0.15 -0.21 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.17 0.03
1984 0.26 0.04 0.12 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.07
1985 0.15 0.19 0.04 0.07 0.16 0.22 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.01
1986 -0.02 -0.06 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.09 0.02 0.02 -0.13 0.01
1987 0.17 0.07 0.25 0.26 0.39 0.29 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.05
1988 -0.26 -0.03 0.25 0.19 -0.04 0.13 0.04 0.03 -0.09 -0.10
1989 0.13 -0.01 0.20 0.19 0.29 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.12
1990 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.27 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.24
• 'a' and 's' denotes actual and simulated values respectively.
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Table 7-3 Evaluating the simulation results
Criteria/variable eb Pd noy
RMS error% 1.1 2.6 58.2
Mean simulation error 0.009 0.012 -7.4
Mean error% 0.2 1.1 -0.7
a For definitions of these criterion see appendix 2.
Table 7-4 Evaluating the simulation results
Criteria/variablea Aeb Apd Anoy
RATS error% 24 58.7 169
Mean simulation error 0.003 -0.003 0.006
Mean error% 26 -5.5 -020.5
a For definitions of these criterion see appendix 2.
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Figure 7-1 Historical simulation of black market exchange rate
(BMER)
Figure 7-2 Historical simulation of domestic prices (CPI)
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Figure 7-3 Historical simulation of non-oil real gdp
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Figure 7-4 Historical simulation of foreign prices
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Figure 7-5 Historical simulation of real exchange rate
I	 LREB	 ----• LREB_SMO	 1
Figure 7-6 Historical simulation of depreciation of black market exchange rate
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Figure 7-7 Historical simulation of domestic inflation
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Figure 7-8 Historical simulation of foreign inflation
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Figure 7-9 Historical simulation of growth rate of non-oil real gdp
Figure 7-10 Historical simulation of depreciation of real exchange rate
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7.3.2 Forecasting and Policy Analysis
We now use the model to perform some simple forecasting and policy experiments. In
each experiment we simulate the model dynamically over the 1960-1990 period with a
new assumption on oil revenues since 1974. We then concentrate on the results over
1974-1990 period so that we can compare the simulated results with the base path
results in the same period. Our objective is to forecast the effects of alternative
scenarios of oil revenues on black market exchange rate, domestic price and real non-
oil output and their changes. In particular, we perform the following two simulation
experiments:
1. Lack of Oil Shock. In this experiment, we generate a forecast under the assumption
that oil revenues are kept constant at 1973's levels (before first oil shock) (see
appendix 1 for table and graph of oil revenue and oil prices projection). (SM1)
2. Constant growth in oil revenue. Oil revenue grows at a steady growth rate over
1974 to 1990. We inject the same composed oil revenues absorbed in this period
but at a constant rate of growth4. Our objective in this case is to test if the policy of
expending obtained oil revenue is a matter on effecting endogenous variables (see
appendix 1). (SM4)
The simulation results for these alternative scenarios, designated by SM1 and SM4 and
their comparison with the previous dynamic simulation based on actual oil revenues
(base path), enable us to isolate the impact of the oil shocks on the economy. The
results of these experiments are shown in Figures 7.11 to 7.16 and Tables 7.5 to 7.6
(for SM1) and Figures 7.17 to 7.22 and Tables 7.7 to 7.8 (for SM4).
When the oil shocks since 1973/74 are removed, CPI moves approximately on the
same trend as the base path (SMOO) but at a lower level (Table 7.5 and figure 7.12),
so that by the end of period the level of simulated prices are lower than the base path
values. Comparing these two set of results emerges also that average inflation differ
about 1% (10% against 11%; see Table 7.6). This is explained by the lower foreign
inflation rate and that after the revolution the rial depreciates less.
4 In this experiment oil prices are the actual prices simply because this is not a necessary condition
for changing the spending policy of oil revenue which is only a domestic policy.
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These results indicate that the SM1 scenario, would result in a lower inflation. A
similar argue is also compatible with the movements of BMER levels and the rates of
devaluation (13% against 14%; Tables 7.5, 7.6 and Figures 7.11 and 7.14).
A comparison of SM1 and SMOO results reveals that an increase in oil revenues
initially results in lower inflation rates without inducing higher rates of non-oil real
gdp.
Table 7-5 Within sample simulation (SM1)
eb noy pd
obs SM1 SMOO (1)/(2) SM1 SMOO (3)1(4) SM1 SMOO (5)1(6)
(1) (2) (%) (3) (4) (0/0) (5) (6) (%)
1973 4.30 4.30 100.00 10.11 10.11 100.00 1.99 1.99 100.00
1974 4.27 4.27 100.00 10.17 10.17 100.00 2.06 2.06 100.00
1975 4.31 4.29 100.38 10.20 10.20 100.00 2.13 2.10 101.40
1976 4.30 4.26 100.98 10.39 10.39 100.00 2.20 2.18 101.24
1977 4.30 4.24 101.51 10.45 10.45 100.00 2.26 2.32 97.75
1978 4.33 4.27 101.49 10.55 10.33 102.19 2.32 2.43 95.43
1979 4.78 4.73 101.06 10.56 10.24 103.15 2.37 2.48 95.59
1980 5.19 5.23 99.25 10.57 10.33 102.29 2.38 2.50 95.29
1981 5.48 5.52 99.32 10.58 10.34 102.35 2.42 2.60 92.95
1982 5.71 5.78 98.73 10.59 10.24 103.39 2.50 2.73 91.55
1983 5.66 5.74 98.56 10.60 10.27 103.17 2.62 2.88 91.10
1984 5.79 5.84 99.14 10.61 10.34 102.53 2.75 3.03 90.73
1985 5.90 6.04 97.76 10.62 10.35 102.54 2.88 3.11 92.69
1986 6.05 6.12 98.83 10.62 10.37 102.47 3.02 3.27 92.20
1987 6.33 6.40 99.00 10.63 10.42 102.08 3.16 3.50 90.26
1988 6.39 6.50 98.43 10.64 10.32 103.11 3.33 3.67 90.69
1989 6.58 6.62 99.47 10.65 10.44 102.00 3.50 3.84 91.17
1990 6.68 6.86 97.31 10.66 10.68 99.83 3.68 3.89 94.51
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Table 7-6 Within sample simulation (SM1)
deb dnoy dpd
obs SM1 SMOO (1)/(2) SM1 SMOO (3)1(4) SM1 SMOO (5)1(6)
(1) (2) (%) (3) (4) (%) (5) (6) (%)
1973 0.02 0.02 100.00 0.09 0.09 100.00 0.09 0.09 100.00
1974 -0.03 -0.03 99.99 0.06 0.06 100.00 0.07 0.07 100.00
1975 0.04 0.03 165.90 0.03 0.03 100.00 0.07 0.04 169.25
1976 -0.01 -0.03 16.44 0.19 0.19 100.00 0.07 0.07 96.76
1977 0.00 -0.03 12.81 0.06 0.06 100.00 0.06 0.14 44.10
1978 0.03 0.03 98.91 0.10 -0.12 -84.64 0.06 0.11 48.42
1979 0.44 0.46 97.04 0.01 -0.09 -10.05 0.05 0.05 103.51
1980 0.42 0.51 82.30 0.01 0.09 9.29 0.01 0.01 41.32
1981 0.29 0.28 100.65 0.01 0.00 352.14 0.04 0.10 36.07
1982 0.23 0.27 86.54 0.01 -0.10 -9.21 0.08 0.13 63.66
1983 -0.05 -0.04 121.85 0.01 0.03 29.01 0.12 0.15 82.94
1984 0.13 0.10 133.37 0.01 0.07 12.04 0.13 0.15 83.53
1985 0.11 0.20 57.17 0.01 0.01 114.33 0.13 0.08 169.46
1986 0.15 0.08 178.08 0.01 0.01 59.28 0.14 0.16 82.95
1987 0.28 0.28 102.87 0.01 0.05 18.14 0.14 0.23 62.74
1988 0.06 0.10 60.91 0.01 -0.10 -9.19 0.17 0.17 99.60
1989 0.19 0.12 155.27 0.01 0.12 7.26 0.17 0.17 101.65
1990 0.09 0.24 38.78 0.01 0.24 3.73 0.18 0.05 332.39
Mean 13% 14% 3.6% 3.7% 10% 11%
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Figure 7-11 Within sample simulation (SM1): BMER (log level)
LEB_SMOO	 ----• LEB_SM1
Figure 7-12 Within sample simulation (SM1): lack of oil shock since 1974, CPI
(log level)
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Figure 7-13 Within sample simulation (SM1): lack of oil shock since 1974,
RBMER (log level)
8.0
Figure 7-14 Within sample simulation (SM1): lack of oil shock since 1974, BMER
(first difference)
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Figure 7-15 Within sample simulation (SM1): lack of oil shock since 1974, CPI
(first difference)
Figure 7-16 Within sample simulation (SM1): lack of oil shock since 1974, rate of
growth of non-oil real gdp
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Under the SM4 scenario, we inject the whole oil revenues absorbed in 1974-1990
period by a steady growth rate instead of observed volatile rates'. The intention
concerned to this assumption is that if the state, instead of pursuing a year-to-year
managed strategy - dependent on the oil fortune 6 and spending oil revenue based on
annual earned revenue, follows a stable policy spending oil revenues during the whole
respected period, what are the likely outcomes that would emerge'. Following
implementing this policy inflation rate starts to slow down in 1979 after a jump in 1975
and 1976 (Table 7.8). This notable slow down in 1977 may be attributed to the earlier
appreciation in rial value in 1976 and that the negative effect of oil revenue on inflation
is spread over many periods. Another result to emerge from this simulation is that
prices and exchange rates move appropriately so that changes in competitiveness (real
exchange rate) are approximately the same in simulated and in the base path results.
There is a huge fall in the value of rial in 1978 and consequently a gain in
competitiveness during the five years (till 1983) after the accomplishment of this
5Within a 14-year period after the revolution, global oil market went from boom to bust, and bust to
boom. Crude oil prices tripled during the first year of the revolution, fell to one-fifth of the early peak
in 1986, and shot up again near the early 1980 level after the Persian Gulf war, before settling down
to a mid-range between the two extremes.
6The necessity of pursuing a year-to-year managed strategy -dependent on the oil fortune- resulted in
a public mode of action and policy formulation based on what may be called expedient
discrimination `. This strategy manifested itself in : establishing a dozen different exchange rates for
different categories of imports; granting various types and amounts of subsidies to domestic social-
economic procedures; setting up different foreign exchange quotas for various industries, activities
and institutions; designating different rates and volumes of foreign exchange surrender obligations for
non-oil exports; offering different price subsidies to essential consumer goods; allowing different
permissions to certain privileged business operators; and guaranteeing arbitrary protection of property
rights belonging to different groups and individuals. (see chapter 2)
7Rajapatirana in his comments on Edwards (1986) argues that if an export boom is temporary, a fiscal
policy through budget surpluses during the boom and through deficit during the slump to stabilise the
economy is all the more important if export revenues accrue to the government and if monetary policy
is ineffective. With aggregate expenditure policies, the government can aim directly at the source of
the disturbance... [p. 265]
Chapter 7: Simulation Results 	 280
policy. The gain in competitiveness is sustained by the failures of prices to rise
substantially to offset the fall in rial value. The simulated results indicate that utilising
the oil revenues on a steady rate would result in smoother inflation, and non-oil real
gdp growth (see Table 7.7 and 7.8). The level of non-oil real gdp, however, keeps
higher in simulated results compared to the base path results for most of the respected
period (Figure 7.18 and Table 7.8) Under the SM4 scenario a more gradual increase in
oil revenues would result in a slower growth of non-oil real gdp; the average growth of
non-oil real gdp would be 1.89% as compared to the base path of 3.6% (Table 7.8).
The lower growth of output would be accompanied by a lower inflation rate; the
average inflation in consumer price index would be 10%, as compared to the average
base path of 11% (Table 7-8). Exchange rate depreciation does not show a significant
deviation from its base path.
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Table 7-7 Within sample simulation (SM4)
eb P
d
noy
obs SM4 SMOO (1)/(2) SM4 SMOO (3)1(4) SM4 SMOO (5)1(6)
(1) (2) (%) (3) (4) (%) (5) (6) (%)
1973 4.300 4.300 100.00 1.988 1.988 100.00 10.107 10.107 100.00
1974 4.268 4.268 100.00 2.061 2.061 100.00 10.169 10.169 100.00
1975 4.293 4.293 100.00 2.186 2.104 103.92 10.203 10.203 100.00
1976 4.288 4.263 100.59 2.312 2.175 106.29 10.392 10.392 100.00
1977 4.286 4.237 101.15 2.420 2.317 104.43 10.450 10.450 100.00
1978 4.324 4.269 101.29 2.507 2.432 103.10 10.531 10.327 101.96
1979 4.784 4.725 101.24 2.578 2.483 103.82 10.516 10.240 102.69
1980 5.232 5.231 100.03 2.597 2.498 103.99 10.502 10.335 101.62
1981 5.531 5.515 100.28 2.666 2.600 102.51 10.488 10.337 101.45
1982 5.783 5.783 99.991 2.775 2.731 101.62 10.473 10.242 102.26
1983 5.747 5.742 100.08 2.904 2.880 100.82 10.459 10.272 101.82
1984 5.886 5.840 100.79 3.016 3.030 99.540 10.445 10.345 100.96
1985 6.0219 6.0393 99.711 3.1248 3.1076 100.55 10.430 10.352 100.75
1986 6.1704 6.1209 100.80 3.2368 3.2724 98.912 10.416 10.367 100.47
1987 6.4756 6.3972 101.22 3.3217 3.5032 94.819 10.401 10.415 99.865
1988 6.5353 6.4953 100.61 3.4432 3.6727 93.751 10.387 10.320 100.65
1989 6.7199 6.6163 101.56 3.5696 3.8411 92.933 10.373 10.441 99.350
1990 6.8191 6.8606 99.395 3.7131 3.8949 95.332 10.359 10,676 97.024
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Table 7-8 Within sample simulation (SM1)
Aeb Apd Anoy
obs SM4 SMOO (1)/(2) SM4 SMOO (3)1(4) SM4 SMOO (5)1(6)
(1) (2) (%) (3) (4) (%) (5) (6) (%)
1973 0.017 0.017 100.00 0.093 0.093 100.00 0.087 0.087 100.00
1974 -0.032 -0.032 99.991 0.073 0.073 100.00 0.062 0.062 100.00
1975 0.025 0.025 100.00 0.125 0.042 294.65 0.035 0.035 100.00
1976 -0.005 -0.030 16.119 0.126 0.072 176.19 0.188 0.188 99.999
1977 -0.002 -0.025 7.702 0.107 0.142 75.761 0.058 0.058 100.00
1978 0.038 0.031 120.67 0.087 0.115 76.296 0.081 -0.123 -65.807
1979 0.460 0.457 100.75 0.071 0.052 137.40 -0.014 -0.087 16.326
1980 0.448 0.506 88.683 0.019 0.014 134.26 -0.014 0.095 -15.083
1981 0.298 0.284 104.89 0.068 0.103 66.493 -0.014 0.002 -571.97
1982 0.252 0.268 94.027 0.109 0.130 83.919 -0.014 -0.095 14.957
1983 -0.036 -0.041 86.890 0.128 0.149 86.141 -0.014 0.030 -47.117
1984 0.139 0.097 142.60 0.113 0.150 74.961 -0.014 0.073 -19.558
1985 0.136 0.200 68.077 0.109 0.078 140.19 -0.014 0.008 -185.69
1986 0.149 0.082 181.87 0.112 0.165 67.956 -0.014 0.015 -96.275
1987 0.305 0.276 110.44 0.085 0.231 36.780 -0.014 0.048 -29.456
1988 0.060 0.098 60.861 0.121 0.169 71.663 -0.014 -0.096 14.921
1989 0.185 0.121 152.59 0.126 0.168 75.107 -0.014 0.121 -11.798
1990 0.099 0.244 40.631 0.143 0.054 266.47 -0.014 0.236 -6.064
Mean 14% 14% 10% 11% 1.89% 3.64%
Max. 46% 51% 14% 23% 20% 23.6%
Min. -3.6% -4.1% 2% 1.4% -1.4% -12%
76	 ' ad	 . 82	 ' 84	 ' 86	 ' 88	 ' 90
84 86 88
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Figure 7-17 Within sample simulation (SM4): constant growth rate in oil revenue
since 1974, BMER (log level)
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Figure 7-18 Within sample simulation (SM4): constant growth rate in oil revenue
spending since 1974, real non-oil gdp (log level)
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Figure 7-19 Within sample simulation (SM4): constant growth rate in oil revenue
since 1974, CPI (log level)
Figure 7-20 Within sample simulation (SM4): constant growth rate in oil revenue
since 1974, BMER (first difference)
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Figure 7-21 Within sample simulation (SM4): constant growth rate in oil revenue
since 1974, rate of growth of non-oil real gdp.
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Figure 7-22 Within sample simulation (SM4): constant growth rate in oil revenue
since 1974, CPI (first difference)
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7.4 Out of Sample Dynamic Simulation (ex ante simulation)
We experimented with three alternative scenarios from the year 1991. The three
alternatives are: a 100% increase in oil revenue and oil prices, sustained throughout the
simulation run (1999) (SM7); a 100% increase in oil revenue and prices in 1991 which
dies out gradually so that in the end of the simulation period oil revenue and oil price
take the values of 1990 (SM6); and finally oil revenues and oil prices are kept constant
at 1990 values during the simulation run (SM5). We imposed these scenarios through
following expressions:
1. SM5. No oil shock since 1990. (oil revenues and oil prices constant at
1990 levels)
2. SM6. Temporary oil shock since 1990. oil(sm6) = (1+(9-0/8) *011(90);
oilp(sm6) = (1+(9-t)/8)*oilp(90); where t shows the trend
3. SM7. Permanent oil shock since 1990. oil(sm7) = 2*011(90); oilp(sm7) =
2*o1lp(90).
Following a 100% increase in revenue and price of oil ( SM6 and SM7), CPI increases
by about 9% in 1992 compared to 12% concerned to no oil shock case (SM5) (Table
7.9). But after 3 years (from 1993) inflation rates in SM6 and SM7 cases exceeds the
inflation rate in SM5 scenario (Table 7.9). This is explained by the negative effects of
oil revenue on inflation in the early years, being dominated by the effects on foreign
prices in later years. On average the no oil shock produce the best growth
performance.
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Figure 7-23 Out of sample dynamic simulation 1991 1999: absence, temporary
and permanent oil shocks since 1990.
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Figure 7-24 Out of sample dynamic simulation 1991 1999: absence, temporary
and permanent oil shocks since 1990.
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Figure 7-25 Out of sample dynamic simulation 1991 1999: absence, temporary
and permanent oil shocks since 1990.
Figure 7-26 Out of sample dynamic simulation 1991 1999: absence, temporary
and permanent oil shocks since 1990.
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Figure 7-27 Out of sample dynamic simulation 1991 1999: absence, temporary
and permanent oil shocks since 1990.
Figure 7-28 Out of sample dynamic simulation 1991 1999: absence, temporary
and permanent oil shocks since 1990.
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Figure 7-29 Out of sample dynamic simulation 1991 1999: absence, temporary
and permanent oil shocks since 1990.
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Figure 7-30 Out of sample dynamic simulation 1991 1999: absence, temporary
and permanent oil shocks since 1990.
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Figure 7-31 Out of sample dynamic simulation 1991 1999: absence, temporary
and permanent oil shocks since 1990.
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7.5 Conclusion
Restimating of the complete model as a system (excluding money demand equation)
using SUR (seemingly unrelated regression) method produced more precise results.
We found that the jointly estimated models appear more precise with mainly lower
standard errors. Consequently, these results were chosen to undertake the simulation
exercise. Judging from the tracking performance of the model and the simulation
exercise, we concluded that the proposed framework does not suffer from any serious
degree of misspecification.
The tracking performance of the equations seems reasonable. RMS (root-mean-
square) percent error, mean simulation error and mean percent errors were calculated
for all the endogenous variables and are generally indicative of the sensible
performance of the models. The evidence points to the non-oil real gdp as the worst
fitting equation, unsurprisingly perhaps. Looking at the graphic representation for the
non-oil real gdp, there is a notable deviation of the simulated from the actual series
during the 1970s. The remaining three equations, namely black market exchange rate,
domestic and foreign prices, achieved impressive tracking records. The exchange rate
equation tracks the actual values during pre and post-revolution periods well. Apart
from a few data points, the equations reproduced the historical data with a high degree
of precision. However, in several cases the turning points fail to be reproduced.
Obviously, many of these failures are attributed to non-economic factors which
affected the Iranian economy during the past two decades (see chapter 2).
Simulation results for alternative within sample scenarios, designated by 'no oil shock
since 1973' (SM1) and 'smoothed oil revenue spending' (SM4) and their comparison
with the previous dynamic simulation based on actual oil revenues (base path), enable
us to isolate the impact of the oil shocks on the economy. The results of these
experiments are shown in Figures 7.11 to 7.16 and Tables 7.5 to 7.6 (for SM1) and
Figures 7.17 to 7.22 and Tables 7.7 to 7.8 (for SM4).
Following the removal of oil shocks since 1973/74, CPI moves approximately on the
same trend as the base path (SMOO) but at a lower level, so that by the end of period
the level of simulated prices are lower than the base path values. Comparing these two
set of results emerges also that average inflation differ about 1% (10% against 11%;
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see Table 7.6). This is explained by the lower foreign inflation rate and that after the
revolution the Rial depreciates less. A comparison of SM1 and SMOO results also
revealed that an increase in oil revenues initially results in lower inflation rates without
inducing higher rates of non-oil real gdp.
By smoothing the spending of oil revenue since 1973 (SM4), inflation rate starts to
slow down in 1977 after a jump in 1975 and 1976 (Table 7.8; Figure 7.22). This
notable slow down in 1977 may be attributed to the earlier appreciation in Rial value in
1976 and that the negative effect of oil revenue on inflation is spread over many
periods. There is a huge fall in the value of Rial in 1978 and consequently a gain in
competitiveness during the five years (till 1983) after the accomplishment of this
policy. The gain in competitiveness is sustained by the failures of prices to rise to offset
the fall in value of the Rial.
The simulated results indicate that utilising the oil revenues at a steady rate (SM4)
would result in smoother inflation, and non-oil real gdp growth (see Table 7.7 and
7.8). The level of non-oil real gdp, however, stays higher in simulated results compared
to the base path results for most of the period (Figure 7.18 and Table 7.8). From 1988,
base path values exceed the simulated values very fast. A policy of 'more stable
spending of oil revenue', hence, would lead to a lower inflation rate (10% against
11%) accompanied with a lower growth rate of non-oil real gdp (1.9% against 3.6%).
Three alternatives out of sample simulation (1991-1999) scenarios: 'no oil shock since
1990' (SM5); 'temporary oil shock in 1991' (SM6) and 'permanent oil shock in 1991'
(SM7), were conducted. Following a 100% increase in revenue and price of oil,
temporarily or permanently ( SM6 and SM7), CPI increases by about 9% in 1992
compared to 12% in no oil shock case (SM5) (Table 7.9). But from 1993 inflation is
lowest in SM5 (Table 7.9). This is explained by the negative effects of oil revenue on
inflation in the early years, being dominated by the effects on foreign prices and a
depressed exchange rate in later years.
These confirm our previous conclusion that an oil boom would alleviate inflation in
short run, in a longer horizon, however, opposite forces, namely higher foreign
inflation and exchange rate depreciation generated by oil boom, put upward pressure
on inflation.
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7.6 Appendix
Table 7-11 projection of oil revenues and oil prices: actual values against
SM1 and SM4 alternatives
obs Index of Oil prices Oil Revenues: B. rials
Actual SM1 SM4 Actual SM1 SM4
1960 5.4000 5.4000 5.4000 54.8000 54.8000 54.8000
1961 5.4000 5.4000 5.4000 54.7000 54.7000 54.7000
1962 5.4000 5.4000 5.4000 53.5000 53.5000 53.5000
1963 5.4000 5.4000 5.4000 60.5000 60.5000 60.5000
1964 5.4000 5.4000 5.4000 84.0000 84.0000 84.0000
1965 5.4000 5.4000 5.4000 86.2000 86.2000 86.2000
1966 5.4000 5.4000 5.4000 87.0000 87.0000 87.0000
1967 5.4000 5.4000 5.4000 132.4000 132.4000 132.4000
I
1968 5.4000 5.4000 5.4000 127.9000 127.9000 127.9000
1969 5.4000 5.4000 5.4000 140.7000 140.7000 140.7000
1970 5.4000 5.4000 5.4000 178.6000 178.6000 178.6000
1971 6.7000 6.7000 6.7000 264.7000 264.7000 264.7000
1972 7.4000 7.4000 7.4000 163.8000 163.8000 163.8000
1973 9.9000 9.9000 9.9000 212.0000 212.0000 212.0000
1974 36.3000 9.9000 36.3000 767,9200 211.9999 241.7436
1975 38.9000 9.9000 38.9000 1328.0000 211.9999 275.6602
1976 41.4000 9.9000 41.4000 814.6300 211.9999 314,3354
1977 45.6000 9.9000 45.6000 844.3400 211.9999 358.4366
1978 45.6000 9.9000 45.6000 1528.2000 211.9999 408.7253
1979 68.9000 9.9000 68.9000 1352.1000 211.9999 466.0694
1980 121.9000 9.9000 121.9000 938.2000 211,9999 531.4590
1981 130.0000 9.9000 130,0000 944.1000 211.9999 606.0226
1982 109.2000 9.9000 109.2000 912.2000 211.9999 691.0476
1983 101.2000 9.9000 101.2000 727.8000 211.9999 788.0016
1984 99.3000 9.9000 99.3000 1319.0000 211.9999 898.5582
1985 100.0000 9.9000 100.0000 696.4000 211.9999 1024.6260
1986 48.9000 9.9000 48.9000 191.7000 211.9999 1168.3810
1987 64.4000 9.9000 64.4000 259.0000 211.9999 1332.3048
1988 55.1000 9.9000 55.1000 227.0000 211.9999 1519.2272
1989 58.4000 9.9000 58.4000 778.4000 211.9999 1732.3748
1990 56.0000 9.9000 56.0000 700.0000 211.9999 1975.4270
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Figure 7-32 projection of oil revenues: actual values against SM1 and SM4
alternatives
OXP
	
OXPSM1	 OXPSM4
Figure 7-33 projections of oil prices: actual, SM1 and SM48
8 Oil prices for SM4 case are set equal to actual values. In fact what we propose in this case is
redistribution of the same oil revenues absorbed during 1974-1990 period.
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Table 7-12 projections of oil revenues and oil prices: actual, SM5, SM6 and SM7
obs Index of Oil prices Oil Revenues B. rials
Actual SM5 SM6 SM7 Actual SM5 SM6 SM7
1990 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 700.00 700.00 700.00 700.00
1991 NA 56.00 112.00 112.00 NA 700.00 1400.00 1400.00
1992 NA 56.00 105.00 112.00 NA 700.00 1312.50 1400.00
1993 NA 56.00 98.00 112.00 NA 700.00 1225.00 1400.00
1994 NA 56.00 91.00 112.00 NA 700.00 1137.50 1400.00
1995 NA 56.00 84.00 112.00 NA 700.00 1050.00 1400.00
1996 NA 56.00 77.00 112.00 NA 700.00 962.50 1400.00
1997 NA 56.00 70.00 112.00 NA 700.00 875.00 1400.00
1998 NA 56.00 63.00 112.00 NA 700.00 787.50 1400.00
1999 NA 56.00 56.00 112.00 NA 700.00 700.00 1400.00
Figure 7-34 projection of oil revenues: SM5, SM6 and SM7
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Table 7-13 projection of growth rates of oil revenues and oil prices: actual
values against SM1 and 5M4 alternatives
obs Growth rates of oil prices Growth rates of oil revenue
Actual SM1 SM4 Actual SM1 SM4
1960 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1961 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0018
1962 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0222 -0.0222 -0.0222
1963 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1230 0.1230 0.1230
1964 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3282 0.3282 0.3282
1965 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0259 0.0259 0.0259
1966 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0092 0.0092 0.0092
1967 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4199 0.4199 0.4199
1968 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0346 -0.0346 -0.0346
1969 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0954 0.0954 0.0954
1970 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2385 0.2385 0.2385
/97/ 0.2157 0.2157 0.2157 0.3934 0.3934 0.3934
1972 0.0994 0.0994 0.0994 -0.4800 -0.4800 -0.4800
1973 0.2911 0.2911 0.2911 0.2579 0.2579 0.2579
1974 1.2993 0.0000 1.2993 1.2871 0.0000 0.1313
1975 0.0692 0.0000 0.0692 0.5477 0.0000 0.1313
1976 0.0623 0.0000 0.0623 -0.4887 0.0000 0.1313
1977 0,0966 0.0000 0.0966 0.0358 0.0000 0,1313
1978 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5933 0.0000 0.1313
1979 0.4127 0.0000 0.4127 -0.1224 0.0000 0.1313
1980 0.5705 0.0000 0.5705 -0.3655 0.0000 0.1313
1981 0.0643 0.0000 0.0643 0.0063 0.0000 0.1313
1982 -0.1744 0.0000 -0.1744 -0.0344 0.0000 0.1313
1983 -0.0761 0.0000 -0.0761 -0.2258 0.0000 0.1313
1984 -0.0190 0.0000 -0.0190 0.5946 0.0000 0.1313
1985 0.0070 0.0000 0.0070
-0.6387 0.0000 0.1313
1986 -0.7154 0.0000 -0.7154
-1.2900 0.0000 0.1313
1987 0.2753 0.0000 0.2753 0.3009 0.0000 0.1313
1988 -0.1560 0.0000 -0.1560
-0.1319 0.0000 0.1313
1989 0.0582 0.0000 0.0582 1.2323 0.0000 0.1313
1990 -0.0420 0.0000 -0.0420 -0.1062 0.0000 0.1313
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Table 7-14 projections of growth rates of oil revenues and oil prices: actual, SM5,
SM6 and SM7
obs Growth rates of oil prices Growth rates of oil revenue
Actual SM5 SM6 SM7 Actual SM5 SM6 SM7
1990 -0.0420 -0.0420 -0.0420 -0.0420 -0.1062 -0.1062 -0.1062 -0.1062
1991 NA 0.0000 0.6931 0.6931 NA 0.0000 0.6931 0.6931
1992 NA 0.0000 -0.0645 0.0000 NA 0.0000 -0.0645 0.0000
1993 NA 0.0000 -0.0690 0.0000 NA 0.0000 -0.0690 0.0000
1994 NA 0.0000 -0.0741 0.0000 NA 0.0000 -0.0741 0.0000
1995 NA 0.0000 -0.0800 0.0000 NA 0.0000 -0.0800 0.0000
1996 NA 0.0000 -0.0870 0.0000 NA 0.0000 -0.0870 0.0000
1997 NA 0.0000 -0.0953 0.0000 NA 0.0000 -0.0953 0.0000
1998 NA 0.0000 -0.1054 0.0000 NA 0.0000 -0.1054 0.0000
1999 NA 0.0000 -0.1178 0.0000 NA 0.0000 -0.1178 0.0000
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7.6.1 Alternative Simulation Programmes
SMO** : Tracking of the Model (Dynamic Simulation)
Imposed Restrictions: No restriction
ASSIGN @ALL _sm0
leb =dleb + leb(-1)
Ipd = dlpd + Ipd(-1)
lpf = dlpf + lpf(-1)
'cpi =exp(Ipd)
'cpif = exp(lpf)
'eb =exp(leb)
Ireb = leb-lpd + lpf
dreb = Ireb-lreb(-1)
DLPD =-0.67994249 +1.0570361*DLPF(-1) + 0.17345207*DMY(-
1) + 0.41475324*DLPD(-1) + 0.11389866*(LREB(-1)-0.15667481*DROIL(-1))-
0.071344454*DLOXP(-1)
DLEB = 1.8048741-0.43728169*DLEB(-1)-0.59715697*DLEB(-4) + 0.47723785*DRV-
0.30953455*(LREB(-1)-0.15667481*DROIL(-1))
DLPF =0.013517596 + 0.68328436*DLPF(-1) +0.041074887*DLOP
DNOY2 =0.10371432-0.17578099*DLOXP(-4)-0.094920177*DRV
OXP = Oil Revenue; OP = Oil Price; 'D' in the bigining of each vrible stands for 'first
difference'; 'L' stands for natural logarithm
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SM00**: Base Path Model
Imposed Restrictions: DMY = 0
ASSIGN @ALL _sm00
'dmy =0
leb = dleb + leb(-1)
Ipd = dlpd + Ipd(-1)
lpf = dlpf + lpf(-1)
'cpi = exp(Ipd)
'cpif = exp(lpf)
'eb = exp(leb)
Ireb = leb-lpd + lpf
dreb = Ireb-lreb(-1)
DLPD =-0.67994249 +1.0570361*DLPF(-1) + 0.17345207*(0) + 0.41475324*DLPD(-
1) + 0.11389866*(LREB(-1)-0.15667481*DROIL(-1))-0.071344454*DLOXP(-1)
DLEB = 1.8048741-0.43728169*DLEB(-1)-0.59715697*DLEB(-4) + 0.47723785*DRV-
0.30953455*(LREB(-1)-0.15667481*DROIL(-1))
DLPF = 0.013517596 + 0.68328436*DLPF(-1) +0.041074887*DLOP
DNOY2 =0.10371432-0.17578099*DLOXP(-4)-0.094920177*DRV
1r*
OXP = Oil Revenue; OP = Oil Price; 'D' in the bigining of each vrible stands for 'first
difference'; `L' stands for natural logarithm
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SM1-: no oil shock since 73:
Imposed Restrictions: DMY = 0; OXP=OXP(73); OPOP(73)
ASSIGN @ALL _sml
'dmy =0
leb = dleb + leb(-1)
Ipd = dlpd + Ipd(-1)
lpf = dlpf + lpf(-1)
cpi = exp(Ipd)
'cpif =exp(lpf)
eb = exp(leb)
Ireb =leb-lpd + lpf
'dreb = Ireb-lreb(-1)
DLPD =-0.68002252 +1.0571841*DLPF(-1) + 0.1734386*(0) + 0.41471359*DLPD(-
1) + 0.11391168*(LREB(-1)-0.1566687*DROILsm1(-1))-0.07134532*Doilsm1(-1)
DLEB = 1.8048741-0.43727427*DLEB(-1)-0.59714997*DLEB(-4) + 0.47724576*DRV-
0.30953446*(LREB(-1)-0.1566687*DROILsm1(-1))
DLPF =0.013517568 + 0.6832854*DLPF(-1) +0.041074317*DLOPsm1
DNOY2 = 0.10371421-0.17577828*Doilsm1(-4)-0.094919634*DRV
OXP = Oil Revenue; OP = Oil Price; 'D' in the bigining of each vrible stands for 'first
difference'; 'L' stands for natural logarithm
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SM4**: injection of oil revenues in the economy at a smooth rate
Imposed Restrictions: DMY = 0; OXPsm4t+1 = (1+r)OXPsm4t. `r is
determined so that E OXPsm4 = E OXP; Opsm4 = actual OP
'original op
ASSIGN @ALL _sm4
'dmy = 0
leb =dleb + leb(-1)
Ipd = dlpd + Ipd(-1)
lpf =dlpf +lpf(-1)
Inoy2 =dnoy2 + Inoy2(-1)
'cpi = exp(Ipd)
'cpif =exp(lpf)
eb =exp(leb)
Ireb =leb-lpd + lpf
'dreb = Ireb-lreb(-1)
DLPD = -0.68002252 + 1.0571841*DLPF(-1) +0.1734386*(0) + 0.41471359*DLPD(-
1) + 0.11391168*(LREB(-1)-0.1566687*DR0ILsm4(-1))-0.07134532*Dloilsm4(-1)
DLEB = 1.8048741-0.43727427*DLEB(-1)-0.59714997*DLEB(-4) +0.47724576*DRV-
0.30953446*(LREB(-1)-0.1566687*DROILsm4(-1))
DLPF = 0.013517568 +0.6832854*DLPF(-1) +0.041074317*DLOP
DNOY2 =0.10371421-0.17577828*Dloilsm4(-4)-0.094919634*DRV
I.
OXP = Oil Revenue; OP = Oil Price; 'D' in the beginning of each variable stands for 'first
difference'; 'L' stands for natural logarithm
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SM5**: No oil shock since 1990 till 1999:
Imposed Restrictions: DMY = 0; OXP and OP constant at 1990
ASSIGN @ALL _sm5
'dmy =0
leb =dleb +leb(-1)
lpd = dlpd + Ipd(-1)
)3.t =dipt +3f-1)
Inoy2 =dnoy2 + Inoy2(-1)
cpi =exp(Ipd)
'cpif =exp(lpf)
eb =exp(leb)
Ireb =leb-lpd +lpf
'dreb =Ireb-lreb(-1)
DLPD = -0.68002252 + 1.0571841*DLPF(-1) + 0.1734386*(0) + 0.41471359*DLPD(-
1) +0.11391168*(LREB(-1)-0.1566687*DROILsm5(-1))-0.07134532*Dloilsm5(-1)
DLEB =1.8048741-0.43727427*DLEB(-1)-0.59714997*DLEB(-4) + 0.47724576*DRV-
0.30953446*(LREB(-1 )-0.1566687*DR0ILsm5(-1))
DLPF =0.013517568 +0.6832854*DLPF(-1) + 0.041074317*DLOPsm5
DNOY2 = 0.10371421-0.17577828*Dloilsm5(-4)-0.094919634*DRV
Mt 
OXP = Oil Revenue; OP = Oil Price; 'D' in the beginning of each variable stands for 'first
difference'; I' stands for natural logarithm
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SM6" : 'Temporary oil shock, 1990-1999.
Imposed Restrictions: DMY = 0; OXPsm6=(1+(94)/8)*OXP(90);
OPsm6=(1+(9-t)/8)*OP(90)
ASSIGN @ALL _sm6
'dmy =0
leb =dleb +leb(-1)
lpd = dlpd + Ipd(-1)
lpf = dlpf +lpf(-1)
Inoy2 =dnoy2 + Inoy2(-1)
cpi =exp(Ipd)
'cpif =exp(lpf)
eb =exp(leb)
Ireb = leb-lpd +lpf
'dreb =Ireb-lreb(-1)
DLPD = -0.68002252 + 1.0571841*DLPF(-1) + 0.1734386*(0) + 0.41471359*DLPD(-
1) +0.11391168*(LREB(-1)-0.1566687*DROILsm6(-1))-0.07134532*Dloilsm6(-1)
DLEB=1.8048741-0.43727427*DLEB(-1)-0.59714997*DLEB(-4) +0.47724576*DRV-
0.30953446*(LREB(-1)-0.1566687*DROILsm6(-1))
DLPF =0.013517568 +0.6832854*OLPF(-1) +0.041074317*DLOPsm6
DNOY2 =0.10371421-0.17577828*Dloilsm6(-4)-0.094919634*DRV
Me 
OXP = Oil Revenue; OP = Oil Price; 'D' in the beginning of each variable stands for 'first
difference'; 'L' stands for natural logarithm
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SM7** : 'Permanent oil shock, 1990-1999.
Imposed Restrictions; DMY = 0; OXPsm7=2*OXP(90); 0Psm7=2*OP(90)
ASSIGN @ALL sm7
'dmy= 0
leb = dleb + leb(-1)
Ipd = dlpd + Ipd(-1)
lpf = dlpf + lpf(-1)
Inoy2 = dnoy2 + Inoy2(-1)
cpi = exp(Ipd)
'cpif = exp(lpf)
eb --= exp(leb)
Ireb =leb-lpd + lpf
'dreb =Ireb-lreb(-1)
DLPD = -0.68002252 +1.0571841*DLPF(-1) +0.1734386*(0) + 0.41471359*DLPD(-
1) + 0.11391168*(LREBI-11-0.1566687*DROILsm7(-1)1-0.07134532*Dloilsm7(-1)
DLEB =1.8048741-0.43727427*DLEB(-1)-0.59714997*DLEB(-4) +0.47724576*DRV-
0.30953446*(LREB(-1)-0.1566687*DROILsm7(-1))
DLPF = 0.013517568 +0.6832854*DLPF(-1) + 0.041074317*DLOPsm7
DNOY2 =0.10371421-0.17577828*Dloilsm7(-4)-0.094919634*DRV
Ira OXP = Oil Revenue; OP = Oil Price; 'D' in the beginning of each variable stands for 'first
difference'; 'L' stands for natural logarithm
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7.7 Appendix 2
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991)9 introduces some measures to evaluate the performance
of a collection of results obtained from running a simulation procedure. Among them
are:
T (Vs )7 ) 2
RMS Percent Error = il YTE  t
V	 Yta
Mean Simulation Error YTE (Yt s Yta)
T=1
T (vs yta)
	Mean Percent Error = yrY 	
	
2 171	 171a
The problem with mean simulation error is that they may be close to 0 if large positive
errors cancel out large negative errors... In this case rms simulation error would be a
better measure of the simulation performance.
Low rms simulation errors are only one desirable measure of simulation fit. Another
important criterion is how well the model simulates turning points. The ability to
duplicate turning points or rapid changes in the data is indicative of the goodness of a
model.
9 Pindyck, Robert S. and Daniel L.Rubinfeld (1991), "Econometric models and economic forecasts",
3rd ed., New York : McGraw-Hill
8The premise underlying the whole contribution of this work is that it provides a careful
analysis with empirical evidence of the issue of the macroeconomic effects of oil
revenue (and price) fluctuations on key economic variables set in a Dutch Disease
framework for the Iranian economy.
The analysis examined the relationships between money demand, domestic and foreign
prices, exchange rate, non-oil gdp growth and oil revenue fluctuations in short and
long-run analyses, using the best current econometric methods given the limitation in
the data. The time period analysed (1960-1990) includes at least 4 major international
oil shocks, in 1973/74, 1979, 1986 and 1990 and other domestic oil shocks which
resulted mostly from changes in oil production policies, since the revolution and war
with Iraq.
The small number of observations is a cause for concern, but the period covered
seems satisfactory from a purely economic slant in that the main adjustments to the
economic fundamentals as a consequence of major 'oil boom and bust' should have
worked through the economy.
The analysis also helps to provide an insight into the exchange rate effects of oil
revenue and also the interactions between official and free market exchange rates
before and after the revolution.
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One of the contributions of this thesis is that it provides further empirical results
relating to the PPP approach to the exchange rates determination. It further extends
the PPP approach to take into consideration oil revenue fluctuations and to discuss the
macroeconomic consequences.
We tried to carefully pass all the necessary stages in building our econometric models
such as testing the degree of integration in our variables, considering cointegrating
relationships, estimating short-run adjustments through error-correction models and
diagnostic testing.
The review of Iranian economy revealed that:
1. By the end of 1970s the Iranian economy was an 'excessively' import-dependent
economy operating in an 'excessively' protected environment financed through oil
revenues accruing to the state. Iran, therefore, at the end of 1970s was more
dependent on oil than it had been at the beginning of 1960s.
2. The main influences on the economy since the revolution arose from political
factors, principally the continuing adverse effects of the Iran-Iraq war and 1991
Persian Gulf war. Effects of the Iran-Iraq war have been made more damaging by
the losses sustained during the revolution. The effects of disinvestment brought on
by eight years of economic dislocation were apparent in low and sluggish rates of
growth, especially in industry and even the oil sector. Economic and political
sanctions and the lack of any alternative source of foreign currency (foreign aids,
etc.) since the revolution made oil revenue the only source of foreign exchange.
Overall, the Iranian economy has become more sensitive to the oil revenues in post-
revolutionary period.
As a theoretical framework, Dutch Disease review showed that:
3. According to the core model of Dutch Disease two main effects are expected:
resource movement effect and spending effect. The former effect is the movement
of mobile factors from the non-boom economy into the boom sector which gives
rise to de-industrialisation, and the latter refers to the excess demand caused by the
boom which creates a real exchange rate appreciation and hence the contraction of
the non-boom tradable sector.
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4. Some authors argue that different outcomes can emerge in various circumstances.
For instance, when the boom sector does not show a strong participation in the
domestic factor market, resource movement effect would not be relevant.
5. Monetary aspects of the boom are parallel forces by which the boom revenue is
accommodated into the domestic economy (Edwards, 1986 ), and which reinforce
the real effects. However, the extent of any change in the domestic money supply
depends on the extent of foreign exchange receipts from boom sector exports and
the extent to which the monetary authorities sterilise these proceeds to neutralise
their effect on the domestic money supply.
6. In oil exporting countries, once the oil boom has settled down in the domestic
economy, we expect an expansion in the non-traded goods and a stagnation in the
lagged sectors (agriculture and traditional manufacturing in oil exporting developing
countries and non-oil industry in oil exporting developed countries). The overall
effect on non-oil gdp, however, is ambiguous and can not be identified beforehand.
7. The economic movements outlined in this study reveal that the 'spending effect' due
to the real revaluation of the exchange rate has worked strongly in the period 1953-
55; though the 'resource movements effect' has not been observed in that situation.
While some Dutch Disease effects are perceptible during 1974-79, we could not
judge on these effects in the post-revolutionary period. Perhaps it is difficult to
isolate a number of effects during 1980-1990 which includes oil crash, war and
revolution shocks.
Review of econometrics methods convinced us that:
8. Two-stage Engle-Granger method for estimating an underlying cointegrated
relationship is a popular and superconsistent method when the data observations are
sufficiently available. Nevertheless, in finite samples, it has been shown that bias is a
problem. To avoid this problem, non-linear one-step estimation method was
preferred. Our starting point in constructing a model in most cases has been a
general unrestricted model. Any interesting and sensible restrictions are imposed if
they are found to be valid.
The principal findings in exchange rate modelling can be outlined as :
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9. Purchasing Power Parity, as a key building-block for exchange rate modelling, may
have relevance to the long-run determination of exchange rates, in the short-run,
however, other factors dominate the movement of exchange rates. In explaining
deviations from PPP several studies have shown that this theory can be
appropriately adjusted to produce better empirical results by adding other
explanatory variables (Officer, 1976) and by using more efficient estimation
techniques'.
10. The relevance of simple economic models to the determination of the official and
black market Rial/Dollar exchange rate was considered. This analysis is also
intended to illustrate how the behaviour of these exchange rates differed before and
after the revolution. The Principal finding suggests that Purchasing Power Parity is
a relevant model of both exchange rates in the pre-Revolutionary period, but applies
only to the black market rate after the revolution.
Further assessment of the black market exchange rate over the whole period
established that:
11 .PPP is a valid model of the long-run black market exchange rate in Iran, conditional
on a shift in the real exchange rate and the asymmetric long-run effects of higher oil
revenue. What is perhaps most interesting in this study is that once this asymmetry
is taken into account we find evidence of a long run economic relationship despite
the tremendous shocks and changes the Iranian economy has been subjected to.
However, this is not surprising within such an import-dependent economic
structure, given that oil revenue has been an exclusive source of providing foreign
currency2 on one hand and a war-induced increase in demand for foreign currency
after the 1979 revolution on the other hand.
12. We found that oil revenue only appears significantly in the equation when it is
allowed to interact with the post revolution dummy variable. We believe this is due
to a reduction in the ability of the economy to absorb the increased demand which
greater oil revenue generates and also due to war-induced production stagnation.
'Related literature discusses various reasons to explain the deviation from PPP. For more detail see
chapter 5.
2 Since the revolution, Iran has not benefited from any aids and grants provided by foreign countries.
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We found no evidence of any other pre- and post-revolution asymmetries in the
slope parameters. There is reason to believe that the effect of oil revenue on the
black market exchange rate has been asymmetric. During the pre-revolution boom
the black market rate seems to have been insensitive to oil revenue, but as the
economy stagnated following the revolution and war so the black market rate
became sensitive to oil revenue. Since the revolution higher oil revenue appears to
have generated extra demand for imports and deflected domestic production away
from exports, so that in the long run the exchange rate tended to depreciate. This
finding is contrary to the standard DD model.
Modelling of domestic and foreign prices, money demand and non-oil gdp are the
next empirical works conducted in this thesis. Principal findings are:
13.A rise in oil revenue suppresses inflationary pressure in the Iranian economy.
Growth in oil revenue is found to reduce inflation, after a one year lag (there is no
contemporaneous effect of oil on inflation). This finding is consistent with that of
Mashayelchi (1991) and inconsistent with the implications of core Dutch Disease
model.
14.A long-run relationship for prices based upon Purchasing Power Parity is
considerably more robust than the inverted long-run money demand equation.
Hence, when the real exchange rate is overvalued, then inflation tends to fall.
Therefore, starting from an equilibrium position, our results show that after an oil
boom domestic inflation tends to fall in short run which put the economic situation
in a diseqilibrium position. However, in longer term, a more depressed exchange
rate and higher foreign inflation induced by oil boom would dominate and put an
upward pressure on the domestic inflation, until a new equilibrium position
emerges.
15 .We failed to detect any significant expansionary effect of an oil boom on real non-
oil gdp. This may appear to be a controversial result, but Looney (1982), covering
only pre-Revolutionary period, found that non-oil real gdp did not respond
significantly to the change in oil exports. Our results do not show any instantaneous
oil effect on non-oil real gdp too. We did find a contractionary effect of oil revenue
on growth but after a long lag.
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16. There is no significant effect from the real exchange rate on non-oil gdp. This
confirms the finding of Edwards (1989) and contradict those authors who find an
expansionary effect (such as Gylfason and Schmid (1983) and Dornbusch (1986))
or contractionary effect (such as Krugman, Taylor (1978) and Hansen (1983) and
Gylfason and Radetzki (1991)). Real exchange rate depreciation causes inflation to
rise but has no effect on output.
The failure to explain a significant proportion of the non-oil gdp growth rate
movements is a bit worrying; however, and one could attribute it to factors that are
difficult to quantify. For example, the dominance of shocks such as revolution and
eight years war and 1980s oil crash accompanied with some other minor political
shocks especially in post-revolutionary period might have seriously changed the real
pattern of this variable. Also this may reflect the fact that in general short run models
of growth do not perform well.
17.We found strong supportive evidence for conventional model of real money
balances, with the addition of a small long run oil revenue elasticity and conditioned
on an upward shift in money demand since the revolution.
The complete model as a system (excluding money demand equation 3) was estimated
using SUR (seemingly unrelated regression) method to get more efficient results. We
found that the jointly estimated models appear more precise with mainly lower
standard errors. Consequently, these results were chosen to undertake the simulation
exercise. Judging from the tracking performance of the model and the simulation
exercise, we concluded that the proposed framework does not suffer from any serious
degree of misspecification.
18.The tracking performance of the equations was reasonable. RMS (root-mean-
square) percent error, mean simulation error and mean percent errors were
calculated for all the endogenous variables and are generally indicative of the
sensible performance of the models. The evidence points to the non-oil real gdp as
the worst fitting equation, unsurprisingly perhaps. Looking at the graphic
representation for the non-oil real gdp, there is a notable deviation of the simulated
'See chapter 7 for explanation.
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from the actual series during the 1970s. The remaining three equations, namely
black market exchange rate, domestic and foreign prices, achieved impressive
tracking records. The exchange rate equation tracks the actual values during pre
and post-revolution periods well. Apart from a few data points, the equations
reproduced the historical data with a high degree of precision. However, in several
cases the turning points fail to be reproduced. Obviously, many of these failures are
attributed to non-economic factors which affected the Iranian economy during the
past two decades (see chapter 2).
Simulation results for alternative within sample scenarios, designated by 'no oil shock
since 1973' (SM1) and 'smoothed oil revenue spending' (SM4) and their comparison
with the previous dynamic simulation based on actual oil revenues (base path), enable
us to isolate the impact of the oil shocks on the economy. The results of these
experiments are shown in Figures 7.11 to 7.16 and Tables 7.5 to 7.6 (for SM1) and
Figures 7.17 to 7.22 and Tables 7.7 to 7.8 (for SM4).
19.VVhen the oil shocks since 1973/74 are removed, CPI moves approximately on the
same trend as the base path (SMOO) but at a lower level, so that by the end of
period the level of simulated prices are lower than the base path values. Comparing
these two set of results emerges also that average inflation differ about 1% (10%
against 11%; see Table 7.6). This is explained by the lower foreign inflation rate and
that after the revolution the Rial devalues less.
A comparison of SM1 and SMOO results also revealed that an increase in oil revenues
initially results in lower inflation rates without inducing higher rates of non-oil real
gdp.
20.If the spending of oil revenue had been smoothed since 1973 (SM4), inflation rate
starts to slow down in 1977 after a jump in 1975 and 1976 (Table 7.8; Figure 7.22).
This notable slow down in 1977 may be attributed to the earlier appreciation in Rial
value in 1976 and that the negative effect of oil revenue on inflation is spread over
many periods. There is a huge fall in the value of Rial in 1978 and consequently a
gain in competitiveness during the five years (till 1983) after the accomplishment of
this policy. The gain in competitiveness is sustained by the failures of prices to rise
to offset the fall in value of the Rial.
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21. The simulated results indicate that utilising the oil revenues at a steady rate (SM4)
would result in smoother inflation, and non-oil real gdp growth (see Table 7.7 and
7.8). The level of non-oil real gdp, however, stays higher in simulated results
compared to the base path results for most of the period (Figure 7.18 and Table
7.8). From 1988, base path values exceed the simulated values very fast. A policy of
'more stable spending of oil revenue', hence, would lead to a lower inflation rate
(10% against 11%) accompanied with a lower growth rate of non-oil real gdp
(1.9% against 3.6%).
22. For out of sample simulation (1991-1999) we implemented three alternative
scenarios: 'no oil shock since 1990' (SM5); 'temporary oil shock in 1991' (SM6)
and 'permanent oil shock in 1991' (SM7). Following a 100% increase in revenue
and price of oil, temporarily or permanently ( SM6 and SM7), CPI increases by
about 9% in 1992 compared to 12% in no oil shock case (SM5) (Table 7.9). But
from 1993 inflation is lowest in SM5 (Table 7.9). This is explained by the negative
effects of oil revenue on inflation in the early years, being dominated by the effects
on foreign prices and a depressed exchange rate in later years.
These confirm our previous conclusion that an oil boom would alleviate inflation in
short run, while in a longer horizon, however, opposite forces, namely higher foreign
inflation and exchange rate depreciation generated by oil boom, put upward pressure
on inflation.
8.1 Limitations and Future Extension
The most restricting element in this study has been the limited numbers of data
observations, particularly for the black market exchange rate. We failed to find any
reliable observation on this variable beyond 1990, and (according to our knowledge)
no other works implemented in this area could cover a longer period. If in the future
quarterly or monthly data become available this would greatly improve the reliability of
a study such as ours.
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The time period under consideration covers some heavy turbulence resulting from
various social-political movements such as revolution, the eight-year war, political and
economic sanctions, etc. These facts made a reliable investigation more complex and
hard to conclude quantitatively. There is hope that by extending the time period some
of these difficulties remove. Extending the empirical framework employed in this work
to similar episodes in other OEDCs would seem to be a useful way to assess the
general applicability of our findings.
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General Appendix: Samples of TSP programming (UNIX
version)
FREQ A; SMPL 1960 1990;
IN YTPO;	 ?this file is taken from paper1801.tsp + noily.tsp
TREND T;
NNOILY=NGDP-OXP;
NOLY=(NNOILY/CP1)*100;
PLOT NOLY;
SMPL 1960 1977;
T2=T*T;
OLSQ NOLY C T;
OLSQ NOLY C T2;
GENR GAP1=@RES;
SMPL 1978 1990;
T2=T*T;
GENR YP = 29.7327 + 1.0362*T2;
PLOT YP;
GENR GAP2 = NOLY - YP;
SMPL 1960 1977; GAP=GAP1; SMPL 1978 1990; GAP =GAP2;
SMPL 1960 1990; PLOT GAP; DGAP=GAP-GAP(-1);
REGOPT(PVPRINT, STARS, LMLAGS=4, QLAGS =4, NOSHORT) ALL;
DLOXP=LOXP-LOXP(-1); DWR=DUM2; DWROIL=DWR*LOXP;
DWRDOIL=DWR*DLOXP; DREV=DUM1;
PRE=LEB-LEO; REO =LEO +LPF-LPD; DREO=REO-RE0(-1); DRVOIL=DREV*LOXP;
DRVDOIL=DREV*DLOXP; DPDF=DLPD-DLPF;
? non-linear estimation method
FRML EB DLEB = AO + A1*DLEB(-1) + A3*DLEB(-3) + A4*DLEI3(-4) + A8*DPDF(-3)
+ A9*DPDF(-4) + A26*GAP(-1) + A27*DGAP(-1) + A28*DGAP(-2) + A29*DGAP(-
3) + A30*DGAP(-4)
+ A17*DRVOIL(-1) + A18*DRVDOIL + A20*DREV + A22*DRE0(-1)
+ A25*(LEB(-1) - B1*LPD(-1) - B2*LPF(-1));
PARAM A0-A30 B1 , 1.75 , B2, -1.49; SMPL 1965 1990;
FRML EB1 B1 + B2;
FRML EB2 B1 -1;
FRML EB3 B2 + 1;
LSQ(TOL=.001, MAXIT=100)EB;
ANALYZ EB1;
ANALYZ EB2;
ANALYZ EB3;
OLSQ DLEB C DLEB(-1) DLEB(-3) DLEB(-4) DPDF(-3) DPDF(-4) LOXP(-1) DLOXP
DREV DRE0(-1) LEB(-1) LPD(-1) LPF(-1);
END;
****?NAME M1133.TSP
FREQ A; SMPL 1960 1990;
IN YTPO;
REGOPT(PVPRINT, STARS, LMLAGS=4, QLAGS =4, NOSHORT) ALL;
DLOXP=LOXP-LOXP(-1); DWR=DUM2; DWROIL=DWR*LOXP;
DWRDOIL=DWR*DLOXP; DREV=DUM1;
DRVOIL=DREV*LOXP; VINV =LM-LPD-LGDP; DLM=LM-LM(-1); DLPD=LPD-LPD(-1);
DRVDOIL=DREV*DLOXP; DDEF=DEF-DEF(-1); DDP=DLPD-DLPD(-1); DLEO=LEO-
LE0(-1);REB=LEB+LPF-LPD; DLOP=LOP-LOP(-1);
FRML RM DLRM = AO + A7*LOXP(-1) + Al l*DREV + A20*(LRM(-1) - B1*LGDP(-1))
PARAM AO-A25 Bl, 1.00; SMPL 1962 1990;
FRML RM1 B1 - 1;
LSQ(TOL=.001, MAXIT=100) RM ;
ANALYZ RM1;
OLSQ DLRM C LOXP(-1) LRM(-1) LGDP(-1) DREV;
FRML M DLM = AO + Al *DLOXP + A2*DL0XP(-1) + A3*DLOP + A4*DL0P(-1) +
A5*DRVDOIL +
A6*DRVDOIL(-1) + Al l*DREV + A20*(LRM(-1) - .851*LGDP(-1) - .18*L0XP(-1))
PARAM A0-A25 Bl, 1.00, B2; SMPL 1962 1990;
FRML M1 B1 - 1;
LSQ(TOL=.001, MAXIT=100) M;
?ANALYZ Ml;
? final model for above model
FRML M DLM = AO + A3*DLOP + Al l*DREV + A20*(LRM(-1) - .851*LGDP(-1) -
.18*LOXP(-1))
PARAM A0-A25 Bl, 1.00, B2; SMPL 1962 1990;
FRML M1 B1 - 1;
LSQ(TOL=.001, MAXIT=100) M;
?ANALYZ Ml;
? long-run expression for money eq. taken from the first LSQ.
ECM1=LRM-.851*LGDP-.18*LOXP;
OLSQ DLPD C DLPD(-1) DLPD(-2) DLGDP(-1) DLGDP(-2) DLRM(-1) DLRM(-2)
DLE0(-1) DLE0(-2) DLEB(-1) DLEB(-2) ECM1(-1) REB(-1) DLOXP DLOXP(-1);
? final model for above eq. WITH intercept.
OLSQ DLPD C DLPD(-1) DLRM(-1) DLE0(-1) ECM1(-1) REB(-1) DLOXP(-1);
? final model for above eq. WITHOUT intercept.
OLSQ DLPD DLPD(-1) DLRM(-1) DLE0(-1) ECM1(-1) REB(-1) DLOXP(-1);
? above eq. without REB(-1).
OLSQ DLPD DLPD(-1) DLRM(-1) DLE0(-1) ECM1 (-1) DLOXP(-1);
END;
***?NAME N0ILY92320.TSP ? modelling non-oil gdp
FREQ A; SMPL 1960 1990;
IN YTPO;
TREND T;
NNOILY=NGDP-OXP; ?nominal non-oil gdp = nominal gdp-nomianl oil exports.
RNOLY=(NNOILY/CP1)*100; ? real non-oil gdp = nominal non-oil gdp/consumer price
In.
PLOT RNOLY;
LRNOY=LOG(RNOLY);PLOT LRNOY;
SMPL 1960 1977;
T2=T*T;
OLSQ LRNOY C T;
OLSQ LRNOY C T2;
GENR GAP1=@RES;
SMPL 1978 1990;
T2=T*T;
GENR LYP = 4.0653 + .00622795*T2;
PLOT LYP;
GENR GAP2 = LRNOY - LYP;
SMPL 1960 1977; GAP=GAP1; SMPL 1978 1990; GAP=GAP2;
SMPL 1960 1990; PLOT LRNOY,A,LYP,F; PLOT GAP;
? see gdp4.tsp for using in this file.
TREND T;
SMPL 1960 1974;
Ti =T;
SMPL 1975 1990;
Ti =T1(-1) + .1; ?trend in 1974.
SMPL 1960 1990; PRINT Ti; PLOT Ti;
PLOTS; OLSQ LRNOY C Ti;
DV =@RES;
TREND T;
SMPL 1960 1990;
DRT=DREV*T;
OLSQ LRNOY C T DRT DREV;
GAP=@RES;
DLOXP=LOXP-LOXP(-1); DWR=DUM2; DWROIL=DWR*LOXP;
DWRDOIL= DWR*DLOXP; DREV=DUM1;
PRE=LEB-LEO; REO=LEO+LPF-LPD; DREO=REO-RE0(-1); DRVOIL=DREV*LOXP;
DRVDOIL=DREV*DLOXP; DPDF=DLPD-DLPF; DPF=LPD-LPF;
DLRNOY =LRNOY-LRNOY(-1);
REGOPT(PVPRINT, STARS, LMLAGS =4, QLAGS =4, NOSHORT) ALL;
FRML NOILY DLRNOY = AO + Al *DLRNOY(-1) + A2*DLRN0Y(-2) + A3*DLRM(-1) +
A4*DLRM(-2) + A5*DLREB(-1) + A6*DLREB(-2) + A7*DLOXP + A8*DLOXP(-1) +
A9*LOXP(-1) + Al 0*DRVDOIL + Al 1 *DRVDOIL(-1) + Al2*DRVOIL(-1) +
Al 3*DREV(-1) + A20*LREB(-1) + A25*(LRM(-1)-LRN0Y(-1));
PARAM AO-A25; SMPL 1963 1990;
LSCI(TOL = .001, MAXIT =100) NOILY;
SMPL 1960 1990;
OLSQ DLRNOY C LPD(-1) LOXP(-1) GAP GAP(-1);
END;
NAME DP110.TSP
FREQ A; SMPL 1960 1990;
IN YTPO;
REGOPT(PVPRINT, STARS, LMLAGS=4, QLAGS=4, NOSHORT) ALL;
DLOXP=LOXP-LOXP(-1); DWR=DUM2; DWROIL=DWR*LOXP;
DWRDOIL = DWR*DLOXP; DREV = DUM1;
DRVOIL=DREV*LOXP; VINV =LM-LPD-LGDP; DLM=LM-LM(-1); DLPD=LPD-LPD(-1);
DRVDOIL=DREV*DLOXP; DDEF=DEF-DEF(-1);
FRML P DLPD = AO + A1*DLM(-1) + A2*DLM(-2) + A3*DLPD(-1) + A4*DLPD(-2) +
A5*DLGDP(-1) + A6*DLGDP(-2) + A7*L0XP(-1) + A8*DLOXP(-1) + A9*DRVOIL(-1)
+
A10*DRVDOIL(-1) +
Al l*DREV + A20*(LM(-1) - Bl*LPD(-1) - B2*LGDP(-1))
PARAM A0-A25 Bl, 1.00, B2, 1.00 ; SMPL 1963 1990;
FRML M1 B1 - 1
FRML M2 B2 -1;
?FRML EB3 B2 + 1;
LSQ(TOL=.001, MAXIT=100) P;
ANALYZ Ml;
ANALYZ M2;
?ANALYZ EB3; SMPL 1960 1990;
OLSQ DLPD C DLM(-1) DLM(-2) DLPD(-1) DLPD(-2) DLGDP(-1) DLGDP(-2)
LOXP(-1) DLOXP(-1) VINV(-1) LPD(-1) DREV;
END;
NAME DP15.TSP
FREQ A; SMPL 1960 1990;
IN YTPO;
REGOPT(PVPRINT, STARS, LMLAGS =4, QLAGS =4, NOSHORT) ALL;
DLOXP=LOXP-LOXP(-1); DWR=DUM2; DWROIL=DWR*LOXP;
DWRDOIL=DWR*DLOXP; DREV=DUM1;
DRVOIL=DREV*LOXP; VINV =LM-LPD-LGDP; DLM=LM-LM(-1); DLPD=LPD-LPD(-1);
DRVDOIL = DREV*DLOXP; DDEF = DEF-DEF(-1); LREB = LEB + LPF-LPD;
FRML P DLPD = AO + A1*DLM(-1) + A2*DLM(-2) + A3*DLPD(-1) + A4*DLPD(-2) +
A5*DLGDP(-1) + A6*DLGDP(-2) + A7*LOXP(-1) + A8*DLOXP(-1) +
All*DREV + A20*(LEB(-1) - LPD(-1) + LPF(-1)) + A21*LPD(-1)
PARAM A0-A25 B1 , 1.00; SMPL 1963 1990;
?FRML M1 B1 - 1
?FRML EB2 B1 - 1;
?FRML EB3 B2 + 1;
LSQ(TOL= .001, MAXIT= 100) P;
?ANALYZ Ml;
?ANALYZ EB2;
?ANALYZ EB3; SMPL 1960 1990;
OLSQ DLPD C DLM(-1) DLM(-2) DLPD(-1) DLPD(-2) DLGDP(-1) DLGDP(-2)
LOXP(-1) DLOXP(-1) LREB(-1) LPD(-1) DREV;
END;
NAME DP176.TSP
FREQ A; SMPL 1960 1990;
IN YTPO;
REGOPT(PVPRINT, STARS, LMLAGS=4, QLAGS=4, NOSHORT) ALL;
DLOXP=LOXP-LOX13 (-1); DWR=DUM2; DWROIL=DWR*LOXP;
DWRDOIL=DWR*DLOXP; DREV=DUM1;
DRVOIL=DREV*LOXP; VINV=LM-LPD-LGDP; DLM=LM-LM(-1); DLPD=LPD-LPD(-1);
DLPF=LPF-LPF(-1); LREB=LEB+LPF-LPD; LEQTRM=LREB-0.18*DRVOIL;
DRQTRM =DREV*LEQTRM; DRVNV=DREV*VINV;
DRVDOIL=DREV*DLOXP; DDEF=DEF-DEF(-1); DPDF=DLPD-DLPF; DLEO=LEO-LE0(-
1);
FRML P DLPD = AO + A3*DLE0(-1) + A4*DLE0(-2) + A8*DLOXP(-1) +
A10*DRVDOIL(-1) +
A13*DLPF(-2) + A21*VINV(-1)
PARAM A0-A25 B1, 1.00; SMPL 1963 1990;
?FRML M1 B1 - 1;
?FRML EB2 B1 - 1;
?FRML EB3 B2 + 1;
LSQ(TOL=.001, MAXIT=100) P;
?ANALYZ Ml;
?ANALYZ EB2;
?ANALYZ EB3; SMPL 1960 1990;
OLSQ DPDF C DPDF(-1) DPDF(-2) DLE0(-1) DLE0(-2) DLEB(-1) DLEB(-2)
LOXP(-1) DLOXP(-1) DREV LEQTRM(-1)
END;
M1170.TSP
FREQ A; SMPL 1960 1990;
IN YTPO;
REGOPT(PVPRINT, STARS, LMLAGS=4, QLAGS=4, NOSHORT) ALL;
DLOXP=LOXP-LOXP(-1); DWR=DUM2; DWROIL=DWR*LOXP;
DWRDOIL=DWR*DLOXP; DREV=DUM1;
DRVOIL=DREV*LOXP; VINV=LM-LPD-LGDP; DLM=LM-LM(-1); DLPD=LPD-LPD(-1);
DRVDOIL=DREV*DLOXP; DDEF=DEF-DEF(-1);
FRML M DLM = AO + A1*DLM(-1) + A2*DLM(-2) + A3*DLPD(-1) + A4*DLPD(-2) +
A5*DLGDP(-1) + A6*DLGDP(-2) + A7*L0X13 (-1) + A8*DLOXP(-1) + A9*DRVOIL(-1)
+
A10*DRVDOIL(1) + A11*DEF(-1) +Al2*DDEF(-1) + A13*DREV +
A20*(LM(-1) - B1*LPD(-1) - B2*LGDP(-1))
PARAM A0-A25 B1 , 1.00, B2; SMPL 1963 1990;
FRML M1 B1 - 1;
FRML M2 B2 -1;
?FRML EB3 B2 + 1;
LSQ(TOL= .001, MAXIT=100) M;
ANALYZ Ml;
ANALYZ M2;
?ANALYZ EB3; SMPL 1960 1990;
OLSQ DLM C DLGDP(-1) LOXP(-1) VINV(-1)
END;
***?NAME NOILY9921.TSP ? modelling non-oil gdp
FREQ A; SMPL 1960 1990;
IN YTPO;
TREND T;
NNOILY=NGDP-OXP; ?nominal non-oil gdp =nominal gdp-nomianl oil exports.
RNOLY=(NNO)LY/CPI)*100; ? real non-oil gdp = nominal non-oil gdp/consumer price
In.
PLOT RNOLY;
LRNOY=LOG(RNOLY);PLOT LRNOY;
SMPL 1960 1977;
T2 =T*T;
OLSQ LRNOY C T;
OLSQ LRNOY C 12;
GENR GAP1=@RES;
SMPL 1978 1990;
T2= T*T;
GENR LYP = 4.0653 + .00622795*12;
PLOT LYP;
GENR GAP2 = LRNOY - LYP;
SMPL 1960 1977; GAP=GAP1; SMPL 1978 1990; GAP=GAP2;
SMPL 1960 1990; PLOT LRNOY,A,LYP,F; PLOT GAP;
? see gdp4.tsp for using in this file.
TREND T;
SMPL 1960 1974;
Ti =1;
SMPL 1975 1990;
Ti =Ti(-i) + .1; ?trend in 1974.
SMPL 1960 1990; PRINT Ti; PLOT Ti;
PLOTS; OLSQ LRNOY C Ti;
DV=@RES;
TREND T;
SMPL 1960 1990;
DRT=DREV*T;
OLSQ LRNOY C T DRT DREV;
GAP =@RES;
DLOXP=LOXP-LOXP(-1); DWR=DUM2; DWROIL=DWR*LOXP;
DWRDOIL=DWR*DLOXP; DREV=DUM1;
PRE=LEB-LEO; REO =LEO +LPF-LPD; REB=LEB+LPF-LPD;DREO=REO-RE0(-1);
DRVOIL=DREV*LOXP;
DRVDOIL=DREV*DLOXP; DPDF=DLPD-DLPF; DPF=LPD-LPF;DRREO=DREV*REO;
DRDREO=DREV*DREO; DREB=REB-REB(-1);DRREB=DREV*REB;
DRDREB=DREV*DREB; DLRNOY=LRNOY-LRNOY(-1);
REGOPT(PVPRINT, STARS, LMLAGS =4, QLAGS =4, NOSHORT) ALL;
FRML NOILY DLRNOY = AO + Al *DLRNOY(-1) + A2*DLRNOY(-2) + A3*DLRM(-1) +
A4*DLRM(-2) + A5*DLREB(-1) + A6*DLREB(-2) + A7*DLOXP + A8*DLOXP(-1) +
A9*LOXP(-1) + AlO*DRVDOIL + A11*DRVD0IL(-1) + Al2*DRVOIL(-1) +
A13*DREV(-1) + A20*LREB(-1) + A25*(LRM(-1)-LRNOY(-1));
PARAM AO-A25; SMPL 1963 1990;
LSQ(TOL= .001, MAXIT=100) NOILY;
SMPL 1960 1990;
OLSQ DLRNOY C DLPD(-2) LM(-1) LPD(-1) GAP GAP(-1);
END;
NAME NOILY502.TSP
FREQ A; SMPL 1960 1990; ?testing short and log-run simult.
IN YTPO;
TREND T;
NNOILY =NGDP-OXP; ?nominal non-oil gdp =nominal gdp-nomianl oil exports.
RNOLY=(NNOILY/CP1)*100; ? real non-oil gdp = nominal non-oil gdp/consumer price
In
PLOT RNOLY;
LRNOY=LOG(RNOLY);PLOT LRNOY;
SMPL 1960 1977;
T2=T*T;
OLSQ LRNOY C T;
OLSQ LRNOY C T2;
GENR GAP1=@RES;
SMPL 1978 1990;
T2=T*T;
GENR LYP = 4.0653 + .00622795*T2;
PLOT LYP;
GENR GAP2 = LRNOY - LYP;
SMPL 1960 1977; GAP=GAP1; SMPL 1978 1990; GAP=GAP2;
SMPL 1960 1990; PLOT LRNOY,A,LYP,F; PLOT GAP;
DLOXP=LOXP-LOXP(-1); DWR=DUM2; DWROIL=DWR*LOXP;
DWRDOIL=DWR*DLOXP; DREV=DUM1;
PRE=LEB-LEO; REO =LEO +LPF-LPD; DREO=REO-RE0(-1); DRVOIL=DREV*LOXP;
DRVDOIL=DREV*DLOXP; DPDF =DLPD-DLPF; DPF =LPD-LPF;
? see gdp4.tsp for using in this file.
TREND T;
SMPL 1960 1990;
DRT=DREV*T;
OLSQ LRNOY C T DRT DREV;
DV =@RES;
DLRNOY=LRNOY-LRNOY(-1);
REGOPT(PVPRINT, STARS, LMLAGS=4, QLAGS=4, NOSHORT) ALL;
FRML NOILY DLRNOY =
Al2*DRVOIL(-1) +
A13*DREV(-1) + A14*DV(-1)
PARAM A0-A20; SMPL 1963 1990;
LSQ(TOL=.001, MAXIT=100) NOILY;
OLSQ DV C DV(-1) LOXP(-1)
END;
NAME NOILY961.TSP
FREQ A; SMPL 1960 1990; ?testing short and log-run simult.
IN YTPO;
TREND T;
NNOILY =NGDP-OXP; ?nominal non-oil gdp =nominal gdp-nomianl oil exports.
RNOLY=(NNOILY/CP1)*100; ? real non-oil gdp = nominal non-oil gdp/consumer price
In.
PLOT RNOLY;
LRNOY=LOG(RNOLY);PLOT LRNOY;
SMPL 1960 1977;
T2=T*T;
OLSQ LRNOY C T;
OLSQ LRNOY C 12;
GENR GAP1=@RES;
SMPL 1978 1990;
T2=T*T;
GENR LYP = 4.0653 + .00622795*T2;
PLOT LYP;
GENR GAP2 = LRNOY - LYP;
SMPL 1960 1977; GAP =GAP1; SMPL 1978 1990; GAP=GAP2;
SMPL 1960 1990; PLOT LRNOY,A,LYP,F; PLOT GAP;
? see gdp4.tsp for using in this file.
TREND T;
SMPL 1960 1974;
Ti =T;
SMPL 1975 1990;
T1 =T1(-1) + .1; ?trend in 1974.
SMPL 1960 1990; PRINT Ti; PLOT Ti;
PLOTS; OLSQ LRNOY C Ti;
DV = @RES;
DLOXP=LOXP-LOXP(-1); DWR=DUM2; DWROIL=DWR*LOXP;
DWRDOIL=DWR*DLOXP; DREV=DUM1;
PRE=LEB-LEO; REO=LEO+LPF-LPD; DREO=REO-RE0(-1); DRVOIL=DREV*LOXP;
DRVDOIL=DREV*DLOXP; DPDF=DLPD-DLPF; DPF=LPD-LPF;
DLRNOY=LRNOY-LRNOY(-1);
REGOPT(PVPRINT, STARS, LMLAGS=4, QLAGS=4, NOSHORT) ALL;
FRML NOILY DLRNOY = AO + Al *DLRNOY(-1) + A2*DLRN0Y(-2) + A3*DLRM(-1) +
A4*DLRM(-2) + A5*DLREB(-1) + A6*DLREB(-2) + A7*DLOXP + A8*DLOXP(-1) +
A9*LOXP(-1) + Al 0*DRVDOIL + Al l*DRVDOIL(-1) + Al2*DRVOIL(-1) +
A13*DREV(-1) + A20*LREB(-1) + A25*(LRM(-1)-LRNOY(-1));
PARAM A0-A25; SMPL 1963 1990;
LSQ(TOL=.001, MAXIT=100) NOILY;
SMPL 1960 1990;
OLSQ DLRNOY C DLPD(-2) DLOXP(-4) LM(-1)
LPD(-1) LGDP(-1) DREV;
END;
